

# **SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust**

Transcript of the Proceedings of the Musgrove  
Conference of the Carter-Brezhnev Project

Musgrove Plantation

St. Simon's Island, GA

May 7-9, 1994

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Final Version  
February 5, 1995



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## MAY 7: MORNING SESSION 1

ROBERT LEGVOLD: Let me begin by saying what a pleasure it is for me to be a part of this undertaking. I cannot think of many conferences that could be more interesting, and potentially more important, than this meeting. Briefly, I would like to make two points about the importance of this meeting from my perspective. First, I believe that the enormous changes that have occurred in international politics and in the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the last several years did not occur overnight. Despite the drama and the intensity of events at the end of the 1980s, I think this has been a long process with various critical stages, one of which was the period that we are talking about at this meeting. And as a result I think it is of more than merely historical interest—merely getting the historical record right for purposes of historians and consumers of history. I think it does have a contemporary significance. I think it is an important part of the legacy that brings us to the present moment.

Second, in terms of understanding that period, I would like to say that, as somebody who has been a consumer of the information that we have—as a university person who cares about this long period of time—my own view is that at this stage, while we have a number of accounts that tell us a good deal about what happened during this period of time—including some important memoirs from those of you around the table—we still do not have very good explanations for why things happened the way they did, especially between the two sides. We may have a better notion of why things happened on the American side than on the Soviet side, but we do not yet have a very good notion of why things happened the way they did *between* the two countries. And if any enterprise can begin to provide a deeper understanding of why things occurred as they did, it should be this process.

Third—and finally—from my point of view, this exchange about this period seems to me important because it was a moment in the post-war era when the hopes of earlier years—the early 1970s—began to go sour, when things began to go wrong. It didn't all happen during this period; it had obviously begun to move in that direction even in the Nixon period and the Ford period. But it continued during this period. When I look at the contemporary U.S.-Russian relationship, I see some similarities. We've been through the period of extraordinary hopes over the last four or five years—not just during the two years of Russian independence.

There may have been illusions at the root of that hope, too, but there are signs now that things may not go as well as we had expected in U.S.-Russian relations. There are signs that we could, to some degree, follow a similar path to that of the 1970s, although in very different circumstances and with a very different shape.

So the problem of understanding why things happened seems to me to be of much more than merely historical interest. Again, I want to say how pleased I am to be a part of the project, and how much I look forward to your exchanges.

And now a few words about detail. First, I want to apologize to you in advance for my rudeness: I will address everyone by their first name, even people that I do not know well personally. I am doing that not because I *want* to be rude, but because I want to dispense with ceremony in order to facilitate the exchange among all of us. Second, when you wish to speak—or when you begin to speak—you need to push the large button on the right of your microphone. When you are not speaking, or when you have finished speaking, make sure that you turn it off, because otherwise it will create interference. As far as the languages are concerned, Russian is on Channel 2, and English is on Channel 1. The volume control is on the left.

Let me say one other thing about the undertaking in general; Jim [Blight] can correct me if I am wrong about this. The objective of this exercise is to get our conversation on the public record, and to introduce these insights to a larger audience. As a result, a transcript of the meeting will be prepared and will be circulated to all of you for your editing or for your adjustments, and then it will be issued to a larger audience. There will also be efforts in the course of the several meetings of this undertaking to publish various parts of it, either as articles, or ultimately perhaps as a book, as happened in the case of the Cuban missile crisis project. But from the beginning we will attempt to communicate what has transpired at this meeting to a broader public.

The agenda is not meant to be constraining, even though it has an order that proceeds chronologically through the period that we are looking at. Our opening session this morning until the coffee break at 10:45 is devoted to the transition from President Carter's election until the actual beginning of the administration in January 1977, looking primarily at the early planning; and then we turn in the second session this morning to look at least in general terms

at the preparation for the important visit of Secretary of State Vance to Moscow in March of 1977. But we understand that the conversation would be most profitable if it has a life of its own. In terms of procedure, I am not going to set formal time limits on people when they speak; but I hope that all of us at the table will recognize that there are a number of people with important things to say, and that we will bear that in mind. In order to have a coherent conversation, I will try as much as I can to recognize people who are commenting on the immediate point under discussion, which may mean that, as a queue forms, I will put off calling upon some of you on the list if you are not speaking to the immediate point. At conferences in the United States we often use a system for signaling a request to break the queue, or to move up on the list to comment on an immediate point. I am not going to use that system at the outset; I am going to see if I can recognize enough of what you mean by your body language so that we don't have to go through that formality. If I'm not good at that and it doesn't work, then we will change it for the second session this morning. But that's the way I would like to proceed at this point, so that we don't constrain things too much in terms of procedure.

Finally, then, we are ready to begin. We will start this session, and most others, with a set of challenges, provocations, or questions to each side. Mark Garrison on the American side, and Sergei Tarasenko on the Russian side, will open with very brief opening challenges of five minutes each. I turn to Mark Garrison first, and then we will hear from Sergei.

**MARK GARRISON:** I see this first session as an opportunity to review where each side was coming from at the time President Carter took office in 1977. Of course, the new administration could not have been expected to have its policies in place already, but the basic perspectives of the new president and his advisers are obviously the starting point for what followed. It will be useful to us to have a baseline to work from that will evolve and be enriched as the sessions go on.

With respect to the materials you all have before you, let me draw to your attention the fact that among the documents newly available to us are the papers of Averell Harriman, who served as Carter's channel to the Soviets before the inauguration. In the briefing book, we also have declassified U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet military capabilities that were

available to the new administration, as well as the famous “Team B” estimate of Soviet intentions.

Sergei Tarasenko and I have been given the role of asking questions in order to “prime the pump,” if you will, to stimulate your own questions and your interactions with each other in pursuit of new insights. So, for my part I would like to invite the Americans at the table to recall the views that they had—and that President Carter held—around January 1977 with respect to the importance that you attached to trying to change Soviet policies, whether in Europe, or in the Third World, or at home—for example, on human rights; and also to recall how those aims of trying to change the Soviets stacked up against nuclear arms control negotiations. In other words, what did you see as the highest priority? That, of course, is going to raise the question of President Carter’s own reluctance to set priorities, growing out of his optimism that all was possible. In addition, would any of you now see merit in Georgy Kornienko’s assertion that the Harriman channel led the Soviet side to believe that Carter would stick to the terms of the Vladivostok Accords, and thus that this magnified the Soviets’ shock when that turned out not to be the case?

Sergei, of course, will have questions regarding Moscow’s views at that time; but I’d also like to add the hope that the Russian participants will try to give us a sense of what the concerns were that preoccupied Soviet leaders—whether they be domestic problems, Eastern Europe, China, or whatever. With that, I turn it over to Sergei.

**SERGEI TARASENKO:** I think it is important now to touch upon some psychological aspects of our relationship at that time. It was a situation when, on our side, there was a team that had been involved in that process for at least ten years. [Leonid] Brezhnev had been in his position and had been dealing with these questions all along. On the American side, a new president came to office, a new team came to office. How did this affect the psychological climate? How did this affect perceptions on both sides? It seems to me that what we had here was an unsynchronized process, or a process taking place at two different levels. I would be very interested to know whether the American side took that psychological factor into consideration—the fact that it had to deal with a very old and experienced leadership, an established leadership. And when the American side embarked on its new approach, so to

speak, how much had those factors been considered?

The second question I would like to address to my colleagues. It always interested me very much. The decision-making processes in the United States and the Soviet Union were completely different. We did not have any public opinion polls; we did not have any public discussions of disarmament, or of strategic negotiations. I have always found it fascinating that no more than ten or twelve people were involved in the process. And they were able to move that process ahead. I talked with [Georgy] Kornienko about it before I came here: “Who was the person, or what were the forces, that favored disarmament?” I asked him. “Who was in favor of it?” And he said that they never had any formal papers—they never wrote any formal documents—detailing our doctrine, or stating our policy. [Andrei] Gromyko was interested in the disarmament process for foreign policy reasons; but Kornienko said that, in his opinion, the main moving force behind that process was Brezhnev himself, who carried with him since World War II a certain emotional attitude towards these problems.

Therefore, I have two questions: a question about psychology, as to how much the American side took the differences that I mentioned above into consideration—the generational differences; and on our side, how we defined our interests—to what extent the Soviet side was interested in genuine disarmament. I will not be revealing any secrets when I say that the first directive for our negotiators in the strategic disarmament negotiations was very simple: to come to the negotiations, to listen to all the Americans had to say, and to do nothing more.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you both. Now the floor will be open. First, Marshall [Shulman] has a question—to Sergei, I believe.

**MARSHALL SHULMAN:** Yes. Sergei, among the people who did have an interest in the technical aspects of disarmament, were there not some Soviet scientists who were engaged and concerned? My impression from the non-governmental contact we had had was that there were a number of leading scientists who may have been influential in the policy-making process.

**TARASENKO:** I think it is a question that my colleagues who were more involved with the

process could answer better. I observed it as an outsider; I don't know anything about the internal process.

**LEGVOLD:** Would someone on the Russian side care to comment on the role of academics or scientists in the negotiations? Anatoly.

**ANATOLY DOBRYNIN:** Others on our delegation would like to say something on the question of the role of the scientific community, but I would like to say that, as a practical matter, they did not have very much influence. That is the answer to the question. I was involved in the negotiations through the Foreign Ministry; I was an ambassador. We had some really knowledgeable people working on the arms negotiations. They wrote their papers; they sent these papers to the Central Committee; but practically nobody read them. If something technical came to the Foreign Ministry marked "Top Secret," Gromyko would get it, but I doubt that he would have read it; he would give it to his deputies. Unfortunately, the scientific community, from the very beginning, was not very much involved in the practical work of negotiations. They were involved intellectually; they were following what was going on; they came to Foreign Ministry for information, using friendly ties—not official, but friendly—and said, "Please tell us what is happening." Georgy Arbatov, for example, was the head of our most important institute in Soviet-American relations. But when he came here to Washington, he used to come to me and ask, "What is our position?" When he went to the American side, he went as a representative from Moscow. But he cannot have known what was really going on there.

**SHULMAN:** What about Nikolai Petrovich Kapitsa?

**DOBRYNIN:** Well; the experts knew what was going on to some extent. They had their sources. But it was our mistake not to involve them more actively. We didn't ask them to participate in preparing the papers. They knew nothing about our negotiating position, our preparations, or our delegation's instructions. Nothing. If you asked them whether they had their own ideas, or if you asked them their opinions, they would answer you; but as to what our actual position was, or how it was prepared, they did not know. They participated, in a

way, by sending papers, and they tried to say things orally to influence some members of the delegation or other high officials—people such as [Yuri] Andropov, for example, or maybe Gromyko. But that was all. They were not really invited to the crucial discussions. As Sergei Tarasenko mentioned, ten or twelve people made the decisions. They never were among those ten or twelve people who participated in the practical preparation, in preparing the crucial directives for our negotiators. None of them did. It was really prohibited to show the telegrams; there was a law, really—unofficially, at least. You couldn't show any telegrams to any of our scientific people. Only to that group of ten or twelve men. While talking with us on a friendly basis, they would criticize certain aspects of our policy. This was useful to us as background. But, unfortunately, we didn't make good use of the intellectual potential that we had for the practical work of formulating our positions.

LEGVOLD: Harold [Brown] is on this, and then Cy [Vance] is next.

HAROLD BROWN: The U.S. scientific and intellectual community, of course, both contributed to the general atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations by writing publicly and by using private channels to people in the government, and by coming up with very specific proposals. They, of course, had access to officials, and a general understanding of forces on both sides, strategic forces. It is my impression that Anatoly is right that the Soviet side's intellectuals were not in a position, in general, even to know what the characteristics of the Soviet systems were. And, in fact, during SALT I it was unclear even how much Foreign Ministry officials knew about that. [Laughter on the Russian side.]

DOBRYNIN: We found it out from you. [Laughter.]

BROWN: Yes. So there was a very considerable asymmetry there. So far, however, neither here nor in the documentation has there been much mention of another element on the Soviet side which, I assume, had a substantial input into the deliberations and even in the negotiations indirectly: the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense. I assume—well, I *know* they had a lot to do with it, but not much of it comes through in the documentation, and it

would be very helpful to have more information about that.

DOBRYNIN: It's quite simple. They affected things the wrong way. [Laughter.]

LEGVOLD: I'm going to come to Nikolai [Detinov] in a moment, because I think he'll say some things about Harold's question, but Cy is next on my list.

VANCE: Thank you very much, Bob. I'd like to shift a bit for a moment, and give a few brief opening remarks. Before doing that I want to say how very pleased I am to be a participant in these discussions, and to express my deep appreciation to Smith Bagley and all the others who labored so carefully in arranging such a congenial setting for these meetings.

Let me start up by saying, as has previously been indicated in the materials which had been put before us before we gathered here, that the task that we are undertaking in this series of meetings is to seek to understand why relations soured between the United States and the USSR during the period 1977-1981. For this conference, our assigned task, as I understand it, is to analyze the course of our efforts to bring nuclear weapons under more rational control. The spirit that would drive our discussions is not, in my judgment, to prove who was right or who was wrong. Clearly, none of us can claim to have been wholly right or to assign blame to our failure to have been more successful in our efforts. But rather, our task is to improve our understanding of why things happened the way that they did in light of the information which is now available to us, and with the benefit of retrospective hindsight and insight.

Perhaps the most important lesson, I think, which emerges from a study of the documents which have been made available to us is how deeply events were influenced by the interaction between the domestic political situation in the two countries, of which we had only limited awareness at that time. A word about some background factors. On the U.S. side, it's apparent in retrospect, I would submit, that an important factor was the rising conservative tide in American politics which limited our freedom of maneuver in the negotiations on the control of nuclear weapons, and which foreshadowed the difficulty of ratifying a SALT treaty. On the Soviet side, it appears that an important factor was that this period coincided with the declining

years of an aging and an increasingly immobilized political leadership. On the international plane, the turbulence of international politics—including the collapse of the colonial empires in Africa, in Southern Asia, and elsewhere—created new opportunities for exploitation and competition, which repeatedly, I submit, interfered with efforts to stabilize political relations between the United States and the USSR.

Now, a brief word on some factors relating to nuclear weapons. The SALT II negotiations came on the heels of a period in which the Soviet Union, through great effort, had achieved strategic parity with the United States. This made the negotiations acceptable to the Soviet side, but it created a new set of apprehensions on the U.S. side. The SALT process was complicated by a number of complex factors. These factors included the asymmetry of the force structures of the two sides, which complicated the problems of determining with precision what “parity” meant in practice, and determining the equitability of measures to constrain non-comparable weapons systems. In particular, the reliance of the Soviet Union on large MIRVed missiles created an apprehension on the U.S. side of the potential vulnerability of its land-based missiles to a disabling first strike attack. This, therefore, led us to emphasize as a major objective the reduction in the number of Soviet MIRVed heavy missiles. From the Soviet point of view this bore inequitably upon its main strategic capability. But beyond this basic technical problem, what proved to be more troublesome were the sharp differences in expectations with which the parties approached the opening negotiations. In the period leading up to the negotiations the Secretary General made it clear that he expected to pick up negotiations where they had been left off in Vladivostok. From President Carter’s point of view, he wanted an early agreement, but he was increasingly concerned that more substantial reductions were required than had been allowed for in Vladivostok. Therefore, in retrospect, it seems clear that the two sides did not allow themselves sufficient time to talk out these critical differences in expectations, and I think this is a very important factor. Thank you, Bob.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Cy. I think it was very helpful general comment, and it concludes with a further challenge to both sides that follows up on Mark’s original point on the American side. Judging from his reaction, Viktor [Sukhodrev] has something to say about the domestic point that you were making at the outset, Cy. I’m going to turn to him. We’ve also opened this other issue: Harold’s question about the role of the General Staff and the military in the

preparation and conduct of the arms negotiations, and Nikolai will respond to that. But first I'm going to turn to Viktor in response to Cy.

VIKTOR SUKHODREV: Thank you. I want to pick up on what Sergei said about the very narrow circle of people who were really dealing with these matters on a day-to-day basis on the Soviet side, and particularly what he said about Brezhnev himself as a person at the core of that—his wartime experience, his lack of formal education, and yet his great emotional involvement in the whole process of détente and disarmament. I want to turn specifically to the MemCon of Harriman's talk with him on June 4, 1974, when the outcome of the American election was still not clear. [Questions from other participants about the exact date of the meeting.] June 4, 1974—Section IV, page 306 in your notebooks. This is June 4, 1974, and I feel that is why it is important. Nixon was still president, and Nixon's final visit was still to come. But Harriman was there to talk about what could come in the post-Nixon period. And there Brezhnev made a remark which those of you who read the MemCons may remember—a remark which he was to make over and over again. Perhaps most Americans did not realize. I quote: "the importance of those first few minutes of conversation with Nixon in 1972 which had had a decisive effect." What was that conversation? This was 1972, the first Nixon visit. It was the conversation that appeared in none of the programs of that visit. It was not scheduled. Two or three minutes after the arrival of Nixon at the Kremlin, where he was to stay, he was approached, through me, with a suggestion, which I had not known about—maybe Anatoly had, but only shortly before that—that they have a non-scheduled meeting: Brezhnev and Nixon, one on one. Nixon could bring an interpreter, if he so desired. Nixon did not so desire, and said he would settle for me alone. Now, why was this unscheduled? Why did nobody know about it? Because, officially, according to the directives—and this went for succeeding talks as well—the Politburo had decided that three people would conduct the negotiations on the Soviet side. This was the troika: Brezhnev, [Nikolai] Podgorny, and [Aleksei] Kosygin. Podgorny and Kosygin had no idea that Brezhnev was going to come out with the suggestion that they meet one on one, because it went against the Politburo decisions. But it was a reflection of the internal competition. I deliberately do not use the word "struggle" for preeminence in the Politburo in this case; that, too, is important. Now, this

conversation was totally unprepared. There were just three people in the room at the Kremlin. Nixon walked over from his residence to the Kremlin, and there were just three people in the room: the two principals and myself. Brezhnev had a piece of paper, Nixon had nothing. May I say, Anatoly, that this caused a furor among the foreign policy people. Nixon bore the brunt of this. Henry Kissinger was absolutely furious.

DOBRYNIN: He tried to get notes from you, right?

SUKHODREV: He did. Ultimately he did. There is one MemCon in the archives of the American State Department, or the White House, or wherever, which was written by a Soviet diplomat: myself.

DOBRYNIN: I think we don't have it in Russian.

SUKHODREV: They have to.

DOBRYNIN: No, they don't.

SUKHODREV: Well, anyway; now, what was that conversation about? It set the tone, and Brezhnev referred to it again, and again, and again. I repeat; I don't know where that MemCon is. It would be interesting for subsequent discussion to get it. Maybe it's no big deal. There was nothing specifically about strategic arms—no numbers, nothing. It's significance is purely psychological. Nixon did indeed say what Brezhnev says that he said, although in different words perhaps: "Let's leave systems aside, and let's talk about how to improve our relationship." That left upon Brezhnev a lasting impression.

Podgorny and Kosygin were furious, partly because it held up the official banquet for about 45 minutes while they were talking. They were also furious because it was a pure violation of the Politburo directive. Nobody knew about it. [First name?] Alexandrov told me: "Go to Nixon before he comes in, go up to his quarters, and ask him whether he wants to meet with Brezhnev right now, one on one." They did. I think that that is important background, and a

backdrop to those conversations, and to all of those that were then held. Brezhnev returned to it over and over again, just as he did to the story which Harriman recounts in this MemCon, and which I am sure is included in many other MemCons. I called it the Sermon on the Mount—where he tells about his father and how his father told him what should be done to those who wage wars. Harriman recounts this in detail. Brezhnev would return to this in conversations with Kissinger, I am sure with Cy, and with many many other people. I knew it by heart. I used to take notes as well as translate, and when I came to that story, I would just put in my notebook, “Sermon on the Mount.” [Laughter.] I would wait patiently for him to finish, because it was a long story, and then I would just go into it from memory. I think that that is important because Brezhnev was at the center of the whole debate on strategic arms. He was deeply personally involved. His personal involvement helps to explain why he was so disappointed. He felt that all he had done at Vladivostok was being completely overturned. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Viktor. Nikolai, then Viktor [Starodubov].

DOBRYNIN: May I say something?

LEGVOLD: Okay, if it's on this point; very briefly, Anatoly.

DOBRYNIN: Just to add two things to what Viktor said. Yes, Brezhnev was very much disappointed at what happened because he felt Vladivostok his was major achievement. More than that, he had had a real struggle over Vladivostok. The Politburo was very badly split. During his stay in Vladivostok, he called [first name?] Grechko, our Minister of Defense, three times. Grechko was the chief opponent. Finally, Brezhnev said to him very angrily: “Okay, convene a Politburo meeting right away; I will come to Moscow and we will discuss this question.” And then, of course, Grechko didn't really want the trouble of a fight with the General Secretary. He said, “Okay, I accept your judgment, I accept on this one.” So Brezhnev had really reached the limits of the Politburo's willingness to go along on this one, and when Cy came to him with a new proposal, he hated the idea of coming back to the

Politburo and saying, “Look here, they are dissatisfied, we again have to begin from the very beginning.” So the psychological and political climate within Politburo made it very difficult at that particular moment to accept the new figures which you proposed.

**LEGVOLD:** Okay, now, the next person I have is Nikolai [Detinov], and then Viktor Starodubov, and then Sergei Kondrashov.

**NIKOLAI DETINOV:** I would like to say several words about the question which has been raised here—about the mechanism of decision-making concerning SALT negotiations in the Soviet Union. I have to admit that indeed our scientists, our basic research institutes, were not involved in the process of working out any specific positions at the negotiations. Such individuals, and such scientists as Inozemtsev, Arbatov, and several other individuals who had direct access to the Soviet leadership and who had frequent meetings with the leaders—they, of course, had some influence on the general character of U.S.-Soviet relations, and on general political questions, but they did not know concrete details about the strategic armaments limitation negotiations, and that’s why they could not have any meaningful influence on this process.

Immediately after the SALT I negotiations had begun, the Politburo of the Central Committee made a decision to create a special group: the so-called Politburo Commission for Monitoring the Helsinki Negotiations. The Secretary of the Central Committee, Dimitry Fedorovich Ustinov, was appointed to be the chairman of that commission. Later he became the Minister of Defense. The members of this Commission were: A.A. Gromyko, A.A. Grechko (the Defense Minister), Y.V. Andropov, L.V. Smirnov (Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission at that time), and President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences M.V. Keldysh. I have to say that M.V. Keldysh was a member of that Commission for a very short time. After several months he had been relieved of his duties as a member of that Commission. Of course, the members of that Commission discussed general issues of the negotiations with L.I. Brezhnev, on the basis of which they gave instructions for preparing concrete documents. At that time all documents were prepared by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, and the Foreign Ministry. N.V. Ogarkov, who was the First Deputy of the Chief of the General Staff

at that time, was in charge of organizing and overseeing this work in the General Staff. A.A. Gromyko himself, and G.M. Kornienko—and also K.P. Novikov, who was then the head of the International Organizations Department—were the crucial people in the Foreign Ministry who dealt with those questions. Of course, every member of that Politburo Commission, which was later called “the Big Five,” had his own advisors and assistants. Naturally, the individual membership of the Big Five was changing, but it always consisted of representatives of the Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry, KGB of the USSR, the Military-Industrial Commission, and the Secretary of the Central Committee who was in charge of the defense industry. Approximately at the time when the documents were being prepared for the Vladivostok summit of L. I. Brezhnev and President Ford, an interagency working group had been created comprised of representatives of the organizations already represented in the Politburo Commission. G.M. Kornienko represented the Foreign Ministry. M.M. Kozlov, who at that time became the First Deputy of the Chief of General Staff, represented the Defense Ministry. V.G. Mityaev, who was an assistant of Y. V. Andropov, represented the KGB. K.G. Asachiev represented the Military-Industrial Commission. And from the Central Committee’s Department of Defense Industry—N.N. Detinov.

That interagency working group, which was called “The Small five,” or simply, “The Five,” prepared all the materials for further consideration by members of the “Big Five,” and presented them to the Politburo of the Central Committee. I need to mention that this working group was not formalized as to its membership. It worked efficiently, it involved military specialists in its work, it involved scientists—mostly engineers who worked on weapons systems—and diplomats. The members of the Soviet negotiating delegation participated in the work of that group when they were in Moscow between sessions. I have to say that the representatives of the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry always played the major role.

This mechanism enabled us to work out very well-balanced proposals in the sphere of strategic disarmament in general. And also it is very important that the creation of such a collegial approach practically excluded the possibility of any serious opposition to the decisions already made in the Soviet Union. This was because all the institutions that could potentially seriously criticize the decisions had to take part in the decision-making process. This mechanism practically existed until the end of 1991. And when some members of the Big Five

were in the Lefortovo Prison, the Small Five continued for some time to prepare proposals for Gorbachev at the last stage of his tenure as President of the Soviet Union. [Laughter.]

LEGVOLD: Nikolai, that was very helpful; thank you very much. Before turning to Viktor and then to Sergei, I will interrupt and turn to Les [Gelb], because I think you are on this issue, aren't you? [Gelb shakes his head.] Okay, then I'm going to hold you for just a moment. Viktor Starodubov, please.

STARODUBOV: Nikolai Detinov has just said most of what I was going to tell you. I would like to add something. He said that the initial number of members in the Big Five was six—six individuals representing six institutions—and then one left the Commission, and five members remained. Nikolai said that Keldysh, who was one of the original members, did not have any influence. I would like to clarify it a little. Even though Keldysh was a member of that Commission for a short time, he left a lasting trace of his presence. In the Commission, as I think everywhere—as here in America—there existed some internal diplomacy, not only external diplomacy. Leonid Ilych Brezhnev gave Keldysh a lot of respect, and listened to his opinions. And the military sometimes used him in order to get their own points of view through to Brezhnev, sometimes even in opposition to the opinion of their own Defense Minister. Especially that was evident in ABM negotiations issues. I think that if not for Keldysh, the discussions about the ABM treaty would have dragged out for a long time.

There was a great ambivalence about whether to negotiate or not. It was through Keldysh that they succeeded in persuading Leonid Ilych that the ABM question had to be resolved by rejecting the option of building unlimited anti-ballistic missiles defenses. He understood that. So did the General Staff, who also favored the ABM treaty; but Grechko was against it. And the question was finally resolved with the help of Keldysh. This is what I wanted to add.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Viktor. Sergei.

SERGEI KONDRASHOV: If you permit me, I would like to say a couple of words on the topic that we are discussing now, concerning the scientists' participation in the process. There is

one aspect that illustrates the role of the Security Ministry in those questions. There were many cases when either those who took part in designing and engineering a weapon system, or those who took part in working out our negotiating positions, did not dare to report their points of view directly to their superiors. There were many examples of such people reporting to Andropov, either directly or through his staff. They wrote memos, expressed their genuine positions, with a hope that it would, naturally, remain confidential and never become public; but they wanted by all means to report their point of view to the leadership. We processed those memos, of course. Andropov knew about each of them, and when necessary, certain opinions were sent to General Secretary Brezhnev anonymously. It was one important element, because the procedure was widely used. This is the first element.

The second element relates to the situation in the country. I have to tell you that right before the new Carter administration came to office there were several defining elements of the situation in our country. One of the most complex elements, and the one which required constant attention, was the Soviet-Chinese relationship. You know that there was serious bloodshed on our border with China in 1969. The subject of the conflict was, in general, the exact location of the border and the status of 270 islands. The essence of the problem I could characterize in the following words: the border was drawn according to four Russian-Chinese treaties; because of the nature of the relationship that we had with China in the last century, the border line was drawn on the Chinese shore of the rivers defining the border, not in the middle of these rivers. Therefore, the Chinese thought that the border line was not drawn fairly. After those complications and the bloodshed on the Chinese border, the huge mass of Chinese population in the immediate border region represented a major problem for the Soviet leadership. Our side of the border was very scarcely populated. It was a big problem. And at that very moment the American Leadership decided to normalize relations with China. That is why the role of the United States in the further development of Soviet-Chinese relations was one of our biggest problems, and we, naturally, began to monitor what the American side was attempting to do—to normalize relations—very closely and carefully, mainly via Foreign Ministry and Intelligence channels. We understood that it might interfere with our vital interests.

The next element was the fact that in 1975, the Final Act had been signed in Helsinki. We

thought that the Final Act had struck an internal balance: between disarmament and confidence-building measures on the one hand, and the sphere of human rights on the other. And at the same time the Final Act had a political balance to it also: the balance between the interests of the East and the West. And when the Carter administration was preparing to begin its term, the question of how that balance of the Final Act would be preserved in Soviet-American relations became a big problem for our leadership. I have to say that already the first signals through our intelligence channels, and our internal evaluation of the news that certain individuals had been appointed by the administration, indicated to us that that sphere—the human rights sphere—would draw the special attention of the administration. And, of course, it was one of the very important circumstances that forces us to define our own position on those problems. I have to tell you that by allowing the official publication of the Helsinki Final Act in our country, we took a bold step. Naturally, we understood that it would cause a very certain reaction in the country. Indeed, very soon Helsinki groups began to emerge, the dissident movement developed. But it still did not represent the level of concern for our leadership which would have prohibited any further progress in the human rights sphere. Just the opposite. I have to tell you that when the views expressed at the Belgrade meeting were considered by our leadership, Andropov told me (since at the time I was responsible for the “third basket” on our side) that we could go further in the sphere of human rights if there was progress in the disarmament sphere. He told me openly: “Well, you know the situation in the country; you know how much further we could go. If there is progress on disarmament with the Carter administration, you can make necessary decisions. You can make proposals in the sphere of human rights and basic freedoms.”

This is what I wanted to tell you at the outset of our meeting. And, of course, I will add more as our conversation proceeds. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Sergei. Les.

**GELB:** The buffet of anecdotes is so terrific that I am loath to suggest moving in another direction; but let me at least raise the possibility, and maybe the anecdotes can be fitted into this larger purpose.

It strikes me that the way you conceived this first session is the way we ought to be talking in this first session: namely, about how each side saw this enterprise, what the purposes were—our purposes, and your purposes; how we saw your motives, and how you saw our motives. I think you can see from these documents that we probably did not spend a great deal of time talking about our purposes in the SALT negotiations, and that had we spent a great deal of time talking about it, we might not have agreed on what our purposes were. But we certainly spent a great deal of time talking about your purposes and your motives. It was in the forefront of many of our discussions. There were some who felt that from your standpoint these talks had very little to do with disarmament and a lot to do with trying to curtail the development of the American nuclear programs—that, in effect, the negotiations were a political trick to slow down the process of nuclear modernization and to prevent us from taking advantage of our technological superiority; to sow division in the American internal debate; and to create conflicts between the United States and its allies. Some even went further in discussing Soviet motives, and said that really what you were after was to try to create a climate to actually be able to intimidate the United States with the threat of the first strike—a preemptive strike. But we spent a great deal of time talking about these motives, and you must have known this, that this preoccupied us and shaped a good deal of what we proposed and what we did during the course of these years. But could you talk to the question of motives and purposes? And I think our side ought to do so as well.

LEGVOLD: Is there someone who will take Les's challenge on the Russian side? Sergei.

TARASENKO: Again, I talked with Kornienko, I asked him this question specifically. What was our military doctrine? What was the Soviet Union ready to do? What were our basic positions? Of course, he was very cautious in this conversation. He said, "I have never seen any paper, or any document, indicating this." And as far as he had known, there were no documents that would have been presented to the leadership of the Soviet Union outlining the operational military doctrine—how to behave under different circumstances; whether or when to try a first strike, or a retaliatory strike, and so forth. There was nothing like that. He said to me, "As far as I know, our military worked on those questions, and they analyzed them for the future as one would a game of chess—how many of these weapons we needed; how many of

those; how much we would need for such and such a situation. But they never presented their positions to the leadership.” And he told me that once, when Kosygin was still powerful—before he was pushed aside from the leadership—the General Staff attempted to push for a launch-under-attack policy. Kosygin very categorically prohibited even discussing that question. He said that by saying certain things, it would make it more likely that we would be put in a situation where it would be necessary to use nuclear weapons. He said that we could not agree to this. And as Kornienko told me, he had the impression that if there had been a first strike from the U.S. side, then our military would have had to write to the Politburo, saying, “According to our information a strike is being delivered,” and the leadership would have voted on what to do. [Laughter.] He was very straightforward about that.

He also insisted that, as far as the military were concerned, the reference in Brezhnev’s Tula speech to “sufficiency” and all the talk about the Soviet desire to achieve military superiority had no grounds. He had known all the Chiefs of General Staff, like [first name?] Zakharov, [first name?] Kulikov, [Sergei] Akhromeev, [Nikolai] Ogarkov, for a long time, and as he said, they deeply felt that the Soviet Union was substantially inferiority in strategic weapons—in all systems—and that the best they could hope for was to preserve the status quo, and not to fall behind any more. What they wanted to try to do was hold on to the position that had been achieved by the time of, let’s say, 1977. There was no discussion about any superiority, about any accumulation; they did not even dream about that. Because, he said—I am just repeating his words—that the military—the disarmament specialists—clearly perceived a big, a qualitative lag, an inferiority. And in those circumstances the decision to hold START negotiations reflected a desire to prevent the U.S. side from a breakthrough in the military sphere, to secure the position already achieved, to stay in the same ballpark, or at least the same league. This is what he said to me very clearly. I am just repeating what he told me. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Sergei. Now I have three people who want to comment on this. First Harold, then Anatoly, then Marshall. Harold.

**BROWN:** I think it’s a good thing that we are concentrating for the moment on strategic

nuclear weapons and disarmament issues. Later—maybe even next year—we’ll get to the questions of linkage, U.S. views about whether the Soviet Union wanted to take over the world, the interactions between these things, and so forth. But on the strategic weapons issue and the disarmament issue, it is clear from what has been said on both sides that the lack of transparency with respect to the Soviet strategic doctrine was a real problem for the United States.

Now, it is true that if the Soviet side had said, “We are interested only in deterrence,” there would have been Americans who said, “They are lying.” But, at least, there would have been the beginning of a discussion. The separation between Foreign Ministry and General Staff knowledge of—and participation in the formulation of—that doctrine probably contributed to the lack of transparency. On the U.S. side, there was also a problem: there was too much concern among the U.S. political class, and among many journalists and academics—not all of them were in favor of disarmament, as Les Gelb pointed out—about Soviet first-strike capabilities, which were never that great. But, in fact, as the strategic arms negotiations evolved, Soviet concerns about the American qualitative superiority, and American concerns about Soviet quantitative superiority—specifically having to do with heavy missiles and their ability to destroy the U.S. retaliatory capability—resulted in quite different goals on both sides. And it was the tension between the respective goals on the two sides that drove the negotiations, beginning all the way back in 1968 and ’69, recurring periodically, including in 1977. When we get to the point of discussing the specific proposals, I think we should keep this background in mind.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you. Anatoly.

**DOBRYNIN:** I want to add something on this issue. Really, it relates more to what Sergei mentioned. Of course, our military people, as I understood it, had various plans and options for using nuclear weapons—when to use them, how to use them, at what level, and so forth. Very occasionally I would discuss these matters with the military—unofficially—because we had a friendly relationship with some people from our General Staff. But I can tell you this: Foreign Ministry people did not discuss this on a regular basis, and we did not spend even five

minutes on it in discussions with your State Department. Gelb and others talked about first strike capability, first use, no-first-use, nuclear options, and so on. We did not discuss them in the Foreign Ministry. *In the Foreign Ministry*, I emphasize. In the General Staff, they discussed these things. But we never really tried to be involved.

This was very bad, because we didn't know what they were talking about. All we knew about nuclear war we knew from American sources, you see. [Laughter.] I am speaking for myself, and all my friends, including Kornienko. We knew nothing about it. So, it made things much more difficult. Actually, it made things too simple, too: we did not have very elaborate theories underlying our negotiating positions. We did not really discuss the balance of interests, we discussed the balance of weaponry: "How many missiles do we have? Okay, you have more, and we have less, so let's insist until we reach the same level. We will stand without moving." It was too simplified. Simplified, but at the same time it was really very difficult to negotiate with you. You put things in a much broader context than this. This was both a plus for you and a minus. The plus was that you were much more educated in strategic doctrine than we were; the minus was that you were always drawn into details. So when we began to discuss with you, we didn't know whether you were just talking, or trying to impress us. [Laughter.] It was very difficult even to report to Moscow what you were talking about. [Laughter.] When I wrote a telegram, I would always try to communicate enough information to let the Politburo decide whether the Americans were serious or not. But in the discussion it was sometimes really very difficult to know.

It is an open secret—I think somebody mentioned it somewhere; Carter, perhaps—that in the whole history of the Soviet-American discussion, not a single time did the Russians mention a figure with respect to their nuclear arms. They always waited until the Americans offered the figures, and they would say "yes" or "no." Sometimes we would add or subtract, but all the numbers were American. So were the names. I myself did not even know until the very last moment what "SS-18" meant. [Laughter.]

So all of this made our diplomacy very difficult. Maybe that's why our diplomacy was really rather simple. We had very simple diplomacy. We just went forward without paying attention to what you were saying to us. We just repeated the same answers to the same questions. Of course, I am exaggerating. But this did make it very difficult for us to negotiate

constructively—I am speaking about the Soviet diplomats.

I think that you overplayed the importance of hypothetical scenarios. I recall speaking to [Thomas] Watson, who before being appointed ambassador was Chairman of the Advisory Committee. I said, "What is the main lesson that you draw from your experience as Chairman of the Commission?" He said, "One thing I draw, Anatoly, after two years being Chairman of the Commission, is that we couldn't allow the military to handle nuclear war. Because they couldn't handle it as well as a civilian could do it. Because they—the military—know very clearly how many weapons one side could strike with, and how many the other could return, but they avoid answering the question of what would be the result after such a war, and how we deal with the world after the war."

So, let's discuss these things in concrete terms. To summarize—yes, this was situation where none of the Russian diplomats, including top ambassadors, knew what our military doctrine was, except that we were always on the defensive, defending our country. But I never heard what the military doctrine of the Soviet Union was. I don't know, maybe you didn't even know your own doctrine. But I didn't know ours. This made things very complicated and very simple. I didn't know much about the actual military situation—how powerful the missiles were, what the real balance was, whether we could annihilate your capacity with a first strike or not—we just took it all for granted. That's all. I think this might clarify your question a little bit.

**LEGVOLD:** Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** Well, I think it's useful that we have identified that at this early stage one of the fundamental problems of the asymmetry on the two sides was the extent to which those responsible for the negotiations were involved in the discussions of strategic doctrine. I go back to what Sergei said about what Kosygin reported. And I think one further elucidation might be useful from the Soviet side, particularly from those with military experience.

From my point of view, in observing the period from Glasboro, in 1967, when the president sought to argue with Kosygin first about the importance of deterrence, there was a gap between U.S. and Soviet understandings of the role of nuclear weapons. The U.S. always spoke about them as retaliatory. But what the discussion at Glasboro reflected was the

American view that it was important to put the emphasis on deterrence rather than on superiority to achieve a first strike capability. The president was also arguing the disutility of defensive measures—arguing that the measures that the Soviet Union was then contemplating for antiballistic missile defense did not make sense either in doctrinal terms or in practical terms. Kosygin took this message back, and obviously was finding it very difficult to accept at that point.

Now, from the point of view of people in the United States who were trying to follow the developments within the Soviet military from what was published, and from what we read between the lines of the published material, it was clear that the idea of *deterrence*—which by this time was well-embedded in American thought—had no acceptance in the professional military and the General Staff. The interesting thing was that there was some percolation; something went on between that time and the time of the drafting of the Tula speech in early 1978 [someone corrects Shulman: 1977]. That’s right; within a few days after the inauguration. At that point it was clear that what Brezhnev was making an effort to say was, “We do not subscribe to the doctrine of superiority; in effect we accept the notion of sufficiency.” And then there was, of course, a debate in the United States about how to read this, how to understand it—whether to take it at face value, or whether to take it as a bit of *agitprop*, or what. But the publication of that speech and the debates on our side were important.

If you have any light to cast on the significance of the events that led up to the drafting of the Tula speech, I think it would be a very useful contribution to our discussion.

LEGVOLD: Viktor Starodubov.

STARODUBOV: The participants repeatedly emphasized the idea, that only the General Staff—the military—possessed full information about the Soviet military forces, and about the programs, that were under way in the Soviet Union. This was indeed the case. And we sincerely felt sorry for our diplomats, when during the discussions they got into very difficult situations because they did not have that information. This is exactly why I have to tell you about this—because I am here as a representative of the General Staff at that time.

I would like to begin with what Secretary Brown mentioned as our main concern, the idea that the General Staff and the Soviet military were primarily concerned with defending themselves from a *retaliatory* American strike. I want to emphasize *retaliatory*. But this is not true. I have to say with a deep knowledge and conviction that that was not our main task. Our main goal—our main concern was to ensure our own retaliatory strike capability. And in the beginning, when the balance of relative capabilities of the two sides was strongly in the Americans' favor, we did think about launch under attack or launch on warning. We were afraid that the U.S. could just wipe out the small number of strategic forces that we had, and then dictate their conditions to us. That is why we considered the possibility of a launch-under-attack, or a strike immediately after we got a signal about a nuclear attack from the United States. Later, when we had achieved relative parity, we considered only the option of a retaliatory strike. The idea behind it was deterrence, even though on our side this term—"deterrence"—was not used at all for a very long time. But in fact the concept of deterrence existed from the very beginning of the existence of the Soviet strategic forces.

Now I would like to describe to you our general way of thinking which led to those concepts, to those conclusions. Maybe what I will say will be familiar to you, but I will try to present our approach systematically.

First, I would like to say that we were not confident that the United States would not use nuclear weapons first. Maybe even to the contrary, we thought that in certain circumstances the United States could use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. What was this conclusion based on? First, they had already used nuclear weapons in war. I am talking about the two Japanese cities. Then, I have to say—and here Kondrashov can support me—that already at that time—at that early time—we knew about the existence of plans for nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. If you want to refute me, then refute me please. That is why we were persuaded that if a possibility of a nuclear attack existed, we should act as fast as possible, in as short time as possible, to ensure deterrence.

And maybe the U.S. side is still wondering, even at this time, why the Soviet Union has so many different types of missiles. Traditionally—especially early, when missiles were first being designed and built—they were put in the field without even having been tested properly, to provide at least some kind of deterrence at least. Modernization of missiles followed very

quickly. New types were designed very quickly, and the variety of types was the result of that process. And then it became a tradition. And the General Staff insisted not only on getting nuclear weapons as soon as possible, but also ensuring the capability to deliver it to the target, and in a quantity sufficient for a guaranteed deterrence— or, as [Robert] McNamara used to say, deterrence ensured by an unacceptable level of damage.

That was all logical; I don't think I am saying anything new. I am only saying that during all that time we just could not set ourselves the task of delivering a first nuclear strike against the United States. And it follows that we could not therefore be concerned about deterring a *retaliatory* strike of the United States.

In the second half of the 1960s, as you recall, the United States was concerned about the speed with which the Soviet Union was accumulating its nuclear missile potential. Yes, the speed was great; we had been building about 200-250 ICBM launchers a year, and more than 100 SLBM launchers. But everything should be considered in relative terms. I have a chart that I can pass around to all of you indicating that in terms of both launchers and warheads, the line representing U.S. weapons has always been above and to the left of the Soviet line. What does this mean? It means that we have been always several years behind the United States. Logically, we see that those U.S. campaigns under the slogan of "falling behind the Soviet Union" were not grounded in reality.

Finally, it was logical for both countries that at some point the leaders came to the conclusion that it was impossible to continue increasing armaments any longer. The U.S. saw it for their own that the Soviet Union was capable of achieving parity and sustaining it, and that made any further arms race unwinnable. We in the Soviet Union understood it too, but we also understood that for us trying to catch up with the United States would be too costly. That is why we came to the conclusion about the need for negotiating limits on, and later reducing strategic weapons. I would like to conclude on this. Thank you for your attention.

**DOBRYNIN:** Excuse me. I have one question for you [indicating the U.S. side]. Did the United States have plans for a first strike, or not? We were very interested in this at the time. Did the United States have a real plans for first strike—a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union? If so, under what circumstances? I am taking about 1977, the beginning of the Carter

period; or let's say Nixon. As the General just mentioned now, we didn't have first strike intentions, for the reasons he just explained. What about your planning? Please explain.

**BROWN:** Well, the U.S. certainly had no first strike *intentions*. There was—and there is, I suppose, still now; but there certainly was then—a so-called “strategic integrated operational plan” [Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP] that included a very large number of targets in the Soviet Union. Periodically the Joint Chiefs of Staff would go through an exercise: a command post exercise, or a study of what an exchange would look like. Those exchanges always began with a Soviet strike on the United States. I assume that the Soviet General Staff also went through such exercises, and that they always began with an American strike on the Soviet Union. We always evaluated our forces in a retaliatory mode, so there was a strike plan, but—

**DOBRYNIN:** Was it a first strike?

**BROWN:** We never did exercises with the U.S. striking first, although we did calculations as to how the exchange would come out if the U.S. struck first and the Soviet Union retaliated, and *vice versa*. And what we always found was that it didn't really matter who began the war: both sides ended up being destroyed. Our operational planning always assumed that the war would begin with a Soviet strike.

See, our position—and it was very publicly expressed—was that no one could win a thermonuclear war, and that therefore deterring it was important. Deterring it was the central strategic issue. But deterrence depends not on how you think something will come out, but on how the *other* side thinks something will come out—because deterrence is deterrence of the other side. And we didn't know what the Soviet calculations looked like because the Soviet strategic doctrine was not transparent. As I said, we had a strategic operational plan which said which targets would be struck in the Soviet Union under certain circumstances, and there were all sorts of arrangements to withhold strikes against civilian populations, withhold strikes against certain Soviet allies in the Warsaw Pact, and so forth. That's all well known. But we had no plans for a first strike.

**DOBRYNIN:** So, as I understand it, it is rather ironic that during all those years of rivalry between our two countries, the main premise was that neither you nor we intended to have a first strike. If it had been clear from the very beginning, I think many issues could have been solved on the spot.

**BROWN:** I think neither side—well, I cannot speak for the Soviet side; but we were not, within the government, so much concerned about Soviet intentions for a first strike in a peaceful situation—a “bolt-out-of-the-blue” situation. What we were concerned about—what I was concerned about, certainly—was that in a situation of great tension—in Europe, for example, where there might even have been conventional military conflict—the Soviet leadership might misconstrue either American intentions or the balance of strategic forces in such a way as to decide either that there was going to be a nuclear exchange, and that they’d be better off striking first. I was concerned that the Soviet political leadership might hear a convincing briefing from a Soviet military planner saying, “If we, the Soviet Union strike first, we can destroy all the land-based American systems and bombers, and the subsequent imbalance would be so great either that we can limit the damage that the American submarine-launched missiles might do, or else we will be in a better negotiating position.” Now, I must say, I always found this scenario difficult to believe or to imagine; but it was something that had to be considered. There may well have been similar considerations on the Soviet side with respect to us. To repeat, I never felt that we would let the imbalance become such that it would become plausible, but it was the kind of calculation of weapons balance that the U.S. military had to make. That was part of their professional responsibility.

**DOBRYNIN:** Let me add—

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly, I’m going to hold you now.

**DOBRYNIN:** Very quickly.

LEGVOLD: All right, but be very brief, because I got other people on the list.

DOBRYNIN: You've heard what the military just said: that they did not have a first strike capability, or first-strike intentions. So, Harold: did you have them or not? I am not speaking about how you evaluated *our* intentions. Did you have plans for a first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union under certain circumstances or not? Yes or no?

BROWN: We never had any intention of a first strike.

STARODUBOV: A couple of words, to finish this. [Laughter; commotion.]

LEGVOLD: One moment. We are trying to bring some order to the discussion now. There are a number of people who want to speak on this specific point, and there is also a longer list of people who have been waiting to speak. So let me explain what I am going to do. I am going to turn first to Bill Odom and then to Stan Turner, who are next in line for brief comments; and then I am going to turn to Sergei Tarasenko and Viktor Starodubov for brief comments on this issue. Cy also wants to speak on this before we finish.

Now, patiently waiting have been Bob Pastor, Phil Brenner, and Odd Arne [Westad]. I will hold you off just a little longer if you don't mind.

Let me make a further point to people around the table. I notice that the initial discipline in comments is beginning to break down. So I would appreciate it if people would speak succinctly, because we are beginning to lose time in the full elaboration of points. Bill Odom.

WILLIAM ODOM: I will be brief. It seems to me that the last exchange is bringing into play a factor that often was not in play in our development of the SALT positions, but which bore very heavily on the way this developed: and that is the conventional military balance in Europe and what the intentions were in Europe. And I think that in light of what Harold has just been saying, he is reflecting the tensions that we felt about this. I would to like to pose a question to the former Soviet side, and to General Starodubov in particular, which perhaps he can answer later. When Grechko and the General Staff prepared their positions for the SALT

process, or when they reacted to the U.S. positions, to what extent were your weapons programs and capabilities assessed in the light of your war plans for Central Europe? You know, we knew through our intelligence that you had very offensive operational plans. And since then we know from documents that have come out in East Germany that there was very extensive planning for using tactical nuclear weapons by the scores in Central Europe. So I think that factor began to bear on SALT, and it was not factored into our conceptualizations of intercontinental deterrence. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Bill. Stan Turner.

STANSFIELD TURNER: I'd just like to ask General Starodubov whether the General Staff took seriously General [Curtis] LeMay and people like him who did talk about American intentions of a first strike?

LEGVOLD: Sergei Tarasenko.

TARASENKO: I would like to ask a question to our participants. I am just interested in this, as an observer, so to speak. How developed were our procedures for actually using nuclear weapons? I am speaking of all those buttons. Was that realistic or not? I think it is a question which is still very relevant today. Now nobody knows who exactly has access to those buttons in Moscow, and where are they. Was there any procedure for actually using them, or not?

LEGVOLD: Viktor Starodubov.

STARODUBOV: I am glad that I inspired such an animated discussion. Maybe I should start from the middle.

General Odom asked a question about how we took the competition in the military sphere in Europe into consideration when we were preparing our positions for the strategic arms limitations negotiations. Yes, we did take it into consideration. But we took it into

consideration not in the sense that you implied in your question, but in the following sense.

During the SALT negotiations, we clearly saw that in Europe, besides those strategic weapons that the United States had—the classic ones, the triad—there were also the forward-based systems. In addition, there were aircraft carriers with nuclear weapons on board cruising along the European shores, whose goal was to deliver a strike at the targets in the territory of the Soviet Union—in Soviet territory, not at sea. It follows that we had to take these into our consideration, and to evaluate those weapons as an addition to the strategic potential of the United States. And as you recall, this question of the forward-base systems had been constantly raised during the strategic negotiations for a very long time—up until Vladivostok, really. Even there it was not completely dropped from the agenda. It was just postponed until future negotiations. This is it.

Admiral Turner said that I claimed that there were U.S. plans for a first strike, and that we were basing that conclusion on certain statements. No, I assure you, there were no statements.

I would also like to argue with Secretary Brown. To say that in 1947, or 1948, or 1949, the U.S. was developing its nuclear strategy on the basis of expecting a Soviet attack requiring a U.S. response—this view is groundless, because the Soviet Union did not have nuclear weapons at that time, and it could not have attacked the United States. I mean nothing personal, Secretary Brown. But my initial remark, and my statement was based on what our thinking was like, on the basis of our thinking from the very beginning. That is why at that time it was just logical to assume that the United States was preparing a nuclear strike, because we simply did not have nuclear weapons. Thank you.

**KONDRASHOV:** I wanted to add something.

**LEGVOLD:** Just a moment, Sergei; Cy also wanted to comment on this. I will come back to you. Please, be brief, and we will break for coffee. Cy?

**VANCE:** I will be very brief.

In response to the question put by Anatoly: I want to say categorically that, during the time

when I was Secretary of State, we had no intention to ever launch a first strike. And I believe that the same thing was true during the period when I was in the Defense Department.

**BROWN:** It was also true in 1977. [Laughter.]

**STARODUBOV:** Very good.

**LEGVOLD:** Sergei Kondrashov.

**KONDRASHOV:** On the basis, gentlemen, of the information we possessed, we come to the conclusion that there were several periods during which it was possible that there could be a first strike from the American side. We knew that right after the war up until 1949 there was a readiness on the U.S. side for a first strike. I would say there was a readiness. And that's why all of our intelligence resources in different fields were directed to get to know your concrete plans. Then, after the Soviet Union acquired atomic weapons, we understood that you entered the next stage of calculations during which you were considering the possibility of a retaliatory strike on our side. After that time—and again, I wish to stress, on the basis of the information that we had—we came to a conclusion that you were considering two types of wars. One was general strategic war; the other was limited war. And you set before yourself the tasks of preparing for both of these alternatives.

I must say that, with respect to the later stage, as soon as Mr. Andropov came to office in '67, one of our major preoccupations was to organize intelligence activity to assess the progress of your planning with regard to the possibility either of a first strike or of a limited strike. I must tell you that we were basing our contingency plans on the assumption of your readiness to strike. The only problem for us was what political situation would cause your action, and what our steps should be. Certainly we had contingency plans for all sorts of weapons—and that's the point. But from the very beginning, I must emphasize, we were basing our calculations on the possibility of your first strike.

**GELB:** What you mean by "readiness"?

**KONDRASHOV:** I mean the readiness according to the political situation. So we were certainly eager to know what situation in Europe, for instance—a situation over Berlin, or a situation somewhere else—would cause you to strike. That was our main anxiety: to assess the overall political situation and your readiness for a first strike. Because certainly our considerations were purely defensive. We were not considering taking triggering some political situation that would cause you to strike first, and result in retaliatory action on our side.

**LEGVOLD:** I see that Zbig and Marshal would like to comment right now. Nikolai, I know, has more to contribute. I think we are at an important point. Zbig wants to comment on what Sergei just said. But, Zbig, could we hold off until after coffee? We are going to break for thirty minutes. When we come back I'll let you make your point to Sergei immediately, and then I think Nikolai is still on it. This issue will continue. Thirty minutes for coffee.

## **MAY 7: MORNING SESSION 2**

**LEGVOLD:** All right, let us begin again. The question was raised earlier about each side's intention of a first strike. I would like to make a point. There seems to be a little roughness in the way issues are being formulated. When Harold Brown responded to the question about American plans and intentions to launch a first strike, he was speaking about a preemptive first strike. When Anatoly asked the question whether the Americans had the intention to use nuclear weapons, he was speaking in any context. That is, he was asking whether the Americans had plans to use nuclear weapons first—perhaps in the context of a European war in which NATO's conventional defenses faltered. In order to clarify the positions on the two sides, I think, we need to be clear about these distinctions. Zbig, you are next.

**ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI:** That's precisely the point I was going to make. I think I know pretty well what the president's attitude was on this issue. I would put it this way, Anatoly.

Under no circumstances could I envisage the president authorizing a preemptive first strike against the Soviet Union. It was totally contrary to his thinking, to his psychology, to his view of the relationship, or to his sense of responsibility to history. That was simply out of the question. Secondly, the president was skeptical of the notion that the Soviets would ever launch a first strike. We sometimes discussed it; we worried that some of the Soviet strategic dispositions might make the Soviets feel that they could do it. But I have to say that the president was always skeptical about it. And he did not think that this was in any way something to be taken very seriously.

Nonetheless, since the issue did arise, the president had to consider how to respond if there was a Soviet first strike. And he did accept the idea that if there was a Soviet first strike, the United States would respond without waiting to absorb the impact of the first strike under all circumstances. In other words, he was inclined to consider the possibility of responding under attack—or, as it used to be called, on warning. But it was deliberately designated as “under attack,” and he was prepared to do that. We exercised that.

Thirdly, the president was clearly willing to use nuclear weapons if necessary in the defense of Europe, in the event of an overwhelming and progressively successful Soviet conventional attack. We had reasons to believe that Soviet war planning involved the use of nuclear weapons even in the course of a conventional attack in Europe. We did not have full knowledge of Soviet plans for war-waging in Europe then, although we now have a fairly complete knowledge. And they did, in fact, entail the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the course of attack. But in any case, without even being sure of that, the president was prepared to use nuclear weapons, and so stated at the first meeting of the Special Coordination Committee, the summaries of the minutes of which we now have before us today. In the very first session, he indicated that he was prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend our principal allies.

But I would like to use this occasion to also raise the question with the Soviet side of the Soviet response to the initial U.S. proposals regarding arms control. The president came to office deeply convinced that there was no fundamental contradiction between the pursuit of human rights and the pursuit of deeper and more comprehensive arms control. He thought human rights was the general historical tendency in our time, and that the Soviet Union could

not be immune to that process. And indeed, I think, historically, he was in fact correct. But beyond that, he thought that we could do better on arms control because the dynamic of the arms competition was creating a more precarious situation for both sides. Please bear in mind that we came to office at a time in which the détente relationship had somewhat stagnated and there had been no breakthrough in arms control for some time prior to the election of President Carter. When he assumed office, therefore, he seriously contemplated the possibility of using that initial phase of innovation which comes with a new administration to achieve a more comprehensive arms control regime with the Soviet Union. And that is what drove him in that direction. At the very first session we had—again, the summary of minutes is available to you—he stressed that he would like to see that explored, and he stressed very strongly that the purpose of any such initiative would not be to gain any advantage for the United States. He instructed all of us to develop proposals which would take into account a need for a balanced, mutually acceptable set of reductions—and this he said in a private meeting with us; it wasn't for public consumption or designed to reassure the Soviets. He stressed to us that the proposals we make must be equitable to both sides. And that is what motivated the initial American effort to propose deeper cuts.

It was said earlier this morning that the Soviet side was surprised by our proposals, especially because Governor Harriman had indicated to Mr. Brezhnev that we would simply continue with the Vladivostok formula. I have to say to you very frankly that Governor Harriman did not speak for President Carter, and he was not sent as an emissary by him. He was, to put it very frankly, a self-appointed emissary. And of far greater impact on Carter were the views of Mr. [Paul] Nitze, who impressed Carter with the strategic desirability of deep cuts, and who argued that that would be more stabilizing. Carter was fascinated by that idea, and very attracted by it.

Nonetheless, when we did make the proposal to you, we made a proposal to you which had two aspects to it: one did indeed propose deeper cuts, and we advertised that quite a bit—so it couldn't have been quite that much of a surprise to you; but, secondly, we also had a proposal at the same time which was based on the Vladivostok formula, and we specifically said that if the deeper cuts were not immediately acceptable, the other proposal, based on Vladivostok formula—though deferring two issues on which no agreement had been reached, and on which

there had obviously been a different interpretation of what Vladivostok involved—would be an acceptable basis for negotiation. These two issues were the *Backfire* and the cruise missile issue. So I am a little surprised to hear that it was such a surprise for you that we were proposing deep cuts, because you knew that it was coming; and second, it was not the only proposal. We also had a fallback proposal based on the Vladivostok formula, setting aside issues on which we disagreed for further resolution. I wonder why that second proposal was not considered more seriously if, for this or that reason, you could not entertain the more ambitious proposal initially.

LEGVOLD: Zbig, thank you very much. That's very helpful, because it pushes along with the agenda that we have this morning, and I think it's important for us to turn to the questions that you've posed. Before I turn next to Nikolai, who is next on the agenda, let me ask a couple of questions prompted by your point, Zbig.

First, I would like to ask about President Carter's own inclinations, preferences, and drives on the question of nuclear weapons. In his inaugural address, he spoke of a nuclear-free world. To what degree was Carter actually influenced by the desire for eliminating nuclear weapons?

Secondly, early in the administration, as I look at the documents, he did ask you, Harold, in the Department of Defense, to assess the implications of going down to 250 launchers, as I recall—a very low level—and it got a very unsympathetic reception both from the civilians and from the regular line military, as I understand it. What was that all about, and how did that figure in things? Did the Soviet side have some sense of what Carter's commitments either to a nuclear-free world, or a world at very low levels, meant in this context? Nikolai, you're next.

DETINOV: I would like to respond to several questions which have recently been raised. The first question: was there in the Soviet Union a certain system of decision making for the use of nuclear weapons? I have to tell you that, yes, we had such a system, and we have one now. It was sufficiently effective, and it gave a certain confidence that there could not have been any accidental launch without a sanction by the highest leadership. This is the system, and it works nowadays also.

Second, when we were talking about a first strike: I think one should not base one's judgment on intentions that the other side has, but rather on the *capability* to deliver such a strike. If you are talking about capabilities, then at that time the Soviet Union had many reasons to judge some U.S. actions as aimed at securing a capability to use nuclear weapons.

It was mentioned here that at the end of 1940s there were about 1,000 bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons deployed along the borders of the Soviet Union. And at that time you were saying openly in the United States that the United States had a nuclear strike plan for use against the Soviet Union. In the beginning of the 1960s a decision was made in the United States to create 1000 Minutemen and 656 SLBMs. At that time the Soviet Union had only about 200 warheads for ballistic missiles. That decision was perceived in the Soviet Union as a U.S. intention to achieve a capability to deliver a first strike.

Third, there is one more example. When President Reagan announced his SDI program in 1983, the first reaction of our leadership and of our scientists was that the United States wanted to create such an anti-ballistic missile system which would give them a possibility to launch a first strike on the Soviet Union without fear of punishment. Such actions of the United States had a certain impact on the attitude that the Soviet Union had toward proposals that the U.S. administrations had been making at the time at the strategic armaments negotiations.

LEGVOLD: Harold, I have you next.

BROWN: I'd like to make a few points, and perhaps put to bed some of these problems, so that we can talk about what actually happened in 1977.

On President Carter's views on the possible use of U.S. nuclear weapons, I think Zbig has it right: possible tactical use in Europe against an overwhelming conventional force was certainly a part of U.S. military doctrine at that time; and a retaliatory strike—not a preemptive strike—in case of a massive Soviet launch against the United States was also a part of U.S. doctrine. Without going into the technical details, the fact that Soviet submarine-launched and land-launched ballistic missiles would arrive at U.S. bomber bases and U.S. silos at different times in case of a major attack—not simultaneously—meant that a U.S. retaliatory strike could

begin before all of the Soviet warheads had landed on the United States. That, however, is not a preemptive strike; it's a retaliatory strike.

I would note also that in 1977—which is the time that concerns us—the situation that existed either in 1947, or in 1983 or 1984, was not relevant. What was relevant was the situation in 1977, and at that time the Soviet Union had, in its SS-18s, the possibility of attacking U.S. bomber bases and silos, and destroying them, leaving the U.S. only with submarine-launched forces for retaliation. I considered that sufficient as a deterrent force on the part of the U.S., but it certainly would have changed the balance after such a Soviet first strike, and that was responsible for a good many of the specific positions that the U.S. took in the SALT II negotiations as regards reductions, and as regards cruise missiles as well.

With respect to U.S. intentions and presidential intentions, I'd like to conclude with an anecdote of my own. It goes back to 1961 when President Kennedy was President of the United States, and I had just arrived in Washington as a Defense Department official—a rather young one in those days. In May of 1961, I found myself at a National Security Council meeting at which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were also present—General LeMay, to whom Admiral Turner has referred, was present. And the president, who had a great deal of intellectual curiosity, asked, “What would be the result of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union?” He turned to General LeMay for an answer, and he turned for some reason to me for an answer—I guess because he knew that I had been a nuclear weapons developer in earlier days. He asked, “What would be the number of U.S. casualties if the Soviet Union struck first, and what would be the number of U.S. casualties if the United States struck first?” And I think I remember the numbers fairly well. The answer that General LeMay gave—who, as Admiral Turner pointed out, was one of the people who at least in earlier times had contemplated the possibility of a U.S. preemptive strike—said that if the Soviet Union struck first, there would be 60 million U.S. deaths. And the president asked me what would be the number if the U.S. struck first. I said, “Probably 20 or 30 million.” And General LeMay had to agree. And President Kennedy said, “I don't see that there is very much difference. The answer is the same: there must never be a thermonuclear war.” And that, I think, contributed to his view that he could never contemplate a preemptive strike. That has been the attitude of every president since.

To begin to respond to Bob Legvold's question, it has always been the case that every president has come to office and announced that he was going to abolish nuclear weapons—or, at least, that it was his strong intention to do so. President Carter, I think, was the first to put it into his inaugural—

LEGVOLD: Harold, is that true?

BROWN: Yes.

LEGVOLD: A nuclear-free world? Have other presidents argued for that?

BROWN: They've all said that we really ought to try to get rid of nuclear weapons. Reagan, for example.

ODD ARNE WESTAD: But I think he was one who *did* believe—

BROWN: I think they all believed it when they came into office. And then they started to think about the problems—for example, the problems that were embodied in my response to President Carter about two hundred nuclear weapons—I think he said one hundred to two hundred to begin with. I think that that memo said, "The lower the number gets, the bigger these problems get." And therefore most of them have settled for reducing the numbers, rather than eliminating nuclear weapons. But I think they all came into office with the intention of saying, "Let's try to get down as far as we can."

LEGVOLD: Thank you. The next person that I'm going to turn to is Vlad Zubok; but before I do, let me underscore now the questions on the table. I would like people on the Soviet-Russian side to respond to Zbig's questions about the spring of 1977 and the American proposal for comprehensive reductions, particularly the issue of surprise and the attitude toward the proposal for deferral. Now, in turn, on the American side, try to get back to Marshall's original question: what did Americans make of the Tula speech? Did the administration take

that seriously? There is a reference to it—especially the pledge of not seeking superiority—in President Carter’s letter to Brezhnev on February 5th. But did it mean that people in the Carter administration believed that Soviet thinking was evolving to a new stage, and that this was something that was meaningful? Or did you think it was essentially eyewash, and you wanted to deal with it in a constructive way? I ask that question, because I think we then want to try to come back and consider the roots of the Tula speech. What was the Soviet leadership trying to say in January a few days before Carter gave his inaugural speech?

Vlad, you’re next, and then I think I see Bill’s hand. Do I, Bill?

ODOM: No. On the Tula speech, I think you want to hear from Sergei.

LEGVOLD: Okay. Vlad.

VLADISLAV ZUBOK: Well, I believe that the issues of perceptions related to the nuclear balance were important, but not crucial. They were not crucial for the beginning of the Cold War, for the end of the Cold War, or for the continuation of the Cold War. The basic question was trust and mistrust. And every new administration that came to the White House the Soviets looked upon with a mixture of apprehension, suspicion, and hope. Much depended upon the first steps and the first signals, and the mechanism of transmitting those signals—the backchannels. My question is: why did the efforts to establish that channel between President-elect Carter—or Governor Carter before the elections—and Brezhnev ultimately fail? It was with great interest that I learned from Dr. Brzezinski that Averell Harriman couldn’t play a role as such a backchannel, at least in the eyes of some American officials. But who could? There were some self-appointed ambassadors on the Soviet side, too: for example, Georgy Arbatov, as far as we can learn from documents. My question to Anatoly Fedorovich Dobrynin is this: how did the Soviet side understand Arbatov’s efforts to indicate to the Americans that there would be no test of the new president? And a general question to both American and Russian participants: why did the efforts to create the backchannel fail? Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Zbig.

**BRZEZINSKI:** I think you have to understand the political situation that prevailed in the United States in 1976. The new administration came to office quite explicitly rejecting the idea of backchannels, secret negotiations, and so forth. It was made very clear from the very beginning that the negotiations would be conducted by the secretary of state either directly with his counterpart in the Soviet Union, or with Toly [Anatoly Dobrynin]. And I remember that, in fact, when Toly and I talked about the possibility of maintaining the kind of relationship that Toly had with Kissinger, I told Toly that this is not the way that the president wants to operate now; that Cy would be the principal channel, and that that would be the way we would conduct our business.

But beyond that there is this question of the seriousness of the relationship. The issues between us were centrally important, and they were being posed very directly through the official channels. I don't think it's an adequate answer to say that somehow or other the absence of a backchannel explains the difficulty of dealing seriously with the proposals that were being advanced by the U.S. side. And, I repeat, these proposals had two dimensions to them: one was a more ambitious effort to go forward in keeping with the president's faith as well as conviction that we ought to move eventually towards a non-nuclear world; and the second set of proposals was based on Vladivostok—quite deliberately, and if you look at our documents, we prepared them on the basis of Vladivostok, but left aside two issues on which we could not have immediate agreement because we viewed them as unresolved.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly.

**DOBRYNIN:** Zbig, I really think your comment about use or non-use was interesting. I think it clarified several points. About the most recent items discussed, let me say this.

First of all, about Harriman. We knew, of course, that he was the not representative of the president. But at the same time he was an eager beaver who went back and forth between Georgia and Washington, and then said things to us on behalf of the president. Our people took that very seriously. After his reports, our Politburo sat and discussed them. Then I received a telegram saying, "You have to go to Harriman and tell Harriman to go to the

president.” So Harriman was like an official channel. Arbatov was different. Arbatov said he was on his own. That is the difference.

On the second question you raised, about whether were we surprised or not about your proposal. No, we were not surprised; because from the very beginning you were talking about deep cuts. From the very beginning. Comprehensive cuts. Harriman had said that President Carter did not feel specifically obliged to follow everything that was in Vladivostok. This was the first time when people in Moscow said, how come? Why is he not obliged? But he was very clear. He indicated that the president was going to seek deep cuts. When we asked him, “How many?” he said, “Two or maybe three hundred missiles.” It was a big revelation to Moscow.

I spoke with Cy, before he went there, and although you had not at that time fully defined your positions, he made it clear what we could expect. So, in Moscow they knew. I simply want to dispel the impression that you get from some of our colleagues. Maybe some of our colleagues have the impression that there was great surprise, that this proposal came suddenly. But for us it was around for four months. There were many indications from many sources that you wanted to make very big drastic comprehensive reductions. So this was no really revelation for us.

About the second proposal: the second proposal was taken in the context of the overall relationship with you. We did not see these as a first proposal and a second proposal. What actually happened before Cy went to Moscow was that we had a big discussion in our government about what kind of relationship we were going to have with the new administration. Would it be like it was with Nixon, or before Nixon? And we were under the impression that the new administration was coming with the intention—maybe we were wrong—of taking a new course toward us on a whole set of issues. I don’t say that it was a good course or a bad course, but a change of course. It was a change in arms negotiations, the proposal for drastic reductions; it was the new position on human rights. It looked as though at the very beginning of the new administration you were setting a new agenda, an agenda proposed by you—a completely new one, which we didn’t have before. How were we to deal with this?

A decision was taken to begin not with the specifics of Vladivostok—because, after all, while they were important, it was more important to know what kind of course our relationship would

take with the new administration. We had to decide whether we were going to fight these two issues, drastic reductions and human rights, and if so, how.

[UNIDENTIFIED]: Do you mean linkage?

DOBRYNIN: In a way, yes. In a way. Not directly, but in a way. It always happens; sometimes you make it a public linkage, and sometimes you do not say it. So this was the decision. And when Vance came, from the very beginning, when we first saw you [indicating Vance], we felt the proposal for drastic reductions was not a serious approach. I don't say that we were right or wrong, but that was the overall impression. So, the question was really: were we going to do something, prepare something, to find a compromise?

Zubok asked here about the backchannel. I was one of the participants for many years. I don't say that it is something of overriding importance, but it has some importance. Specifically in one sense: it gives you a chance to explain things. It helps provide a preliminary explanation of the position of the other country. It's simple. It doesn't always matter who the channel is; things are decided by the president. But the backchannel helps elaborate on your thinking a little bit. Not always. There was one situation when the secretary of state brought one proposal—drastic reductions—and someone else brought another one. And someone would raise human rights. It was difficult to know how to deal with this administration at all.

I should say, after an elaborate discussion they had in the government, Brezhnev was a little bit angry. He was not in the mood for this. In the first meeting with Nixon, he said, "Let's sit down and discuss what we are you going to do, because I am for peace, and you are for peace too." There was no such opportunity with the Carter administration. Maybe it sounds funny, but psychologically it's important, because during the previous fifteen years, that had been the pattern with any administration. And suddenly this administration came and did not send anything except a self-appointed ambassador who says one thing, but at the same time they couldn't take him for word because he was not speaking for a president, but a president-elect.

So, that was the situation. I think that in this sense, the channel—the backchannel—was

useful at least for explaining things. It is important not just to have people come with very big proposals, accompanied by some other things which were not acceptable. You need contacts to explain things.

What we were really concerned about was having the agenda prepared by your administration from the very beginning. You prepared it, and then brought it to us. Why did we have to accept it? If we want to understand the fight we had for years with your administration, we have to look at your agenda. Wrongly or rightly, that is how we saw things. That's why we were so angry, and didn't even want to discuss your proposals.

I think back channels are sometimes useful, useful mostly first for advance explanation, and also sometimes useful for working things out without much publicity. As a matter of fact, at one point there was work between Cy, me, and you too [indicating Brzezinski]. You were involved in this negotiation. Very few people know it, but before 1979 I had many meetings with you, too. They were useful. There was no publicity. So back channels were useful. I don't say it's really the most important thing, but still this is what happened.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much, Anatoly. I think that's a rich introduction.

**BRZEZINSKI:** Could I respond to Anatoly?

**LEGVOLD:** Yes. I've got Cy next, and then I have Viktor. Before you respond, Zbig, when you noted the objective linkage that was implicit in the way Anatoly spoke, I would remind you of something that Sergei said earlier on the issue of human rights and arms control. According to his report, Andropov said that if there was a prospect of progress in arms control, then they might have been willing to be more forthcoming on the human rights issue. So, there was also a kind of linkage as Andropov saw the matter. Cy, you're next.

**VANCE:** I simply want to clarify some things that Anatoly stated. He was absolutely correct in saying that we laid out our proposals in really considerable detail. In the briefing book, there is a report of the March 21 meeting between Anatoly and myself in which we laid out immediately prior to going exactly what it was that we were going to put forward in terms of the basic deep

cuts proposal, and in addition to that a fallback proposal. The problem that really arose, it seems to me, was that when we put our proposals on the table, nobody would listen to them, and contrary to usual practice, nobody said, "Well, let's sit down and talk about that and see if we can find a way to get around this thing." We got a wet rug in the face, and were told to go home. That was, in my judgment, a very important tactical mistake on your part, and indeed in subsequent years that was confirmed to me by Gromyko. Gromyko said to me, "One of the big mistakes we made was not coming back before you left and saying, 'Let's see what we can do about it.'"

**LEGVOLD:** Viktor.

**SUKHODREV:** Just a few points relating to the linkage between disarmament and human rights and what Anatoly was saying about the desire of the Soviet side—of Gromyko and Brezhnev—to talk about the overall relationship, the conceptual side of the Soviet-American relationship. Secretary Vance knows that Gromyko always used to start his meetings with secretaries of state or with presidents with that conceptual approach, from which he would then go on to the various items on the agenda—from disarmament, to Africa, to Cuba, or to whatever was on the agenda. Now, with respect to SALT, you have to take into account the attitude of the Soviets. And here again, because this was so personalized, it was Brezhnev and Gromyko—those two—who conducted these negotiations, after all. You also have to take into account their attitude towards questions of human rights.

There was no surprise in the new proposals that were brought by Secretary Vance. I am not a policy maker, but I familiarized myself with the briefs for those talks, as I had to in order to be competent as an interpreter. I saw in those briefs a rough description of what eventually Secretary Vance did bring to Moscow. So, they were not a surprise, as Anatoly just said. But they were a disappointment for Brezhnev, who felt he had done so much hard work, personally, in Vladivostok. Suddenly this new administration was toppling the whole structure he had worked so hard to build.

Added to that was the attitude to human rights. Gromyko always detested having to discuss anything connected with Basket 3. But he had been conditioned—and this, I think, is

an important factor—he had been conditioned by Henry Kissinger to treat the whole thing as something of no practical importance. [Laughter.] In Geneva, during one of their meetings—this was when the Final Act was being sort of hammered out, and when one of the main sticking points was Basket 3—they were quibbling over some specific formula, some form of words in what was to become Basket 3, which was unacceptable to Gromyko—it was too intrusive, he thought—when Henry Kissinger said directly, “Mr. Minister, why are we quibbling over these forms of words? No matter what goes into that Final Act, I don’t believe that the Soviet Union will ever do anything it doesn’t want to do.” So that, in a nutshell, was what Gromyko—and therefore, Brezhnev—had been conditioned to believe. Forget it. Let it be in there. Let’s publish it. A bold step indeed, as Sergei has said. And suddenly, these human rights—out of nothing, in the minds of the Soviet leaders, Gromyko and Brezhnev—become a first priority issue in the eyes of the new administration.

So, those two things were regarded by both Brezhnev and Gromyko as a kind of personal affront. And that attitude—that emotional attitude—colored the whole relationship, as it were, and the negotiations on all other issues. They could never obliterate them.

Just another point on Harriman, and whether he was a kind of ambassador or a representative of the new administration: I have lived through several periods of transition between American administrations, and let me say that in that period, right after the elections and leading up to January the 20th, there was always a stream of would-be representatives of the new administration coming to Moscow and meeting at various levels—starting, of course, with Brezhnev on down. Of course, Harriman was a respected figure in the Soviet Union. He was believed perhaps more than others were. But I do recall that stream. I do recall a conversation that Brezhnev had, for instance, with Sargent Shriver. And, of course, I dutifully recorded those conversations, and they all went to the Politburo. They didn’t know who the person in question was, but there were some of these people who were actually intimately hinting that they had the president-elect’s ear—that they alone could speak on his behalf—and hinted broadly at the various high positions that they would be occupying in the incoming administration. Most of them never did. But the Politburo had these MemCons on the table.

Now, I remember discussing with Kornienko my impressions of people like Sargent Shriver. Kornienko wasn’t present; but I gave him my impressions—not what I put down on paper, but

my impressions. Let me not go into that now. [Laughter.] But I think you all know what I mean. Thank you very much.

LEGVOLD: Okay. Now what I've got is a very short comment from Zbig on this, then Les next, then Sergei Tarasenko, and then I really am going to go to Odd Arne, who has been on the list for a long time.

BRZEZINSKI: I think we've gotten a very important clarification from the Soviet side of what happened in early 1977. It was in fact unilateral linkage that prevented progress on arms control, because we were not linking progress in arms control to other issues. After all, we are also entitled to have a view on human rights, just as you had a view on our human rights policy which you thought offensive or a personal affront. But we were not linking other issues to progress on arms control. It's quite evident from your responses that you were—that you felt concerned about our views on other issues, and *that*, in turn, led you to reject not only the more ambitious proposal—which was not designed to throw Vladivostok into a wastebasket, but was designed to go beyond it—but also the other proposal, which was based on Vladivostok. You've made it very clear, both of you now. That was because of other issues.

Well, of course, if there is to be linkage, then linkage can be reciprocal: we can link other issues to progress in arms control, too. But we didn't, because we wanted to have progress in arms control. Your position may be justified in terms of your reading of your own interest; but you were clearly linking other issues to progress on arms control. We were not.

Now, I have to confess that I became someone who favored linkage, especially later on when other issues surfaced. But I was aware of the fact that once other issues were linked to arms control, it would certainly slow arms control down.

LEGVOLD: Anatoly, very quickly on this.

DOBRYNIN: Thank you. We couldn't leave it as it is—as if there was a linkage as Zbig understood it. What we are trying to say, myself and my colleagues, is that, for the sake of arms control, we were really prepared to consider some concessions, on our own. That's why

even Andropov was giving instructions to make concessions on the most unwelcome issue—the issue of human rights. So, this was really linkage in a way, but this was not a tight linkage in bargaining terms. We were prepared, if things went well on arms control, to swallow some unwelcome discussion of human rights, since we hoped that the climate would be better between us. This is more or less what happened with Nixon. This was a connection in a way—a positive connection. But it was not a bargaining linkage.

BRZEZINSKI: So why didn't you accept our more modest proposal?

DOBRYNIN: Because we looked at the whole set of positions your administration brought into office, and they were unacceptable to us.

BRZEZINSKI: But the fallback—

DOBRYNIN: The fallback position had nothing really to do with Vladivostok. If you really wanted to discuss this issue, I was prepared to discuss it. The second proposal was not really a follow-up to Vladivostok. You said categorically on all levels, beginning with you, Cy, and the president himself, who made it clear when I spoke with him: there would be no restrictions on cruise missiles.

BRZEZINSKI: We said there were two issues which were not resolved—

DOBRYNIN: Yes. *Backfire* and this one. And the air-launched cruise missiles. This was an important question. And you just said, "No; let's leave it aside."

BRZEZINSKI: We said, "Let's defer that until we reach an agreement on that issue."

DOBRYNIN: Well, we had already been deferring for six years, through three administrations. Why defer each issue? We had experience enough in negotiating. I think we had enough.

LEGVOLD: I think we will revisit this issue when we begin talking about March and the proposals themselves. Les Gelb is next, and then Sergei.

GELB: I think I might be able to clarify some of these questions, but there are so many scorpions on the table now, it's hard to tell which one to pick up. [Laughter.] Even though the Carter administration did not in any formal way link human rights to arms control, I think we all understood that the strong position being taken on human rights issues was driving you crazy. It was not a mystery to us.

DOBRYNIN: I don't want to say crazy, but it was close. [Laughter.]

GELB: I meant crazy, Anatoly, in the same positive sense you were talking about linkage. [Laughter.] Secondly, I was a strong advocate for the Vladivostok agreement—let's just finish there. So, everything else I say should be understood in that context. I was in favor of settling for Vladivostok, as was my boss. We wanted to do that and move on from there. But when we were discussing what your reaction would be to going beyond Vladivostok, toward comprehensive agreement, you should know that even proponents of Vladivostok thought you would not react as negatively as you did. Now, I'm sorry Bill Hyland isn't here, because Bill played a critical role in this. Bill was a part of the Vladivostok agreement, and Bill's judgment was that you would not just totally reject a more comprehensive approach. He didn't want to destroy Vladivostok, but he thought you would not be nearly as negative as you turned out to be.

Next point. There is on occasion a little pallet you can throw into the water that clears up historical mysteries. You can walk away from here thinking that the comprehensive proposal and the Vladivostok-minus proposal were not serious, but there actually is evidence that President Carter was prepared to go much further, including in the direction of meeting your other concerns about strategic arms. I think Harold, Cy, Zbig should talk to that point, because had you responded with any counterproposal to what Cy brought to Moscow in March 1977, you would have been greeted with a very interesting, far more interesting proposal on the American side, just to show, to prove that this wasn't a game. And I think we ought to talk

about that, you ought to know that.

Finally, when we left Moscow, I think we left with real grievances as well, because, as Cy said, and as the record shows, you were fully forewarned about the alternatives—not just in the week before we left, but in the run-up to that. Your letter to Brezhnev shows that he knew fully what we were going to put on the table. And yet when we left, we left to the chorus of public statements by your government and background statements by your government that you had had no forewarning, that that was a very amateurish attempt to force something down the throat of the Soviet leadership after careful negotiations. So, from our standpoint, we did not surprise you; we did not come with a bolt out of the blue; and yet when we left, as Cy said, it was with a wet rag across the top of the head.

LEGVOLD: Sergei.

TARASENKO: Maybe I will try to speculate about some personal moments. It is a confirmed fact that in 1977, after Vladivostok, Brezhnev's health had deteriorated. He did not as attentively —

LEGVOLD: Sergei, did you said 1977? Do you mean after 1974 in Vladivostok?

TARASENKO: In 1975.

LEGVOLD: '75; all right.

TARASENKO: So, over these two years, he didn't follow foreign policy developments. And I would think that he did not read the telegrams which he was receiving from Washington. He did not follow the development of the new administration's position. He was not interested in that. In any case, in the reports both from the Embassy and from the Foreign Ministry, it was said that the position of the new administration had not been finally worked out yet. So there still remained some hope.

As far as I understand, on the eve of the negotiations, everybody who took part in preparing the documents and position papers came to a firm conclusion that the Americans had

completely abandoned the Vladivostok agreements. Brezhnev simply felt indignation. Gromyko's reaction was unusual, too. You know, Gromyko was a very cautious person, always able to control his feelings. And I can only explain the fact that he gave that press conference—and the *way* in which he conducted it—in terms of the following. At that time, Brezhnev was still was in full control over policy making, both internal and foreign. So Gromyko was carrying out an order, it seems to me. Although we can only speculate about it, Brezhnev might have said, "We need to give them a sharp rebuke, for their attempts to abandon Vladivostok." Nobody else probably studied the question. There was an order from the very top to destroy the American proposals completely, and not to leave any other versions or any other hopes. If you look at all our previous policies, nothing like this had ever happened before. Such thing could have happened only if the person at the very top gave a certain very angry order. And then the person who received that order had to do the dirty work, so to speak. This is my explanation.

I think what we have here is the deteriorating state of Brezhnev's health. And in a way he probably felt that he was misled, because in our system people were not very eager to tell the truth; they always made it look a little better, or left it to the very end of conversation. And probably he was told about it only on the eve of the negotiations. He probably reacted: "No, how can it be!" At least, that's my impression.

LEGVOLD: Very briefly, Sergei, on this point.

KONDRASHOV: On the substance, I agree with what Sergei just said. But one small point of clarification: in 1977 I would say that Brezhnev was still in a full possession of his abilities. Later on the situation changed. But at that moment he still was able to follow the situation pretty closely. Maybe he wasn't able to read all the cables or the telegrams. But still his decisions were made with a clear mind and clear understanding of the situation. Otherwise, I agree with what was just said now. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Odd Arne, and then Harold.

**WESTAD:** I want to continue a little bit on this important issue of perceptions, following up on what Les said. There is something here which is very unclear to me in terms of negotiation strategy. If the Soviet side was more or less expecting what came out of the American preparation process, how was it then possible that there was no direct answer prepared. Nothing seemed prepared in terms of political strategy—not at the meeting, and not for the next several months. We got some indications now from Sergei and others that Brezhnev's health may have been a factor; but, truly, there must have been some kind of discussion of Soviet perceptions of the Carter administration—this new incoming administration—which must have led to the kind of negotiation strategy that was developed on the Soviet side. I would very much like to challenge our Russian friends here to try to address that issue, in the broader sense. What was the perception of this new incoming administration—of the people that are sitting on the other side of the table from you here—in terms of what they wanted to achieve on the issues that we are now trying to discuss?

**LEGVOLD:** Harold.

**BROWN:** There has been some discussion of self-appointed emissaries as a factor in perception or misperception. And I take it that part of our task here is to learn some lessons about that. I would like to put on the table, as a useful introduction to this afternoon's discussions, the question of public diplomacy, as well, as it contributed to perceptions or misperceptions, and to cite two items. One is Brezhnev's January 18th speech in 1977. I would like to ask our Russian friends what its purpose was, and how they expected it to be received. As we looked at it, I don't think I was clear at that time, and I'm still not clear now as to whether it was meant to be a major change in strategic thought, or just another "samovar" from Tula.

On the U.S. side, there is the question of public statements about SALT, including some leaks in March before Cy left for Moscow, and a statement by President Carter—a public statement. It would be interesting to know how that was received on the Russian side. I suppose it's important for the Americans to say, too, what it was meant to achieve.

LEGVOLD: The next person would be Viktor Starodubov, but Ilia Gaiduk, are you on this last point?

ILIA GAIDUK: Not really.

LEGVOLD: Okay, I'm going to hold you, then. Viktor, you're next.

STARODUBOV: I would like to say couple of words about lost opportunities, in regards to the Secretary of State's visit to Moscow in March 1977. First, let me comment on the proposals themselves. Yes, apparently, there was some irritation about the human rights issues. We cannot deny it. But we also had information the U.S. President did not want to be associated with the previous negotiation, and that provided an additional negative impulse for our top leader, who, as we knew, considered himself—and maybe rightly so—very active in Vladivostok. He felt that it was primarily because of his efforts that the results were achieved there.

But there was a third cause of our failure to respond. We knew about the character of the proposals approximately a week beforehand, and later we saw that that was pretty close to what we actually received. And our evaluation of those proposals led to the conclusion that both of them—the comprehensive, and the alternative one—represented a departure from the Vladivostok positions, and moved away from that balance which was achieved in Vladivostok, toward a bias in favor of U.S. interests. And Brezhnev received our evaluation report also. So, those were facts.

Now let's talk about the lost opportunities. We just have found out here at the conference, accidentally—I don't know how reliable this information is—that there was a third proposal from the American side. And that third position, as I understand, was clearly different from the first two. And from what we now know about it, I would say that if it had been presented at that time, as a third proposal, it is very likely that the secretary of state would have left Moscow with a more positive result. Yes, of course, I understand the reaction of the American side when they received a negative response from the Soviet side. I can understand that they decided not to put the third proposal on the table. But maybe that was the mistake. Maybe it would have made sense to put the third proposal on the table. Maybe it was exactly the type

of lost opportunity which everyone mentions when speaking about the March 1977 visit of Cyrus Vance to Moscow. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Cy is next on the list, and then Ilia.

**VANCE:** First of all, in terms of lost opportunity, it's very clear that if we had had any response other than a wet rag in the face, we would have come forward with proposals dealing with new systems that were very important to you: namely, the MX and [Trident] D-V. We were prepared to sit down and talk about limits on those. But you cut it off completely by refusing to listen, to pay any attention to what we were saying and what we had attempted to do. That had a further impact in that it led to a delay—not an exorbitantly long one, but to a delay nonetheless—that meant that we presented the agreement for ratification later than we had hoped. If we had gotten there earlier, I think we might have had a better chance on ratification.

**LEGVOLD:** Before going on to Ilia, let me ask a question of the American side. To what degree did you have fairly elaborate assessment of what the Soviet response might be? Les Gelb has said that even Bill Hyland, who had been part of the Vladivostok talks, did not think that you would get this decisive across-the-board rejection. But what range of estimations did you have on the American side, and what were the risks in going forward with this proposal? How did you calculate those risks? Ilia, you're next.

**GAIDUK:** There seems to be a thread that has been going through all of our discussion, and this is the question of how the two sides perceived each other, each other's plans, each other's intentions, and each other's capabilities. The question that we have just heard discussed also relates to the topic of perceptions. And if we talk about the perceptions on both sides of the other's plans, it is clear that on both sides intelligence services played a very important role. However, we know many cases from history when intelligence services provided the information which their bosses wanted to see; or the intelligence information did not reach the leadership; or when the leadership saw the information and then put it aside; or

sometimes the intelligence information clearly reflected the general prevailing mood in the leadership or in society.

I have a question for Admiral Turner concerning this problem: how do you now evaluate the information that you received at the time about the Soviet plans and intentions during the very early period—let's say, during the transition period, and during the period leading up to Secretary Vance's 1977 visit to Moscow? To what extent did the information which you supplied to the administration take into account those various influences? Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Stan, do you want respond on that now?

TURNER: I will try. [Laughter.] Without trying to make excuses, I was late coming in to the Carter administration and had been in office only little more than a week when we had the last meeting preparing Cy for the trip to Moscow. I did not—even to myself—ask the question of how the Soviets would respond to this. CIA professionals had not offered me that as background in preparation for the meeting.

In retrospect, I've always looked back and felt personally guilty. I felt that the CIA was remiss in not making that contribution. I doubt whether we would have made the right assessment. I mean, if Bill Hyland didn't, I don't think we would have. It also happened that at the CIA at that time we were in transition between two Soviet experts as the principal adviser to the Director. We didn't have a new one in place, and the old one was transitioning out. So I didn't have a principal Soviet analyst on whom to rely. But again, that's not an excuse, because there certainly are more people in the CIA than just the one principal analyst of the Soviet Union.

So, I think I am trying to say to you that I don't think we did a good job here. A little later than this we produced an analysis—a national intelligence estimate—of Soviet intentions in a broader sense. I haven't read it for a long time; my recollection is that it took a middle ground here between seeing an "evil empire" and imputing benign intent. Certainly we did not renounce the possibility of an aggressive Soviet military move, and we did endorse the general idea that the Soviet Union was bent on aggrandizing its position in the world. But I think we also tempered this with a feeling that your resources were limited, and that you did not intend

to move aggressively soon.

LEGVOLD: Before turning to Zbig and Bill who want to say something about this, a question to Anatoly. Why didn't you warn Cy in your conversation that this would likely be the outcome? You were an even greater expert on the Soviet Union than our professionals were; were you surprised by how absolute the response was when it came?

DOBRYNIN: I told Cy, when I met with him, that it was absolutely unacceptable, and that it would be rejected.

LEGVOLD: And did you say that there would be no further negotiations?

DOBRYNIN: Well, I couldn't explain the whole position.

VANCE: The issue was a counterproposal.

DOBRYNIN: The issue was really—

GELB: The issue was counterproposal, not acceptance. You did say to Cy: "This is unacceptable." But what about a counterproposal? What about putting something else on the table?

LEGVOLD: I am talking about the wet washcloth over the head.

DOBRYNIN: This was a decision made in Moscow. All I knew was that the proposals were unacceptable.

LEGVOLD: Bob Pastor.

ROBERT PASTOR: Let me pursue the question that you've just asked. Ambassador Dobry-

nin, you are a long-time expert in Washington. You observed the 1976 presidential campaign over an extended period of time, in which the winner had criticized severely and successfully the style and the approach of the previous administration, particularly Secretary Kissinger. Did you tell Moscow that this would be an administration that would need to modify the Kissinger proposal? Therefore, even if your government rejected Carter's comprehensive proposal, wouldn't it have been advisable to make a counter offer? And secondly, did you factor into your own analysis the timetable of ratification? I mean, assume for the moment that the United States accepted Vladivostok, or some variation on that. Did Moscow have any awareness that that would be a tough debate extending over a significant period of time, and would have to be completed in practice before Congressional elections in 1978, or the presidential elections in 1980?

DOBRYNIN: Have you ever been an ambassador? [Laughter.]

PASTOR: It was an ulterior purpose of my question. [Laughter.]

DOBRYNIN: I am sorry, your question comes exactly from the fact that you are not. So, coming back to your question. Of course I made my observations; but what kind of observation could I make in, say, December of 1976? What kind of observation? The election? I knew that an election campaign is an election campaign. So, we had to wait a little bit. What did I know before? Very little about Carter. Just what I read in his statements. I didn't know much about Vance or Zbig; just what I read about them. But first of all, it was not clear who would occupy what office. So, at that particular time it was very difficult to predict the situation.

What is interesting is that, historically, for ten years—maybe even twelve years—there had not been a single case when a new administration came to power, and we—the Soviet government—took a harsh position from the very beginning. In March, when we rejected the proposal, it was the first time we had taken such a harsh position with a new administration. Usually there was a lengthy period of give and take, so to speak, where we felt each other out, carefully negotiating, forming our opinion.

The question that we faced, when Cy Vance arrived in Moscow, was whether we were going to continue détente by pursuing Vladivostok, or whether we were facing a situation of having to accept an agenda that we thought at the time represented a major departure: a revision of the Vladivostok agreement, human rights, and many other issues which were until now unacceptable. That was really the problem as we saw it at that time. And we wanted from the very beginning to know where the new administration stood on our relationship.

Gromyko did later on accept that we made a mistake by not answering Cy Vance. That's another story; and I agree with him. But we are speaking about history as it was. We wondered why Cy arrived with this proposal. It was not the particular proposal that made people mad there, but the fact that during the whole previous month, the administration had been pushing its Sakharov, Bukovsky, Ginzburg, Sharansky. Now it sounds ridiculous, but at that time, the telegram from the White House to Sakharov was very offensive. We considered this a departure from the normal diplomatic relations between two countries. Those people Brezhnev very sincerely considered enemies of the regime. How should one react to this? It's a psychological point. At that time, it stirred very strong emotions. I am explaining to you the psychological state of mind of our government.

**LEGVOLD:** Very quickly, Harold, and then Zbig is next on my list.

**BROWN:** From what you've just said, Anatoly, it becomes clear that the linkage with human rights was not solely a positive linkage in Soviet view. You have just described a very negative linkage.

The other point I'd like to make is that Vladivostok had been more than two years before, and no movement had occurred toward completing it or toward ratifying it. In retrospect, wasn't it a little naïve on the part of the Soviet side to think that the new administration would come in and just accept and move on an agreement which the previous administration had not been able to do anything with for two years?

**DOBRYNIN:** It was in '74, and in '76—

BROWN: But Vladivostok—

DOBRYNIN: Yes, but '76 was a continuation of Vladivostok.

BROWN: But there had not really been any attempts to ratify—

DOBRYNIN: The question isn't ratification; you're wrong. The question was whether there was continuity in our discussions. And indeed, until the very moment of the last administration—

BROWN: Yes, but Kissinger had tried to get the administration to complete the endgame, and it had failed because the Joint Chiefs and Don Rumsfeld had essentially vetoed it.

DOBRYNIN: Harold, we had to deal with the administration which was in power.

BROWN: I understand; but—

DOBRYNIN: But we continued to discuss Vladivostok with Kissinger. We continued to discuss it.

BROWN: But wanting a continuation of discussions on something that had stalled is really quite different from asking a new group simply to sign what you say had been completed.

DOBRYNIN: But what had already been completed, you rejected. This is the point. It's not a question of continuation or no continuation, because there was no continuity. This is exactly the point you are raising. The trouble we had with you at the time was that there was no continuity in the process. You may agree or disagree, but as we felt it, for many years, although there had been much back and forth, still we moved in one direction. Then suddenly—suddenly, it all changed.

**BROWN:** My point is that Vladivostok was not as complete on the U.S. side in the previous administration as you thought at that time.

**DOBRYNIN:** But there was a continuation of the discussion. There was no disruption.

**BROWN:** But what Cy went forward with was a continuation of the discussion on number two (his fallback position).

**DOBRYNIN:** Discussion yes; not a promise, as we saw it in the previous administration.

**LEGVOLD:** Okay, now the next person on the list is Zbig. His hand went up when Ilia Gaiduk had posed his question about American sources of the information and Stan Turner was responding. Zbig, and then Bill Odom.

**BRZEZINSKI:** Just a footnote to that. Someone raised the question whether we had a reason to expect that the Soviet side might consider positively this more ambitious proposal. And among people consulted was a person who conducted extensive negotiations with the Soviet side: namely, Henry Kissinger. The president invited Henry Kissinger to supper in the evening sometime early in 1977—I was there—and Henry was asked by the president whether he thought the Soviet side would accept this more ambitious proposals. And Henry rolled his eyes, took a deep sigh, thought for a while, and then said “Yes.” He thought that the Soviet side would actually accept.

The one point about Vladivostok which I think really is important to consider is the relationship of the cruise missile issue to the agreement. If my memory serves me right, the Soviet interpretation of what was agreed at Vladivostok was that each cruise missile would count as a single missile.

**DOBRYNIN:** And you were not prepared to accept that.

**BRZEZINSKI:** And we were not—yes, we were not prepared to accept that. And when SALT was completed finally, that idea was abandoned, because it really was quite unrealistic and

very one-sided. So you bought a year later, unfortunately very late, the position that we were maintaining regarding Vladivostok: namely, that it simply was not practical to count every cruise missile as equivalent to a missile.

**LEGVOLD:** Bill Odom.

**ODOM:** I want to return to the question of intelligence. I don't believe in speaking into a microphone. [Long laughter.] I don't want to look at the micro situation, or the assessment at the particular time, but to expand it a bit, and ask for a reaction of the other side. I was following the larger intelligence picture, and in some of the technical detail, if you look at the U.S. side, we had dropped a real amount in our defense spending: 38% in a decade. In other words, we had gone down rather dramatically in our defense allocations. Your programs were really beginning to come on line. Your forces were beginning to look much more modern; your T-72 tanks were beginning to come on line; the second and third models of your ICBMs were there; your accuracy was beginning to appear more effective; and for those of us who looked at it closely—who followed your open literature and data, and also the intelligence—we saw an employment attitude—call it military doctrine, or whatever you want to—that was completely at odds with the assumptions that we brought in.

Now, I looked at those bits of data and at the NIEs. Some of that material really didn't come into general use on the policy side for some time—I've always suspected that Henry didn't want to see some of the bad news in the technical aspects of the intelligence. That stuff really didn't surface early, and it was not really on the agenda. And I think toward the end of the Carter administration a lot of that stuff was in there and began to change people's views a little bit on exactly what your forces were.

Now, here's my question to you: was there an assumption—and I almost sensed it—that the correlation of forces between the two camps in the late 1970s was favoring the Soviet Union, and that the U.S. was in decline? Did you think you could afford to slap the U.S. Secretary of Defense in the face when he came to Moscow, with only trivial consequences? And I wonder if you could have done it in 1968.

**LEGVOLD:** The next speaker is Nikolai Detinov.

DETINOV: I would like to say several words about the proposals that Secretary Vance brought to Moscow from the point of view of a military expert who took part in evaluating those proposals.

As was well-known, there were differences of opinion between the United States and the Soviet Union from the very beginning about exact definition of strategic weapons. The United States believed that strategic weapons consisted of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. And the Soviet Union believed that the forward-based systems should be included in the definition. Those were: American airplanes stationed in Europe; airplanes on respective American carriers; and submarine bases which were located near Soviet territory. Besides, when we calculated the balance, we believed that the nuclear weapons of Britain and France should be included in the calculations. That's why, when the Soviet Union agreed in Vladivostok to limit the calculation to heavy bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, and to leave the forward-based systems and the weapons of Britain and France out of it, the Soviet Union made a major concession. And in Moscow they received the news about such a decision with less than full support. There were people who disagreed with that.

Why did the Soviet Union make such a decision then? Because the general levels of strategic armaments were sufficiently high. They were: 2400 in carriers and 1320 in MIRVed missiles. With numbers of strategic weapons so high, the role and the importance of the so-called forward-based systems, was in a way, diminished.

Now, what did the new American administration propose? First, to cut the overall levels of strategic armaments substantially. This immediately raised the importance of the forward-based nuclear systems. More than that: the United States proposed, in essence, very far-reaching proposals for reductions of ground-based ICBMs. They would give the priority to the development of the sea-based weapons. As you know, they proposed to limit the heavy missiles, the mobile missiles. We saw all this primarily as efforts by the U.S. to achieve some one-sided advantages, and to destroy the parity in the strategic armaments, which had emerged between our two countries by that time.

Now let's consider the proposals on the *Backfire* bomber and the cruise missiles. Why were they unsatisfactory for us? Well, to agree with a proposal to defer the discussion of the

*Backfire* until the next negotiations would mean for the Soviet Union to admit the *Backfire* problem. We did not consider it a problem. *Backfire* was a tactical bomber, and had no relevance to any negotiations concerning SALT. The Soviet Union could not accept that. In regard to cruise missiles, we had known the U.S. plans of expanded deployment of land-based, air-borne, and sea-based cruise missiles. You were talking about thousands of such missiles, and we thought it absolutely impossible to leave such a component out of any kind of agreements we were discussing.

LEGVOLD: Thank you. Now, an observation on my part, and then I will turn to Marshall who has a general comment on the discussion. And then we are going to go to lunch. First, Bill Odom and Nikolai Detinov's last comments are a nice bridge to this afternoon, when we'll be looking at each side's version of what the problem was that we were trying to deal with through arms control, and then what our respective arms control answers were in the strategic sphere. The further observation I have as I listen to these exchanges this morning is that the issues that each side is raising with the other, and the arguments with which each is responding, appear to me almost a direct duplication of what you did at the time. There is no indication that there are further second thoughts about this at this stage. Now, maybe that's the important reality; maybe there aren't second thoughts to be had about it. But this conversation is essentially the conversation you had at the time. Cy, you disagree.

VANCE: Yes, I disagree with you.

LEGVOLD: Okay, put your mike on.

VANCE: What we have been talking about is the question of missed opportunities, and therefore, I think it's really quite different from what you're saying.

LEGVOLD: You don't think there was a recognition of missed opportunities at the time?

VANCE: At the time, we had different views with respect to whether there was a missed

opportunity. But clearly when you are looking back in a retrospective fashion, you are talking about what the missed opportunities were at that time.

LEGVOLD: Okay. Marshall.

SHULMAN: First, in response to a question you asked earlier, Robert, about what our assessments were at the time about the acceptability of the proposal: I can recall vividly that my own feeling was that I had no doubt at all that the preferred proposal of the United States would draw a rejection. I thought that the possibilities ranged from “no, but” to “no”. That is, there might be a rejection, but then there might be some kind of dialogue which would follow. That was the most optimistic assessment. At the other extreme, there might be a total “no.” But this raises a more general point that seems to me not yet adequately represented in our discussions this morning: and that is that in an effort to consider what was happening on the other side, there were dimensions in the positions of the two sides that arose from the context in which they were taken. That is to say, it’s a mistake simply to look at numbers and ask whether the Soviets would accept it or not. It depends very much on the context in which it was done. And I want to illustrate this briefly with reference to two issues: one is human rights, and the other is the comprehensive proposal in the March package.

To some extent I am repeating a little bit what I said at Pocantico, at the previous meeting with regard to human rights. That is, it seemed to me that it is important to bear in mind that human rights was not a homogeneous issue. It represented a confluence of a number of streams in American politics. At one level there is President Carter’s own strong feelings about civil rights—the experience he had had—which he was then projecting onto an international plane. It was simply a projection of the same values that he had fought for, believing in them very deeply. He was logical and consistent enough in projecting those values on the international plane.

At another level, there was a stream of thought in American life that was reacting negatively to the Kissinger period, the *realpolitik*, and the feeling that the absence of moral considerations in international politics was a serious deficiency. Therefore, there was an effort to restore a sense of values in American policy as the reaction against the policies of the previous

administration.

At a third level, there were those who saw the human rights issue as an instrument in the political offensive. They saw the Soviet Union as being vulnerable on this issue, and thought that it was an issue that could put the Soviet Union on the defensive, and could be used to discredit it. This was not unmixed with feelings of compassion and concern for the people involved; but it was also an instrument in political combat. So, it was not a thing that had a unified existence. It had complex dimensions to it.

Now, to some extent, there are also dimensions involved in the comprehensive proposal. For some—and I think this included the president, as I understood it at the time—there was a real concern about getting the numbers down: a feeling that the numbers were too high; that it wasn't rational to have so many nuclear weapons. This was illustrated by the fact that he was willing at least to consider, in a preliminary way, what the world would look like if you got down to very low numbers. But to some others who fed into the discussions of the comprehensive proposal, the reasoning was a little different. I think, for example, in the briefing books there is a contribution by Senator Jackson—a memorandum written for Senator Jackson by Richard Perle. And it seems to me that at the time, there was a feeling—probably stronger in the case of Perle than in the case of Scoop Jackson—that the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union essentially were disadvantageous to the United States: that they had the effect of disarming the American public, of creating a false impression that things were better than they were, and of reducing support for necessary military appropriations. It seems to me that when the comprehensive proposal had the effect that it did have—drawing rejection—from the point of view of people who thought in this way, it was a success. It had done whatever it was intended to do. Now, I am not saying that that was the view of the administration, or that this was the intention in putting it forward. But it had various dimensions in American political life, just as the human rights issue had various dimensions in American political life.

When we are thinking of the process of interreaction, we should not just look at a simple mathematical formula, but take into account the deep and complex political context of the times.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much. We are now going to break for lunch. We resume at

2:15. Lunch is here, as dinner was last night, so make yourself comfortable. At 2:15 we go on. Thank you very much.

## **MAY 7: AFTERNOON SESSION**

**LEGVOLD:** May I have your attention. We resume now, and we will go from 2:20 until 4:00 o'clock. There won't be a coffee break in this session, because it's the equivalent of the individual sessions this morning. If you want coffee or cold drinks feel free to get up in the course of the session. Jim?

**JAMES BLIGHT:** Excuse me. Before we get going, I'd just like to point out to those of you who haven't already discovered it, that the table to my left here down at this end has a lot of materials from the National Security Archive, Malcolm Byrne presiding. The National Security Archive and its people are primarily responsible for putting together this briefing notebook, which gives us the empirical base from which to launch our investigations. So if you have questions about the organization, about the briefing book, or if you want to blame somebody for having to check your baggage on the way down here, Malcolm Byrne is the guy to see. New issues of the Cold War History Project are in front of Svetlana [Savranskaya]. Thank you.

**VANCE:** I think they've done a terrific job.

**LEGVOLD:** Yes, indeed. I'm glad you made this point, Jim, that's absolutely appropriate.

This afternoon session is to wind up the discussion of the Moscow meeting in March of 1977, and then go beyond it to discuss the aftermath and the next steps. And we will begin as we did this morning with very brief questions to both sides from Mark and from Sergei. Mark?

**GARRISON:** We've already begun to get very deeply into the questions of the preparation for the March visit. And important documents are available to us, including the SSC documents and the reports by Ambassador Dobrynin from Washington which contained the text of the early Carter-Brezhnev correspondence. Before we got away from the topic, I'd like to take just one more swing at the question of the American perceptions of the psychological and emotional situation in Moscow—particularly with respect to Brezhnev—and raise the question whether in retrospect it might have been useful and desirable to take steps to cope with that?

The Carter-Brezhnev letters, I think, give us a case in point, because at the beginning of that correspondence they exchanged their "Sermons on the Mount," as Viktor Sukhodrev calls them. Presumably, this caused a certain satisfaction in the Kremlin. But then, as Georgy Kornienko points out, the February 14th Carter letter was something of a turning point in the Soviet understanding of what the American side was up to. Now, if you look at the text of that letter, at first you wonder what the fuss is about, because it doesn't seem all that new or exceptionable, at least if you take a look at just the paragraph on arms control.

**DOBRYNIN:** What page is it on?

**GARRISON:** I don't know; can somebody tell us? [Several people try to find the page.] But the point I want to make is that although that paragraph on arms control sets forth the American position as it had come to be known, it doesn't even contain the word "Vladivostok." Now, just taking into account the purely psychological, emotional aspects of the situation, might it not have been a good idea to present that position in response to Brezhnev's letter? Brezhnev's letter, of course, emphasized Vladivostok, Vladivostok, Vladivostok. The answer came back—no Vladivostok. Wouldn't it have been useful just as a matter of atmospherics to avoid the misunderstanding and to say, "Yes, of course, there is Vladivostok; but we think that in order to move on rapidly we need to think about deferring the most difficult questions in Vladivostok?"

**DOBRYNIN:** Are you speaking of the letter from Carter, Vance?

GARRISON: Carter.

LEGVOLD: Sergei.

KONDRASHOV: Just a few remarks.

LEGVOLD: No, no; I am sorry. Sergei Tarasenko, then you. We have two Sergeis; I apologize.

TARASENKO: I would like to tell you what Kornienko told me with regard to the March meeting. When he was talking to me, he finished by saying that if, in his view, the American side had brought proposals completely satisfying the Soviet side, even the best imaginable ones, they would have been rejected. The best offer would have been rejected. This was because the leaders were in certain mood, and set in a certain position, and the formal side of things did not matter. The emotions had already overwhelmed them—the emotional side. And I think, now, when we are trying to deliberate on this topic—when we are talking about lost opportunities—maybe we should say that the tactics and the “packaging” mattered. Had those same American proposals been differently packaged, with frequent mentioning of the word “Vladivostok” and certain pledges like “we, the American side, are committed to the Vladivostok agreements,” and if they had then later developed some additional ideas about the necessity to change something in that agreement, only then would negotiations have been possible. Then it would have been possible to develop some dialogue. This is the impression I have. Thank you.

DOBRYNIN: May I ask him a question? Sergei, tell me, did Kornienko really believe that even if the Americans brought the best possible version, we still would have rejected it? This I cannot understand. I disagree. And not only me; the whole delegation except the absent Kornienko. [Laughter.]

LEGVOLD: All right, the next person on the list is Sergei Kondrashov left over from this

morning, but before I turn to him with his comment from this morning, let me put something else on the table for both sides for this afternoon's session, after we continue with this discussion of the lead-up to the Moscow meeting and the events in Moscow. And I don't want to cut that short before all of you are satisfied that we've done what we want to do with it. But then I think we want to turn our attention this afternoon—fairly quickly—to what follows the Moscow meeting. A question that I would put to both sides is, "What lessons, or what implications, were drawn from what happened at Moscow, with what sense of the next steps that should follow from it?" This afternoon we should begin turning to the aftermath and the events between March and the fall of the 1977. Sergei Kondrashov.

**KONDRASHOV:** Just a few remarks in connection with the statement made by Marshall Shulman, and the comparative weakness and the strength of our position in the area of human rights. I must tell that we were certainly conscious that you were attacking us on individual human rights. And it was very difficult for us to respond, because we certainly felt that you were mixing in our internal affairs. That was our general stance.

**DOBRYNIN:** interfering.

**KONDRASHOV:** Interfering, I am sorry. Interfering in our internal affairs. And that certainly was not a strong position. We were conscious of that. But we were governed by that formula: we may go as far in the area of human rights as will not contradict the interests, so to speak, of the state, of society. And that, I would say, was our view throughout the Carter period.

But, certainly, I would say that the effect of this criticism of our position was such that we were conscious that we had to revise it. And we were actually revising it—but for a much later stage. But in the course of the meeting, we were responding to Judge Goldberg and his very acute criticism by also responding with a criticism of your position. We had other arguments with which to respond in the same way. But we were very conscious that our position was rather weak. And so we were very conscious—and Andropov was conscious—that it was necessary to develop our position further. And we were prepared to enter into negotiations in the area of human rights.

Let me give you an example. I was present in the room on couple of occasions when Mr.

Andropov was speaking with Academician Sakharov. And he was said to him, “We beg you, please, to understand that you have to cut your contacts with foreign journalists and foreigners in general. You are in possession of enormous state secrets. Please understand the necessity for you to cut it. Otherwise, you force us to undertake some steps which may be not very pleasant.” So on a number of occasions he spoke with Sakharov in that sense, very mildly—just begging him to understand the position of the government. Thank you.

**SHULMAN:** Could I ask a question?

**LEGVOLD:** Yes.

**SHULMAN:** That’s very interesting. Extend it one step further, Sergei. One of the major development on the human rights front that came in the following period was the issue of Jewish emigration and Most-Favored-Nation status—I mean, the linkage between those two things. And the decision was apparently made in the Soviet leadership to let the level of Jewish emigration rise—as it did in 1977, ’78, and ’79—against the background of word that have been received from the U.S. that that was the condition required for Most-Favored-Nation status. So there must have been some decision at that point on an important human rights issue that was linked to the trade question?

**KONDRASHOV:** You are quite right. But, first of all, we were trying to solve individual issues in the area of Jewish emigration, and in the area of certain religious groups—for instance, in the case of Pentecostals—in the case of Anatoly Scharansky, and these sort of things. We were trying to solve these questions first—and we solved them, much later. But certainly the decision was made to revise the whole overall situation in the area of human rights and to prepare for the next stage of the CSCE process.

I must say that there was a difference of opinion on these issues between the Ministry of State Security and the Foreign Ministry. I was telling Mark Garrison an anecdote that I’m sure you will all find interesting. Ambassador Kampelman pointed out to me that it would be regarded by the American side as an act of crucial importance if we freed Anatoly Scharansky.

Naturally, I faithfully reported that to Andropov, and he replied promptly: "Promise that we will do that, but with certain conditions: either he or his mother should apply for clemency." But Anatoly Scharansky was stubborn enough not to do this. Ambassador Kampelman and others on the American side pressed me for a solution of this case. Then Andropov formally authorized me to say that we would solve the case within the next two or three months.

At the next meeting between Gromyko and Shultz, Shultz was thanking Gromyko for this promise which I gave to solve the issue with Anatoly Scharansky. Gromyko was unaware of this decision, which was made by Andropov, and he was unaware of the directive Andropov gave me. So he flatly denied this possibility. He said, "I was misunderstood." Naturally, I reported this faithfully to Andropov, and the next day I received a message saying, "Don't worry, it will be done; I certainly will discuss it with Andrei Andreevich, and we will come to a solution." And they did. In a couple of days I heard confirmation of the decision, and in a few months' time Scharansky was freed.

**LEGVOLD:** Zbig, could I pick on you for a moment and ask you to respond to Mark's question to the American side, knowing what you know now, or even what you knew after the fact in March? What kinds of things would you do differently—if any—in order to reach the objective that you had as of mid-March? What would you change in the decisions on the comprehensive proposal or the deferral? What would you do differently, if anything?

**BRZEZINSKI:** I'm sure there were more than the ones now mentioned, but the following come to my mind. First, probably it would have been better not to publicize our attraction for the comprehensive approach so much at the highest level. That applies to the president as well as to those of us around him. That made the comprehensive cuts idea very much an American idea, rather than something that might have come out of the joint process of the negotiations. Although one has to take into account the dynamics of the American political campaigns and the pressures that they generated on the principle candidates, nonetheless I think that the president perhaps oversold it, and overtalked it.

Secondly, with respect to the negotiating strategy rather than to the substance of the proposals, I would not have repeated so often—and I repeatedly urged the President not to

repeat so often—his expectation that a SALT agreement would be concluded, first in 1977 (which he publicly stated several times), and then in 1978. I thought this was actually weakening our negotiating position, and placing us under pressure to have an agreement; because if we did not, it would have looked like a political failure not have one. My attitude was that the proposals we had advanced were reasonable; that in the long run it was in the Soviet interest to accept them; and that if there was going to be a competition without arms control, we would not lose it. Therefore, we had to have a reason to stick to our position without building up public expectations that the SALT agreement would be concluded within a given time frame.

**LEGVOLD:** Are there any other comments on this side?

**VANCE:** I agree with what Zbig has said on that. But I would also suggest that if we had extended the time so we could have had further discussion on some of these questions—not only amongst ourselves, but also with the most senior people in the Soviet Union—it might have been useful. Perhaps we might have been able to move closer to what we finally ended up with in the three-tier arrangement. Will be coming to discuss that, I assume, later on.

**LEGVOLD:** Harold, did you want to say something on this quickly?

**BROWN:** I don't think I have a great deal to add. I would agree strongly with Zbig. As I said in the morning session, there was a real problem with the very high public profile that was given to deep cuts, desirable as they were. And in addition, there was a sense that we were rushing things. It seems to me this was overdone.

A lot of these proposals were formulated with the "skeleton crew." A great many people in the administration were not aboard. That problem has actually gotten worse in many subsequent administrations; when a new administration comes in, the president is expected to produce a very quick result—and yet, especially when there is a change of party in power, it used to take many weeks to get people in office. And it did during the Carter administration. Since then it has taken many months, and now even a couple of years, in some cases. That disjunction, I think, was a real problem—less then than now, but a real problem.

I think that we should have taken a little bit more to time with things, and not hyped it all so much publicly.

LEGVOLD: Nikolai?

DETINOV: I would like to add several words about the rejection of Vance's proposals.

The proposals were presented in such a way that it aggravated all negotiation problems for the future. First, the substance of the negotiations had become publicly known in the United States even before the proposals had been officially presented in Moscow. From this fact the Soviet Union concluded that to a large extent those proposals had a propagandistic rather than a substantive character.

Second, apparently, the initial reaction to the proposals on the part of the Soviet leadership was stated in a very incorrect way. Clearly, it was a wrong step to discuss those proposals at various press conferences and in the mass media. That, in a way, defined and made more rigid the positions of both the Soviet Union and of the United States. I think that you should not have put such issues on the table for public discussion. It was a wrong thing to do.

LEGVOLD: Anatoly.

DOBRYNIN: Just to add to what Nikolai said: Your position, which was brought by Cy to Moscow, was used against the administration. It became a yardstick for the opponents, and they turned it against the administration. To everything else later they charged, "It's a retreat! A retreat!" And it was very difficult for you to formulate your later position.

LEGVOLD: Viktor Starodubov.

STARODUBOV: I just wanted to add to what Brzezinski and Nikolai Nikolaevich Detinov, and now Anatoly Fedorovich, have said before me, concerning the fact that after Cyrus Vance left Moscow, a situation was such that both sides became sort of fixated on their positions, and they deprived themselves of the ability to be flexible in the negotiations. And since it had

already been said, I would like to add that both sides still had sufficient courage and wisdom not to freeze everything at that point for a long time. If you recall, it was announced that the negotiations would be resumed at the end of April, and that dissolved the tension a little bit. And later in Geneva there was a meeting of Gromyko and Vance, and the negotiations were resumed. At that meeting they outlined broad frameworks of the future agreement. Thus, it seems to me, both sides allowed themselves some freedom of maneuver for the future. I think we should regard it as a very positive experience in the history of SALT negotiations and in the general Soviet-American relationship that they were able to overcome that crisis relatively quickly. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Well, what Viktor Starodubov has said anticipates the second issue that I put before you, and that is what kind of thinking took place in Washington, and what kind of thinking took place in Moscow immediately after the Vance mission. How was it that we were able to move as rapidly to the May agreement, on the three-tiered approach, as we did? Cy.

**VANCE:** Let me first say a few words, and then, Les, would you join us at the table? Because Les was very much involved in the aftermath. And leave your cigar there, will you please? [Long laughter; stormy applause.]

Let me say that I think, in hindsight, that I was too frank, too open with the press. But certainly by a similar token, I think that my good friend Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko also really compounded our problems—and your problems—very heavily by that really heavy handed press conference. I acknowledge mistakes on my part; but I think there were also mistakes on his part. And therefore we were left with a very tough situation.

On the other hand, obviously we had to address the issue immediately as to how we could handle this, how we could try to bring it back under control. Fortunately, I had very able, very clever colleagues, one of whom was Les, another of whom was Marshall, and others. So we got together and began to work on getting out of this the that we were in. We wanted to move as quickly as possible to get ourselves back on track in time for the meeting in Geneva, which we had announced that we would be going to have. And, so, with the help all this undoubted talent, we were able to move very rapidly to the three-level proposal, which, I think,

was very wisely put together.

I'm going to turn it over now to Les, who was one of the architects of that piece of construction that got us back on track.

**LEGVOLD:** Les?

**GELB:** After we came back from the Moscow trip, Bill Hyland and I went out to lunch. We made a lot of fun of our friends, a lot of fun of our adversaries, and then we said there must be some way to reconstruct what was done and what could be done. And we came up with the three-part proposal that you see before you. The first part embodied the essence of Vladivostok. The second part took the harder questions that couldn't be resolved there and put them in a protocol where we felt both sides could live with solutions of a very limited duration and go back at the issues. The third part was intended to get us where President Carter wanted to go in the first place: namely, toward the principles looking forward to creating a more stable strategic balance.

We looked at this inside the administration, and we were happy to find that it provided a way out. When Cy presented this to you informally shortly thereafter, we had it as a way out of the box we had both found ourselves in.

**LEGVOLD:** How shortly thereafter, Les?

**GELB:** Quickly. April.

**LEGVOLD:** What was going on in Moscow it those days immediately after March?

**DOBRYNIN:** I was involved immediately with the negotiations with Cy and Gelb—and with Marshall, too—on this issue—exactly on this issue. We were just preparing this “tripartite” or three-level plan, whatever you call it.

Well, in Moscow immediately after, of course, there was a recognition that we went to far, from both of our points of view. We knew that he had to find a way out; not immediately,

necessarily, but little by little. So, there was movement. I don't recall who was the first to reestablish communication, but somebody spoke rather quickly. And we established contact with the State Department—with Vance—and we began the exchange.

At first, we had no specific concrete plan. But we did intend to get something to move us forward. There was a mutual desire on both sides. So I was acting under this instruction from my government, and they were acting on theirs. And then things began to develop more elaborately. But in the beginning we were just saying, "Let's find a way," and ultimately that wasn't very simple, really. We had an unacceptable proposal on one side—unacceptable for the other—so what were we to do? We had to construct some kind of alternative. This three-level proposal ultimately ended in the agreement of 1979, if you look at it. It was the basis for '79.

VANCE: Basically, it was a very good—

DOBRYNIN: Basically, it was a very good ground, and there was not really much difficulty when we negotiated these issues with the State Department, and then with Gromyko they finalized all the details. It was done very quickly because both sides recognized that it was a good proposal.

I think that if we had begun with this kind of proposal when you first came to Moscow, everything would have been fine. But I am saying "if;" history was different.

LEGVOLD: Nikolai, could I ask you, from your perspective, sitting in Moscow, what was the reaction to all of this?

DETINOV: As far as I can recall that time, we in Moscow were also trying to come up with a way to restore a normal negotiating process. Our side prepared some proposals that included an agreement to some reductions in overall levels of the strategic arms. A decision had been made to reduce them by 150 launchers—from 2400 to 2250—in the overall level of strategic weapons.

DOBRYNIN: That was at the level of the delegations.

DETINOV: And that had opened the possibility of introducing sublevels in ballistic missiles with MIRVs. To some extent those proposals that Vance brought to Moscow in March had been included.

LEGVOLD: Before I turn to Marshall, let me come back to the question of the atmosphere that you were describing on the Moscow side in the weeks leading up to, and including the March meeting. I think the most comprehensive statement of that was made by Anatoly: there was enormous frustration that the American administration was trying to dictate a new agenda in a number of spheres, including strategic arms control and human rights. What happened to that sentiment? Was the leadership satisfied that they had adequately rebuffed the American side? Did they decide that they were mistaken in the way in which they had defined the problem?

DOBRYNIN: Well, I think you do understand that there was no major confession in the Politburo: "Thank you, we are sinners, etc." There is no question about it. The question was very simple.

DETINOV: They were pragmatic.

DOBRYNIN: Yes, they were very pragmatic. So there was great tension, and we were sitting and thinking about what to do next. Should we go further? If so, where do we go further? Do we break off negotiations on SALT? Do we break diplomatic relations? It was logical to consider the alternatives. But we decided to look once again at the proposal which was brought by Vance, to see if we could find some basis for resuming negotiations. Then came the three-level proposal. We decided to negotiate on the basis of that. Gromyko was originally against this, but then he really encouraged it. Brezhnev recognized that we could not stand still forever; it was a new administration, and we had to deal with it. The question was how. We could not have complete deadlock for four more years.

So, we searched for a way out. There was no change of mind; no one felt sorry about how

things had happened. They felt that there was a need for a pragmatic approach. We had to do something to find a way, so to speak, to keep contact, to explore our common ground, to work little by little to rebuild this kind of process and deal with the arms race, even though we could not do it the way we had hoped. This was the feeling, and nobody objected to it.

LEGVOLD: I've got three responses to this point now on this specific issue: Marshall, Les, and then Harold. Marshall?

SHULMAN: First I'd like to underline what Les said about the credit that the record should show for Bill Hyland's contribution at this point, breaking out the three stage approach. That, I think, helped really to move toward the ultimate solution.

Secondly, it's important at this point, I think, to take account of the fact that there were several extraneous issues that interfered with the process. And from the time of the May negotiations with Gromyko through the following year, two issues arose that interfered with the negotiations. One of these was Ethiopia, and the issue of the Cuban troops there—

DOBRYNIN: That was in '77, wasn't it? It was later; one year later.

SHULMAN: But the meetings, as I recall, between Gromyko and the president on the issue of Soviet military involvement in Ethiopia came, as I recall, in—what?—1978?

DOBRYNIN: '78; even later.

SHULMAN: No, but bear in mind that negotiations started in Geneva in May, and went through a year and a half cycle before they were approved.

DOBRYNIN: Yes, but we discussed with Cy the three-tier, three-level—

SHULMAN: All right; but look what happened. In the course of 1978 we went through series of negotiations, and by the end of the year we had almost reached an agreement when there came the second extraneous issue, which was China.

Why was it that it took so long to pick up the pieces and to move forward? At this point in the record, it's important to take account of the extraneous issues that interfered with the negotiations. One of them was Ethiopia, and another one was China.

DOBRYNIN: There were many other issues.

LEGVOLD: Marshal, I think that the issue of the Ogaden didn't really begin to have an impact until the fall of 1977. And the interesting thing is that, in fact, enormous progress was made, given what happened in March, between April and the fall of '77. It wasn't just the May meeting; there was also the September meeting where you really did push things along. And the interesting thing is that you did make that much progress in that period of time. Les, you are next.

GELB: Just a historical footnote that turned out to be a center-stage problem for us—because, while we solved the problem of establishing a new framework for negotiations with the three-tiered proposal, and while we dealt with our problem with the Soviet Union, we triggered a new problem here, in the United States, with the opponents of the SALT agreement. They argued, particularly at that point Senator Jackson and Paul Nitze, that we had put a serious proposal on the table in March—

DOBRYNIN: This is exactly what I mentioned.

GELB: —and you kicked us in the teeth on it, and then we immediately caved in. And so we opened up a door to criticism here at home.

At the same time, we opened a door to criticism from our allies, because in order to try to move with you quickly we didn't pay much attention to them, and that created a whole series of other issues that became very important in the course of these negotiations, such as the forward-based systems, and non-circumvention questions.

BROWN: As I look back, it seems to me that the SALT negotiations proceeded really quite

well after both sides had looked at what they had done in March and decided to proceed. It delayed them perhaps, which didn't seem so bad at the time, but created problems later on—after '78 or '79—when it came time for ratification. But I think that both sides regrouped and went back into serious negotiations. After all, from '72 to '76 the previous administration did not manage to get a new agreement; and this was pretty well wrapped-up by the end of '78, although the formal signing did not take place until June of '79. On the U.S. side there was, however, if I recall correctly, a residue of the March debacle that I think affected the way we thought about each other. Certainly, I think, it affected the way the U.S. side thought. And I think that so far as the U.S. military was concerned, it failed to be remedied by an attempt which failed because of U.S. behavior, not Soviet behavior: to establish direct military-to-military contact. That was a case in which the U.S. ambassador, Mac Toon, showed that a can have an effect, and not always a good one. He was unwilling to deliver the invitation that we had extended for Ogarkov to visit the United States, except personally to Ustinov.

All of this, I think, left a residue that's hard to evaluate. I would make one other observation, and that is that if we look at lessons for the future, the difficulties created by the access of the free press to official positions on these matters created much more of a problem in the U.S. than in the Soviet Union. Now that Russia has entered into the capitalist millennium with freedom of the press, it's going to be a two-sided problem.

**LEGVOLD:** Are there any others who want to comment on any of these issues? Let me push us on, then. My judgment may be wrong at this score, but it strikes me that you did achieve enormous progress, as I said, from April to the Fall of 1977. Harold has said that it then took you another year to wind it up but that you had the agreement more or less in this essential form by late Fall 1978. And, indeed, I think you thought you were going to wind it up in Geneva in December of 1978, although it took a few more months. The question I have for you is, why? And this may be in part what Marshall was touching on. Why did it take so long after the Fall of 1977 to get what you finally got in the Fall of 1978?

**GELB:** It turned out that when the Nixon—rather, when the Kissinger administration [Laughter] turned over life to the Carter administration, and said that the agreement was 90% completed,

it was probably closer to, what, 30% completed? In real terms, in terms of the negotiating document?

DOBRYNIN: I think a little bit more.

GELB: 35%. [Laughter.] If you look at the text at that time and the text at time of the conclusion of SALT II, it's about a third and no more than that. And even when the new framework was concluded, every time we tried to settle one problem we discovered three new ones. It just became very technical as the negotiations became very serious. I don't think there were any dilatory tactics. Some of the issues which were deferred were just incredibly difficult: telemetry encryption, for example, was a very difficult issue. Forward-based systems were a very difficult issue. Non-circumvention was a very difficult issue.

DOBRYNIN: Plus the definition of cruise missiles.

GELB: Yes, the definition of cruise missile was a difficult issue. Everyone of these issues turned out to be far more technical than we thought. And even at the end, when both sides announced that the summit was going to occur in three or four weeks, there were roughly 40-odd issues that we still had bracketed in the text. And in the remaining three weeks all of those issues were resolved. They were technical, and we resolved a number of them, I think, without fully understanding them, just to have the summit. [Laughter.]

VANCE: That's correct. We sat down with Anatoly on most of these and we were able to dispose of them at a very, very rapid pace.

LEGVOLD: Viktor Starodubov.

STARODUBOV: It is a very interesting topic we are touching right now. I was in Geneva as a member of the Soviet delegation at that very time. How did we perceive the situation? It was like a donkey. Sometimes to make him go faster, they put a bunch of hay in front of his nose.

And he walks and thinks, “I will get it now, and eat it, and everything will be fine, and I will not be hungry.” This is how we, in the end of the negotiations—in 1979—were moving toward the signing of the SALT II agreement. Every day we were thinking: “One more week, two weeks, and we’ll get it done;” but every time a new question would appear.

And meanwhile, I would like to stress that the Soviet side did not put any new questions on the table. Let’s take the encryption issue that Gelb has just mentioned. What kind of issue is it? I think the majority of the participants know what it is, but just in case somebody doesn’t, the encryption issue is about the American side’s proposal to the Soviet side—it dealt only with the Soviet side, because we did not ask a similar thing from the U.S. The Soviet side did not encrypt the information which we received from our missiles during the testing. So naturally, we asked: what kind of information is it that you are talking about? We asked this question to the side which had introduced the proposal. But they shrugged their shoulders, unable to say anything about what kind of information they asked not to be encrypted.

LEGVOLD: The negotiations apparently have not yet ended. [Laughter.]

STARODUBOV: Or maybe they knew what they wanted, but did not want to tell the Soviet side.

DOBRYNIN: That’s exactly the point.

STARODUBOV: And that question, in essence, was left unresolved. Nobody was able to understand the formula that was put into the agreement. It made no sense. Later this question had been discussed in the Soviet-American Standing Consulting Commission. Still the matter had not been finalized. We left it at the point where the Soviet side said, “We are ready, we will give you any information you want; but tell us, exactly, what kind?” But because they didn’t tell us what kind, the question was left to rest. If we had tried to resolve this question completely, we could have spent ten more years on the encryption issue. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Stan Turner on this, and then Bill Odom. Stan?

TURNER: To begin with, you mentioned this was a one-way agreement, but that's because we were not encrypting any telemetry. [Laughter.] And the agreement would have applied to us had we wanted to do so, which we didn't. From the intelligence point of view, we were in a no-win situation here. With a great stream of telemetry, you can get lots of different information. If we identified to you precisely which portion of that stream we needed in order to verify certain terms of the agreement, all you had to do was screw up those few numbers.

DOBRYNIN: That's why we were asking you that question. [Laughter.]

STARODUBOV: If you would like, we could continue this discussion right now at the table; but I am not sure if everyone is ready to listen to it. And I would also like to add that we could not receive the information from the American missiles, because, as you know, it was being shot off in capsules, as far as I know, rather than transmitted. A ship would pick up the capsules with the information inside. We couldn't have picked them up, even though the information was not encrypted.

LEGVOLD: Bill Odom.

ODOM: This verification issue—the encryption issue—I saw only peripherally in the 1970s, but I saw it very closely through the 1980s. It reflected a fundamental, political difficulty that precluded implementation of some of these verification measures on a basis that would satisfy the U.S. public and U.S. Congress. So it seems to me that, already in the Carter administration, we were running up against what the Reagan administration ran up against. Encryption was always right at the center of it. And until you had a fundamental political change in Russia, you just could not get to where we wanted to go by the means that we were trying proceed. It seems to me that once you introduced a number of factors in the counting rules, there was no way out of this, and we were thrust up against this unresolvable difference in political views and trust.

STARODUBOV: I apologize to the Chairman, but I would like to add a couple of words. What is encryption? What is it? It is an instrument of control. An instrument of control over what? Of new types of missiles. Now, what is a new type of a missile? What were the defining parameters? The number of stages; the kind of fuel; initial weight; throw weight; and the number of warheads, if my memory serves me right. Which of these parameters were included in the telemetry information? Do you think the Soviet side encrypted the information about the number of stages, or about the kind of fuel—solid or liquid? You don't need telemetry information for that. Initial weight is known a priori. The throw weight is also known to the Soviet side; why would it need to get this information from space? It is known without any telemetry. Therefore, not a single parameter which was included in the treaty, and was used for defining a new type of a missile, could be included in telemetric information. And if there aren't any in there, then what do you want to control for? Do you understand what I mean? Maybe there is still something to control for; but then, do tell us. The Soviet side was ready, as a gesture of good will, to meet you halfway, to agree to that, to open something else. But there was nothing required under the treaty.

ODOM: I think your comments are merely vindicating my general proposition.

LEGVOLD: Nikolai on this, briefly.

DETINOV: We have spent so much time on the issue of the encryption of telemetry information, but all this issue indicates is the attitude of certain individuals in Washington to the negotiations. I just wanted to remind you how that question came up in the negotiations. During a discussion of the Soviet delegation with the American delegation, one Soviet member of the delegation said, "Maybe you'd like us not to encrypt the telemetry information?" And then the American responded, "Yes, that's exactly what we want." As a result, that question became almost the most important issue in the negotiations.

I would like to stress that there were many questions of that kind, especially at the final stage of the negotiations. They had been sort of "constructed" deliberately in order to

aggravate the process of the negotiations—in order to slow down the process of the SALT negotiations. One didn't even need to be particularly ingenious for that.

LEGVOLD: Zbig, and then Stan on this point, and then Cy.

BRZEZINSKI: This is just going to be an anecdote, but it's *à propos*, and happens to be true. Cy was in Geneva, and we were negotiating with your side, and telemetry came up. And Cy phoned me up and left a message for me. For some reason you couldn't connect, so I had to call you back. You were then in the Soviet Embassy. Marshall came on the line and said to me, "Do you know where Cy is?" And I said, "Yes I know, but I need to talk to him because Cy asked me a question whether we were willing to change our position on telemetry." In the meantime, I asked Harold and Stan to come into my office. It was late at night. We had a discussion on this, and it was decided we had to ask the president. So, I phoned up the president. He was down here in Georgia. And now the anecdotal part arises, which is not in memoirs or anywhere. The president was in bed with hemorrhoids. [Laughter.] And the question was: what's more important, telemetry or hemorrhoids? [Laughter.] And we finally decided that it was telemetry.

I remember that I consulted with him after Stan and Harold made their position very, very clear. And then the president said, "Well, we just have to stick with that position." And, as I remember, I called you back, Cy, and I could tell that you were disappointed about it. [Laughter.] That's the connection here: hemorrhoids and telemetry.

DOBRYNIN: At that time we didn't have Preparation H. [Laughter.]

LEGVOLD: Stan?

TURNER: I'd like to suggest that if the Soviets were to test a missile with ten warheads but simulated five more, telemetry would be useful. And it's not a frivolous thing, as you've been suggesting. We can see ten go off, but you don't have to send ten off in a test in order to determine that it could, in fact, fire more.

LEGVOLD: Cy?

VANCE: I think we've talked enough about this subject, so let's move on to another.

LEGVOLD: All right. Viktor, are you on this subject? Because I agree with Cy.

STARODUBOV: No, I can wait.

LEGVOLD: Then I'm going to hold you off. And let me make a general point, because I think we may be losing sight of one dimension of this issue as a result of this exchange over telemetry and encryption. Les Gelb said at the beginning of this part of the conversation that, in fact, one of the major reasons for the delay between the Fall of 1977 and the Fall of '78 was that an enormous amount of work—difficult work, detailed work—remained to be done. And then you picked out a few of these illustrations. In looking at the minutes that we have from your ministerial meeting in the Fall of '78, Cy—the meeting that you began in New York, and that you then carried back down to Washington—Gromyko continually says to you that the Soviet side is put off by this practice of bringing up a new obstacle as soon as one obstacle is resolved. The question is really addressed to the Soviet side. Was that your view in this period? That, in fact, these were ploys or tactics on the part of the United States to make things difficult? Or did you, in fact, believe that these were difficult issues and this was a negotiating ploy on Gromyko's part to make that argument? The reason why that's important is that if the Soviet side really did believe that a lot of this was happening for political reasons rather than for substantive and intrinsic reasons, then it would have made the process of reaching agreements even more difficult. Viktor?

STARODUBOV: Did Gromyko contribute dragging things out? Clearly not. You can see that there were no new Soviet proposals in the final stage of the negotiations. And he could not have been slowing the work on the agreement down in any other way. I begin from the end in order to put this question to rest.

How did we see it? Of course, when we saw new questions constantly emerging, we could not help thinking that it had been done deliberately. Maybe it was not so. But then, why were the Americans introducing new proposals? I am just telling you my own impressions, as we saw it in the Soviet delegation. We were considering new proposals all the time. We thought, on the basis of the information that we had, that the Carter team wanted the agreement, but that it also wanted to protect itself from right-wing criticism, and that's why, at that final stage, they were introducing some clarifications, or some improvements to the treaty, which would have reduced their vulnerability to criticism from those who opposed the treaty. We thought that it was not so much Carter's team, or the administration, that was to blame, but the pressure that the opponents of the treaty—which at that time became more powerful—were able to exert on the administration. We could see it in both the information that we were receiving and from the press. I would say, we need to differentiate our judgments when we look at this issue.

In short, we did not have any direct grievances against the Carter administration.

**LEGVOLD:** Harold.

**BROWN:** I think there may have been two elements here. One, indeed, has to do with the need for the U.S. administration to get the treaty ratified, and to that end it was important to be able to defend the treaty against the charge—as Anatoly mentioned—that we had fallen far back from our original positions. That was a difficulty that the Soviet side did not have. And to take care of that it was important for the U.S. side to do as well on the subsequent negotiations—to gain as many of these points as possible.

There was a separate matter, I think, and that was a feeling on the U.S. side that it was very important to be as precise as possible in the provisions of the treaty, because, as we saw it—this may have been incorrect on our part; but I think it was correct—the U.S. side would have very great difficulty in interpreting imprecise provisions the way it had intended them when matters were agreed. In other words, we felt that when something was papered over, the Soviet side could take advantage of the imprecision, while the United States could not. Again, that may not have been correct. But that is the way we saw it.

And, indeed, we had the example of many of the previous negotiations and agreements that Kissinger had signed off on proving this to be the case. The issue of the volume of missile silos, for example—when 5% in dimension turned out to be 15% in volume. The failure to identify what an “air-to-surface missile” meant—whether it meant ballistic missiles, or whether it meant cruise missiles as well—was another problem. With those examples before us, we felt it was very important to nail things down. And that takes longer. It may have appeared to the Soviet side to be an attempt to delay things on the U.S. side, but it reflected very serious concerns on our part.

**LEGVOLD:** A question to the Soviet side on this score: If, as Viktor Starodubov has said, the Soviet negotiators and Soviet policy makers believed that many of these issues were raised because the administration wanted to protect itself against potential criticism from the opponents of the treaty; and if you believed that the political environment in the United States was growing more difficult for the administration on these issues; then why didn't you feel pressured to speed up the conclusion of this agreement before more time passed?

**DOBRYNIN:** I may put it this way. While I agree with what my colleague General Starodubov said—because he knows these things better than I—I should say that not all of the people on the political side really believed in this stuff about ratification being more difficult or less difficult, because—particularly in this period—there were so many official approaches from your side on small things. “We ask you to give in on this, because otherwise we will have difficulty in ratification,” or, “We would like you to take into consideration such-and-such because of the difficulty of ratification.” This matter, by the way, was a special subject for discussion in the government in the autumn of '78. We got a little bit suspicious, really. You were trying to get a lot of concessions by arguing that otherwise the treaty will not be ratified—not just on arms control, but on other issues as well. We were told, “Look here, the fellows on the Right—Mr. Jackson or some others—will be against it. So, let's do this.” It was unbelievable.

Once before the summit, for example, you asked us about reconnaissance flights along the Soviet-Turkish border. You asked permission—I don't know why you needed it, but nevertheless, you asked it, so we were definitely against it. This is just one example; I could

give you others, rather trivial ones—because there were so many. These appeals to the importance of verification for domestic political reasons were so many that they became, as I said, a subject for special discussion in our government.

LEGVOLD: Could you recall the specific date?

DOBRYNIN: In the autumn; I don't recall.

LEGVOLD: What year?

DOBRYNIN: '78.

LEGVOLD: Cy Vance.

VANCE: I just want to make a point—and it's an important point, I think. Verification was a very important issue politically. That's something that everybody understands: whether the other side will be honest, or whether they're going to cheat, is very important. And it's a very technical business. But it was very important because this was the kind of thing where somebody, when you were trying to get the treaty ratified, could say, "Yes, but you haven't proved that we can verify it, and then how can we be sure that they aren't going to cheat?" So that was not a simple issue to deal with, as all of the issues we are now talking about were not simple. They are very complex because of the kinds of very technical and complicated machinery used in military matters. So I don't think it's strange that it took more time than most of us thought or hoped that it would. These were issues that had to be resolved, and as painful as it might be to do it, they had to be done because they were not things you could just toss away.

LEGVOLD: Before I turn to—

VANCE: There is one other thing that just came to my mind: the Iranian radar. That was a very important thing. We lost that at that time, as you will recall, and that made it even more

important that we find other ways to be sure that we were able to get what we needed for the purposes of verification.

**LEGVOLD:** Before I turn to Jim Blight, and then to Phil Brenner—Cy, when you had those sessions with Gromyko in the Fall of '78—in September, and then on the first day of October—where he was making this case to you that every time there was one problem resolved, another one came up, what did you judge that to represent? Did you think that he was serious about it, or that he was trying to manipulate you on the issue?

**VANCE:** I had the feeling that he was being pushed by his people; that therefore that he was coming back and pushing us; and that he really didn't pretend to know what the complexities of this kind of issue were. But there were people whom he trusted, and I felt that they were pushing him, and therefore he came to us and tried to push us to move things along.

**LEGVOLD:** Jim Blight.

**BLIGHT:** I would like to ask a question, if I could, to both sides. To the U.S. side—especially, to Dr. Brzezinski—the question is about President Carter. I have the impression from the documents, and from my own memory, that Jimmy Carter was, of course, inexperienced when he came to office, but a man of very deep convictions about the two issues that we've been discussing here, the primary issue being disarmament, but also human rights, as some people on the U.S. side have explained. I also have the impression that he was kind of an impatient person—impatient to move ahead. I'm just wondering about this period we're talking about—between, let's say, March of '77 and a year or so later, while all this process was going on and seeming to get bogged down and getting very technical. What memories do you have about the evolution of the president's thinking, and his growing into this new kind of problem that had to face?

I'd also like to address this to the other side, particularly those of you who knew Mr. Brezhnev. What about his perception of the process, and also of President Carter?

LEGVOLD: Zbig.

BRZEZINSKI: I think you've characterized the president correctly. He was genuinely an idealist. And he believed it would be possible to achieve deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. He did stress, as I have said earlier, the importance of our approaching this in a manner that the Soviets would not perceive as being one-sidedly focused on achieving an American advantage. And that, of course, was not easy to convey to the other side. He was also a person who liked to be deeply engrossed in these issues, and he monitored them in enormous depth. He understood the different options and their technicalities I think as well as any of us. Better than I. Particularly as months went on, he became increasingly impatient with the process, and while he did blame the Soviets somewhat—or even considerably—for the difficulties, I think there came a time when he started blaming some of us as well, and felt that some of us were perhaps being excessively rigid, or too insistent on specific provisions. He became uneasy about that.

Beyond that he a specific problem, to which Cy alluded: namely, that the ratification process would involve testimony by his principal advisers, and also, particularly, from the military services. He knew that in the ratification process they would be asked explicitly by the Senators, "Does this protect American security adequately? Is it verifiable?" And we, frankly, were not sure, until very late in the game, whether the JCS would be prepared to say that it was verifiable. I think Stan had serious concerns, and, to his credit, he had the courage to answer those questions honestly. It was his responsibility to do so. He expressed skepticism. I remember having some discussions with him on the question of verification, and of telemetry, where he very courageously said, "Well, until this is resolved—until there is a satisfactory answer—I cannot testify that this is verifiable." These were things that made the president impatient. I think he kind of tempered his idealism over time, but his impatience showed throughout.

LEGVOLD: Thank you. Is there someone on the Soviet side that would comment on your perceptions of the president and General Secretary Brezhnev's mood as you went through this prolonged period of actually finalizing an agreement?

DOBRYNIN: General Secretary Brezhnev was not bothered very much with the ratification. So, it was not really an issue for him. [Laughter.] Verification, too, was not a very important issue for him personally. I am not speaking about—

LEGVOLD: No, I'm asking how he felt about this long, drawn-out process of completing the agreement, and in turn, how he saw Carter?

DOBRYNIN: Let me put it this way. First, I think he became used to it. It was a long process, and nobody knew whether we would reach the end of it. Second, of course, he was a little bit impatient, but what he could do? When you come to the highly technical questions, he was in no position to judge—as Gromyko, by the way, could not judge, either. When we were diplomats sat and listened to the Generals say, "Look here, it's very important to have this encryption," we knew nothing about its real importance. Then an American would say, "It's very important, this issue." I couldn't even pass my judgment as a politician. I guess Gromyko didn't know either. Usually he would not speak from notes, but when these highly technical matters came up, he would read from his papers. Cy remembers.

VANCE: I remember.

DOBRYNIN: It's useful to know the details about what Mr. Turner just mentioned. I understand the problem he had before the Congress. I am sure that our people in the military, too, in their own way, worried about verification. They, too, wanted more or less perfection in the agreement. But at the same time I could tell, too, that our military men sometimes became impatient, and would say, "Look here, they are again asking another question." They sometimes felt that it was completely unnecessary. We would accept their judgment. We would say that these things were unnecessary. Ultimately we would ask them: what really do you need? It became so highly complicated technically.

That's why we became involved in such protracted discussions without, on the political side, knowing very much what we were talking about. This was the difficulty. There were many

other issues which preoccupied us in 1978, too—Ogaden, Somalia, the Middle East “Arc of Crisis,” as my dear friend referred to it [indicating Brzezinski], sending us running to the map asking, “Where this Arc of Crisis going on?” [Laughter.] Even Brezhnev looked at the map, because he was interested in knowing where this Arc of Crisis was that he had created. [Laughter.] So, it was an educational process, too. [Laughter.] There were other issues, as you know, too: a new adventure in South-East Asia—our beloved friend China organized something there; then our friend Vietnam, too. So we were trying to say, “Let’s do something;” but how were we to do it? Sometimes our minds were very much preoccupied. It wasn’t a situation where there was a cloudless sky and SALT was our only concern. No. We were preoccupied with many other things.

The Cuban brigade, which came up later, was another example. We spent a whole month on it. A whole month! There was a lapse of memory from your intelligence community, and the result was a Cuban brigade crisis. A whole month we were arguing. But this was typical. There were other difficulties as well. China, of course, was very much involved. We will probably discuss this issue tomorrow; I just mention it now in answering your question. SALT was not the only issue in our relations during this period of time. We were very much preoccupied with these other negative developments. They made it rather difficult to push a little bit quicker on SALT.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly is whetting our appetite, because a lot of what he has raised in his comment is something that we are going to come to tomorrow; but not at this hour, this afternoon. Harold, early on in Anatoly’s comment, you wanted to say something; and then I am going to turn to Phil Brenner. But let’s wait on the broader set of issues that he raised in his comment.

**BROWN:** Well, two points. One that he raised earlier has to do with the use by the U.S. side of its political Right—the U.S. political Right—as a reason for the Soviet side to make concessions. I think that was so used; but it worked the other way as well. Americans within the government—and I don’t know how much they heard this from the Soviet side—would say, “Well, Brezhnev has his hawks and his doves, and the more we stonewall the Soviet Union on

these arms control issues, or on other issues, the less likely we are to get an agreement.”

This came up with respect to U.S.-China relations. Some would say: “The more the U.S. does that sort of thing, the more trouble Brezhnev will have controlling his hawks, the military, the security services, and the ideologues.” So, it worked both ways—perhaps not as visibly on the Soviet side, but there as well.

The other point I want to make is that when things get bogged down in details and get delayed—whether they have to do with complicated military technical issues, or whether they have to do with geostrategic issues—the political leader needs to be able to make the judgment that this is a detail that we should not pursue. That’s what political leaders get paid to do. And, I think, President Carter on our side did make some such decisions. Some of them may well have been wrong; many of them I think were correct.

**LEGVOLD:** Phil Brenner.

**BRENNER:** Part of what goes on in negotiation is the process of confidence building, where both sides have to convince the other that they deserve the other side’s confidence. Can I ask the Russian side—and this is a difficult and delicate question; I can ask it because I’m not a diplomat—what confidence did you have in the American side? In particular, what confidence did you have in some of the people who are sitting at the table today? In some ways, this is an extension of Jim Blight’s question; it’s not only a question of the confidence you had in President Carter, but also in the particular people that you were dealing with.

In the press during this period there reports of conflicts within the administration. In private conversations here I am told that those conflicts were overstated—that this was the press manufacturing conflicts. But to what extent did you believe that those conflicts between some of the principals here were real? And did you feel that they were preventing the administration from being able to negotiate the treaty? Did you feel that they ultimately prevented them from getting the treaty through the Senate?

**LEGVOLD:** Nikolai, I’m willing to move you up on the list if you’re willing to answer that question. [Laughter.]

DETINOV: I would like to direct your attention to the other side of this question. Of course we mistrusted each other. It would be unfair to say now that we trusted each other completely. However, by the end of the negotiations, we got to know each other really well, and the level of trust rose.

I would like to mention one other thing. You see, SALT II was, in essence, the first agreement in history about reducing strategic arms. It was packed not only with political questions about the general levels of armaments, but also with a lot of very technical issues, very specific technical issues. Only very few people understood those issues. And those technical questions were very hard to formulate, and to find satisfactory solutions to. As we say, you cannot hop over your head. We had to think over and over about issue such as the definition of a cruise missile. How long did we spend on it, on that definition—an issue that now seems like nothing? We dwelt on this issue for months in order to be able to say exactly what a cruise missile is. What is the radius of a cruise missile? Never before, never in history, had we had such commonly agreed-on definitions. But here we had to work them out.

And I have to say that the SALT II agreement opened the door for subsequent treaties, because when we were negotiating about strategic arms later, in the Reagan years, we were taking those definitions as the basis for our discussions. We firmly stood on the ground of understandings which had been achieved during the SALT II negotiations. And that helped us immensely to move faster in the subsequent negotiations. But here we had to walk all this way. Nobody could walk it for us. Therefore, of course there were some questions—some extraneous questions. Some were introduced by the Soviet Union, some by the American administration; of course it made the process more difficult. But more importantly, we needed time to work things out. This, I think, took all the time, all the period that we are talking about.

LEGVOLD: Thank you. My list now is Bob Pastor, Mark Garrison, and David Welch. Bob?

PASTOR: Just a brief question. One sign of President Carter's impatience, according to the documents, seems to have been his desire to have a summit meeting with Brezhnev. I think this was a message that he sent through Harriman, and that he repeated despite Zbig's advice that he shouldn't keep repeating it. Obviously, it did reflect the politician's sense of the need

to sit down across the table from his counterpart and see whether or not he could communicate his own sincerity. Was it a lost opportunity that the two leaders did not meet until Vienna, in June of '79? Did the Soviets consider an earlier summit? Why did you not seize the opportunity?

LEGVOLD: Anatoly.

DOBRYNIN: To answer this specific question: my personal opinion is, yes, it was a mistake on our side not to have a summit. That was my opinion then, and it is still my opinion now. It was a mistake that we were linking SALT II and a summit. It was really Gromyko's idea; he sold it to Brezhnev. Gromyko firmly believed that we should have a SALT II agreement ready for signing at a summit, and that we should not have a summit beforehand. And Brezhnev went along because he was at such an age that he was not prepared to sit down with Carter, who knew the subject quite well, and negotiate SALT II during a summit conference. He simply couldn't do it. That's why he was deferring.

Brezhnev also remembered the situation when Khrushchev met with Kennedy in Vienna, and what happened there. He didn't want a repetition of that. He was already an old, distinguished gentleman; he just wanted to have a nice quiet signing, with everybody looking at him and kissing each other. This was his kind of paradise. [Laughter.] He was definitely too stubborn, really.

Many times, I remember—five times; six times, maybe, beginning in 1977 and all through '78—I spoke with Cy many times, and even the president himself twice mentioned to me directly when I met with him that he wanted a summit. He said directly, "Please pick any time." He mentioned this place, specifically, to fish and to hunt, etc. He offered all kinds of seductions. But he failed, because Gromyko and Brezhnev wanted to come and sign this nice agreement.

I believe that if Brezhnev had been of a little bit different state of mind—if he had had greater capacity—it would have been important from the very beginning to sit down and to discuss what we were against, what you were against, or what we were for, and what you were for. If that had been a possibility, there would have been no need for Vance to bring this

kind of proposal in March. You could have had an April summit meeting just for discussion, to clarify where you stand. But I said that the leadership—at least these two men—simply did not want to meet before there was an agreement. Gromyko believed very strongly that only through the diplomatic process we could make a good agreement.

As for the military, I could tell—and my friends from military could tell you—that Ustinov was definitely against a meeting with the military people from your side. He had quite an experience in '79, I can tell you; I was there. Carter pressed Brezhnev for a meeting between our ministers of defense. Ustinov balked. Then one evening, Brezhnev said to him, "Look, Carter and I want you to sit down with the Secretary of Defense, and you are refusing." Ustinov said, "That is not my job. It is the job of Gromyko and Dobrynin to discuss things with Americans, it's not my job." Brezhnev pressed him, but then Ustinov said, "What am I supposed to do there, discussing things with Brown? I have no specific position." Then Gromyko said, "Look, in Vienna you have the MBFR negotiations going on. We have a fallback position which our delegation didn't use; so I will give it to you, this fallback position, which I have been withholding for six months, and not using, waiting for the proper moment. I will present it to you." So then Ustinov said, "Okay, I will go." And he went, and he met with Brown with no diplomats involved—because Ustinov didn't want to have any diplomats present from our side or from your side. Ogarkov, I guess, was there on our side—Ustinov and Ogarkov. Nobody else from our side, except maybe an interpreter—a military interpreter, I think. So they had a discussion, and when he came back, you should have seen Ustinov's reaction. [To Brown:] He was so angry with you. He said, "I am talking one way then another, trying to negotiate, making some concessions by additional unilateral reductions in the number of troops in Europe, and he just sat there saying, 'Yes, yes,' without elaborating anything, or making a single concession in return. He just stuck with the same position. I don't know how Gromyko negotiates with Americans in general. I am not going to negotiate with them any more. Period." That was the Vienna discussion. It shows you the mood of the military. They were very much involved in the negotiations, and they were sometimes decisive in working out our positions; but not in a direct negotiation, really.

I think that was a mistake. Many of them were really very able people who knew much better than we diplomats knew. And they couldn't discuss things. But that was the mood of

their top man. He did not want to be in the front-line of the negotiations.

LEGVOLD: Mark Garrison is next.

GARRISON: I want to go back to Anatoly's previous comments about the usefulness of the telemetry discussion, because it helped get at the question of how difficult it was on the Soviet side to understand the political dynamics on the American side. I guess the lesson I would draw from that is the necessity and importance of having the best possible understanding of the dynamics—including the internal political dynamics—on the other side, in order to separate out those things which are real from those which are not. In that particular period the Soviet side had a problem understanding our internal dynamics, just as in the early Carter period we had a problem understanding the internal dynamics of the Soviet side.

One other kind of dynamic that was at play here. I put it to you with some trepidation; perhaps we don't want to get into this at this late hour. But Les mentioned, among many of the issues that came up in this period, issues affecting American allies, which is another case where the American side was under certain real pressures, and I assume that on the Soviet side there was a problem of understanding the extent to which these were real and the extent to which they were a lever used by the American side to get some additional concessions. If at some point there is time and interest in getting into that, it might be an interesting brief discussion.

LEGVOLD: Mark, I think that's an issue that we want to come back to tomorrow. It deserves some discussion. David Welch, you have been patient, and you get the last word this afternoon.

DAVID WELCH: I don't have a last word, but a question; so maybe I should put it off until tomorrow also?

LEGVOLD: If it's a question that's can be answered fairly briefly, go ahead and ask it.

**WELCH:** Okay. I am intrigued by the image of Mr. Gromyko negotiating forcefully on the basis of notes that he doesn't understand written by military experts, and my question is this: if military experts were so crucial in formulating Soviet positions and responding to American proposals, what was the chief criterion Soviet military experts were using to evaluate different negotiating positions? Was it crisis stability? Was it numerical equity? Was it some other conception of the security needs of the Soviet Union?

**DOBRYNIN:** I think this question could be more easily answered by our military representatives here. We, the Soviet diplomats, used to evaluate different negotiating positions mostly in terms of numerical equity.

**WELCH:** One of the documents I found most intriguing in the briefing book was a memorandum Mr. Brown prepared in May 1976 as an overview of SALT. It is interesting to me, because it includes a very detailed list of U.S. goals and objectives in arms control negotiations, and an analysis of some of the trade-offs between them. What I am wondering is whether there was a similar list of goals or objectives on the Soviet side, or a similar discussion of the trade-offs between them?

**LEGVOLD:** Viktor Sukhodrev, and then I'm going to come back to Cy.

**SUKHODREV:** I just want to finish the subject of Gromyko's raucous press conference following Secretary Vance's visit. That press conference wasn't planned. It happened to be unplanned. It was done on the spur of the moment. Sergei, I think, earlier said that Gromyko was reflecting the angry mood of Brezhnev. Yes, he was. Gromyko made quite a long statement, and then took some questions. Most of it was statement. It had not been written by any expert. He had nothing written by the Foreign Ministry, or by the military, or anyone. He had just a couple of pages with his famous (or infamous) blue-pencil unreadable handwriting on them. He got a few figures wrong, and Kornienko had to do some homework before they could be published in the press the next day.

LEGVOLD: A quick comment, and then a concluding statement. Cy, you said that to some degree you felt your own press conference in Moscow had played a role in it. But many of the outsiders who looked at this at the time believed that the Gromyko response was really directed in several directions. He was responding not merely to your press conference, but to your comments, Zbig, in Washington, and to the president's own press conferences.

VANCE: Mine was after Gromyko.

LEGVOLD: I thought yours was before; but Carter's were before. In any case, there was a feeling that he was also responding to the president's public statements.

VANCE: Yes, to answer the question which was just asked a moment ago. I—and, I'm sure, Gromyko as well—didn't just come in with a sheet of paper that somebody had written on. We discussed things with individuals who knew about these issues; we tried to understand them as accurately as we could—and usually we could understand pretty much the general framework of the issue, and certainly the nature of the problem that was involved. We talked those through. If I needed further details, I could turn to Harold, or to the other experts, or to Stan, and talk to them about telemetry and all that kind of stuff. And we did it. We did it repeatedly, and again and again. So, it isn't just as though we all came in like a bunch of dummies and read a sheet of paper and walked away.

LEGVOLD: I'm going to end now, and emphasize a point that David was making at the end, because I think we want to come back to it. I think it's a very interesting question when he points to Harold's memorandum during the election year of 1976. The question, to repeat again to the Soviet side—not for today, but for tomorrow—is this: we had a secretary of defense who came into office thinking about large issues in terms of strategic weapons, about what our objectives and primary concerns would be, about the trade-offs among them, and the things that we might do in the arms control area. Did the Minister of Defense and those who staffed him in an Moscow have the same thing, or was the essential approach to arms control fending off American proposals—in fact, reacting to the American agenda? A lot of your actual

diplomacy seemed to us to be reactive. So, that's for tomorrow.

## **MAY 8: MORNING SESSION 1**

**LEGVOLD:** All right, if we might begin now; I want to welcome all of you back to the second day of the meeting. And in particular I want to wish a happy Mother's Day to all of the mothers in the room. And thank you for joining us on this day.

The schedule for this morning called for us to begin by looking at the substantive issues in SALT and the primary problems in negotiating the agreement itself, then, in a later session this morning, to turn to what I call the extrinsic obstacles to the agreement. My sense of the group is that we don't want to spend much time talking about the issues at stake in SALT itself. But I don't want to leave the issue until every one around the table is satisfied on that score.

And in that spirit, before we move on, in effect collapsing these two sessions, I would like to repeat to the Soviet side the question that David Welch put last night. And that is: we have an example of how the senior—in fact, the most senior American defense official—thought about arms control and the American stake in the SALT agreement, and the way in which he saw the trade-offs between different American objectives—different positive American objectives. So far as you can, we would like you to reconstruct the military's stake in SALT on the Soviet side. Did they have a positive agenda? Did they have a way of understanding the trade-offs? Or was the military position driven largely by efforts to counter American objectives and to defend the Soviet military position? Would someone on the Soviet side be willing to address that question? Nikolai, you really are probably the most qualified to do it, if you're willing to say something.

**DETINOV:** I would like to add something. I need to say that we did not have any special program of possible compromises, compromises that we could possibly be making later on in order to make progress in the negotiations. After each round of negotiations, or after every meeting at the level of Gromyko and Vance, our interagency working group made an analysis

of the positions of both sides, considered once more all the issues on which we had not reached understanding, and tried to define what else could be done, what compromises could be made to reach an agreement.

**LEGVOLD:** If you permit me, let me push a little harder, and maybe others can also enter into the discussion on the Russian side. Those of us on the outside that watched the process had the impression that in SALT I—and as long as Grechko was Minister of Defense—you had, essentially, an opponent of arms control, a man who was very skeptical of the process itself, and who strongly resisted the compromises that the political leadership was willing to make. Anatoly Dobrynin told us about the Vladivostok meeting in 1974. Did that begin to change under Ustinov? Did the military begin to see a positive stake in strategic arms control?

**DETINOV:** A.A. Grechko died in 1974, and D.F. Ustinov came to office. It approximately coincided in time with the change of administration in the United States. I have to say that even though Grechko was very skeptical about the possibility of achieving any kind of agreement with the United States which would be satisfactory for the Soviet Union—such was his attitude to this issue—we did not have any significant complications during the negotiations. The process of preparing major decisions which we had in the Soviet Union at that time enabled us to come up with the decisions which we needed for working out certain agreements.

The most difficult question for the Soviet Union that came up during the SALT negotiations, in my opinion, was the question of counting MIRVed ballistic missiles under the ceiling of 1320. And the reason was that our SS-19 missiles were tested both in a MIRVed, and in a monobloc version at the missile sites in Derazhna and Pervomaisk. However, those missiles were deployed in a monobloc version. Grechko was categorically against counting as MIRVed the missiles deployed at those bases that were ever tested in a MIRVed mode. He thought that we should stick to the approach that if the missile is deployed with a MIRVed warhead, then it should be counted as MIRVed. If that same missile is deployed with a single warhead, then it should not be counted as MIRVed. Of course, it was a vulnerable position, and you couldn't have reached any agreement on that basis. But Grechko had a very firm position on this

issue. And this position hampered our progress. But nonetheless we were able to find a solution which enabled us to reach an agreement with the American side. Several people were against Grechko on this issue: Ustinov; Gromyko; and later Andropov joined their position. And they were able to resolve that question at the Brezhnev level, and to force Grechko to agree to count all missiles which were ever tested in a MIRVed version under the ceiling for MIRVed missiles. This was, I think, the most difficult question on which Grechko created obstacles to the negotiating process.

**LEGVOLD:** And Ustinov?

**DETINOV:** Ustinov from the very beginning believed that it was in the national interest of the Soviet Union to achieve an agreement on strategic arms reductions—of course on the condition that it would guarantee the security of the Soviet Union. He always made us work in order to find such decisions that would both enable us to reach an agreement but also to secure the defensive capacity of our country. In this sense he was like Gromyko, like Andropov—they were all for achieving an agreement with the U.S. on strategic arms reductions.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much. Harold, then Sergei, then Viktor. Harold?

**BROWN:** I would like to mention something that our Russian colleagues may want to comment on. Academician Aleksandr Shchukin, who was a senior member of the Soviet SALT delegation, and who, I'm told, worked closely with the military and with the technologists who worked with the military, told me on several occasions that many of the Soviet military looked on strategic arms in the same way as their experience in World War II had taught them to look on conventional arms: that just as what mattered in the assault on Berlin was the number of artillery pieces per kilometer that could be lined up, so that's the way they looked at nuclear weapons as well, and simply counting and having more numbers than the other side was what was important. He, of course, regarded this as somewhat naïve—or, at least, out of date in the nuclear age. And he had a more sophisticated view of what the balance was. I should say that on the U.S. side as well, especially in the Congress, such simple measures as

numbers of missiles and throw weight were also given more importance than is warranted in the case of nuclear weapons.

It was also my impression later on, and from a great distance, that when Marshal Ogarkov became Chief of General Staff, the analysis became considerably more sophisticated with much greater emphasis—both for conventional and for nuclear weapons—on qualitative measures and the importance of technology. And I really would like to find out from our Russian friends whether that is an accurate picture of what happened? Of course Ogarkov had experience at the SALT negotiations himself.

LEGVOLD: Nikolai, please.

DETINOV: I agree with you that a certain part of our leadership approached the problem of weapons development with measures that had been formed during the Second World War. But that is understandable—all our leaders of those years went through the war. For them it was the most formative experience of their lives. They all went through the very same hardships that the Soviet Union had to face during the war. They were convinced that to win a war, the Soviet Union had to have no fewer weapons than the possible adversary had. It would be even better if it had a few more weapons. The experience of World War Two has been felt in our country up until the very recent time. But I think that in the United States, also, the leaders who took part in the war had similar measures in their minds when they were talking about the security of their country.

In generational terms, the Soviet leadership was older than the American leadership. When new people—those who did not have that war experience—started coming to power, they looked at the problems of ensuring the country's security differently.

LEGVOLD: On my list now I have Sergei Tarasenko, Viktor Starodubov, and David Welch. But Viktor, you are very qualified to comment on these questions, too. So I'm going to move you up, take you next, and then go to Sergei.

STARODUBOV: Thank you for the compliment, and even more for the opportunity to speak. I

understand your question, but I cannot agree with your statement that the Soviet Union only followed and reacted to the proposals that the U.S. was introducing rather than introducing their own initiatives. I can give you an example when our initiatives were introduced at the negotiations. Unfortunately the American side did not take them seriously, as we would have liked.

Let's take the beginning of the SALT II negotiations. I just want to remind you of our position, and you will see for yourself that it did not follow or react to any of the American positions. The Soviet Union proposed to include in the definition of strategic weapons—besides the strategic ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers—the forward-based systems. I don't think that the Americans had ever raised that question in their proposals. Another example: we proposed to confine submarines with SLBMs to a region with agreed upon borders, and to do the same thing with aircraft carriers. We proposed to withdraw the forward-based systems from other national territories. This was our program. It did not resemble any American program. I don't think anyone would disagree with that. That's why I think that the question was not formulated appropriately.

I agree with what Nikolai Detinov has said: that in the beginning we did not have a long-term program for strategic disarmament; as you say, a step-by-step program. But we prepared different proposals, and different versions of our positions, for every new round of the negotiations. And they, of course, took account of the proposals that the American side was introducing. That was natural. On the other hand, we also considered versions that would ensure our demands, the requirements of our defense, and the requirements of deterrence. Sometimes we had up to five different versions before each round of negotiations. They were thoroughly discussed by the General Staff in the beginning, then by the Small Five that we've mentioned here. The opinions of many other institutions were taken into account, even though still it was on the basis of proposals prepared in the General Staff. And I can tell you that in 1986 we introduced a very long-term program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. But many people did not take it seriously. Many thought, maybe because of the inertia, that it was just propaganda. They thought that the Soviet Union came up with this proposal only to gain some political capital by introducing it. But I know how that proposal had been emerging. It had emerged more than half a year before 1986. It was introduced in January 1986. It was

first conceived in the General Staff. We did not risk anything. We thought that if that program had been approved, that would have been good. We were ready to go for a total elimination of nuclear weapons, even though, frankly, we thought that our opponents would not agree with us. We thought that it would probably be impossible to reach a total zero—complete nuclear disarmament. Maybe we will never be able to achieve it. But we were not afraid and we were ready to go down to a very low, agreed upon minimum.

Our initial program was a little bit different because it was developed only within the General Staff, and neither the Foreign Ministry nor any other institution was involved in it. And when the process reached the “Five” level, then the Foreign Ministry opposed us on the grounds that we were rapidly changing our course—that they had already introduced our proposals at the negotiations in Geneva, and we had to reconcile them somehow. You probably noticed that the program looked a little incoherent at a later stage; that was a result of the initial Program of nuclear disarmament by 2000 having been prepared in the circumstances where it had to be reconciled with some of the realities of the Geneva negotiations at the time. That was done at the “Five” level. And in this case, I want to reiterate that that was a long-term program. And I cannot agree, precisely because I knew how the idea came about, that it was just a propaganda action. Yes, to some extent we believed that it might not go through. But we were not afraid of what would happen if it passed; we desired it.

Well, I think I covered the issues you’ve asked me about. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Thank you very much, Viktor. Nikolai.

DETINOV: I would like to clarify for one moment. Maybe you misunderstood me on that. Of course, when every new round of negotiations was about to begin—for example, the SALT II negotiations—we formulated our goals, and the issues we wanted to resolve at that round of negotiations. But we never had any plans for possible compromises for the entire negotiating process—no plans that would determine the sequence of stages of the negotiating process of the strategic arms limitation.

LEGVOLD: Thank you. Sergei.

TARASENKO: It is very difficult for me to speak substantively. I was not very involved in that process at the time. But as a Foreign Ministry man, I had a very clear impression—and I was very disappointed by it—that our side never had a clear conception of what we wanted, or of what we were expecting from these negotiations. Apart from holding a purely defensive line, that is: they introduce some proposals, and we begin to fight them off, to defend ourselves—“This is acceptable, this is unacceptable, this will damage us,” and so forth. I had a very clear impression of a complete absence—even though we lived in a planned economy, a planned state—of any plans for developing the defense industry, or weaponry. It seemed to me that we had no conscious line about what kind of configuration of forces we wanted to have—the relative mix of various kinds of forces, or various kinds of weapons systems. I had the impression that whatever happened simply happened. If our engineers developed a system, then it didn’t matter whether it was a good system or not, they just built it and deployed it.

I think this is a problem in Russia today also. It is a very big problem, and it has been with us continuously for a long time. And it is still continuing today. It’s a problem of not having our own ideas. What do we want? How much do we want? How much money do we want to spend? How many personnel, soldiers, do we want to have? How many officers? What kind of systems? How to distribute those systems among the different kinds of forces? We always had that problem. And I think what General Starodubov just said was a tactical line, reflecting some tactical line of the day. I had an impression that, unfortunately, we could never say exactly what it was that we wanted. We could only say, “This is unacceptable, this will cost us too much, we have such and such systems, we cannot change to different ones”—even though, in a purely technical sense, as far as I understand (and I am not an expert in this issue), there are some progressive technological things. I was always concerned that we were trying to manipulate the negotiations with the help of our technological backwardness—because we were behind; we did not have many things; we were negotiating from a position of weakness, as far as I understand. Forgive me if I said something wrong.

LEGVOLD: Sergei, thank you. It was very interesting. And I think it’s important that this was a perspective in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I must tell you that down at this end

of the table your comment has produced some vigorous head shaking. Nikolai would like to speak.

**DETINOV:** As I have already said, we did not have any long-term plans for nuclear disarmament. But we did have the conception of building the armed forces, and modernizing the armed forces. They were systematically approved, and they were very strictly carried out. We had long-term programs, for 15 years (for certain smaller tasks, for 5 years). We had long-term visions for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. We had substantial funding to cover those programs. Various research projects were under way. That whole system of planning and modernizing our armed forces and weapons—we had it in a very efficient form.

Only very few people knew about those programs and systems, and those issues were never covered in the press. They were never discussed publicly. And it is only natural that Sergei Tarasenko would not have known about them.

**TARASENKO:** Maybe it was bad that nobody knew. We were not convinced that it was reasonable. Who could have known if those issues were worth the taxpayers' money? Who could tell if we were doing the things that were—

**DETINOV:** This is a different question.

**TARASENKO:** So only three or five people were doing something? They had some metal toys with them, and they moved them back and forth? Decisions like that should have been made on some rational basis.

**LEGVOLD:** Nikolai's comment was that that's another question. Sergei is next.

**KONDRASHOV:** I was a SALT I participant in 1969—when the SALT negotiations just started. When Ogarkov and I exchanged opinions, I have to tell you that we took into account the prospective developments in weapons systems. I remember very clearly that we had been receiving clear information about the development of our cruise missiles, and about other

weapons systems. And we knew approximately when certain weapons systems were supposed to reach the testing stage, and we took those developments into account in the negotiations. At the negotiations we did not have a position of simply not taking the prospective developments of the new weapons systems into consideration. It was all included in our negotiating positions.

I would also like to add something more related to the topic of our negotiations. Take, for example, the period when Eurostrategic weapons had emerged—when the United States imposed their nuclear weapons, or deployed their nuclear weapons in Europe. During the negotiations, we were taking into account the balance of forces both in Europe and in general. We understood that the United States were trying to take their own territory out of the theater of possible nuclear war, to limit nuclear exchanges to Europe. All these factors were clearly taken into account during our negotiations on SALT. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly.

**DOBRYNIN:** I think I will clarify the situation, because I see the right wing and left wing views beginning to argue. I think the situation was simple to understand from the American point of view. We on the political side—by the “political side,” I mean the Foreign Ministry—really knew very little. We knew very little about what was going on in our military thinking. Did they have long-range planning in the military or not? What kind of weaponry we were preparing? [Indicating Kondrashov:] Well, he knows, because he was working in the KGB, and the KGB knew everything. But there was no way for ordinary—I say ordinary—channels, working in the Foreign Ministry, to know what was going on? So, the situation was really a little bit like what Tarasenko said it was. He speaks for the Foreign Ministry. Georgy Kornienko knew a little bit more, because he was in this famous “Five.” But even he didn’t know everything, because he didn’t have any secrets from me, and when we discussed things, I felt that he was on a rather shaky ground: he knew a little bit more; but still, in the grand scheme of things, he did not know much.

When I came back from Washington and saw friends in the KGB and General Staff, I began to learn some things. But this was just piece by piece; things were not well-connected in my

mind. So I would return to Washington a little bit enlightened, but not on a great scale. I was enlightened on this particular sphere, or on that particular sphere—so that when I discussed things with you, I would try to learn from you. This was the situation. There was no system. It was as our Generals said. It was a closed society. Five, six men—who knows? And the whole Ministry—the Foreign Ministry, I mean—knew nothing—except when we participated directly in formulating negotiation strategy. We had a very good team in Geneva, and in other places. We worked very closely together—military, diplomats, and KGB people. It was a very good team. But they weren't working together within their own society, so to speak. The military did not always tell us all the whole all the story. Maybe they didn't know themselves—I mean, our participants in the negotiations. Or maybe there was some military discipline preventing it. Perhaps they didn't want to go too far, because, after all, it was only planning.

Military planning in Russia was top secret. It's unbelievable: in your country, it's a loose cannon. You discuss all these military things, rightly or wrongly. And ultimately you yourself don't know what you are talking about. [Laughter.] But it made an impression on us, I should say, because we tried to understand what you were talking about. We still believed in you. We had a much higher opinion of you at that time, by the way, than you did of yourselves. [Laughter.]

So, what Generals Detinov and Starodubov said was quite right. At the later stages, I had a chance to be a little bit more involved on the military side. I had several chance to speak with the Minister. But this was just because I happened to know the fellow. For most of the period, the military did not know me, the ambassador, personally. They did not know how to talk with me. This was the situation. There is always an eagerness among the diplomats to know what we were up to; but it was very difficult for us to know.

It was also difficult for you. When I would go to the negotiations with you, Cy, or with Zbig, I would have an instruction from Moscow: "Do not compromise on this issue; merely inform the Americans of our position on this issue," and so forth. There was no indication of what we were really interested in. They even asked me sometimes to find things out from you. When I asked you questions, they were my questions; they were not Gromyko's questions. I was trying to find out what was going on. It was very difficult for us diplomats. I repeat what Tarasenko said: his is the voice of despair of the time. We were not dumb diplomats, but it is

a difficult profession if you try very hard.

We were trying very hard. But the military people developed our positions. One day they tried to explain to Mr. Gromyko—in the very beginning, of course—how missiles fly without a propeller. [Laughter.] I was present when one of our fellows explained it to him. Then, of course, he knew. I graduated from Moscow Aviation Institute, and I had very good connections with the Yakovlev Design Bureau when I was still ambassador; so it was easy for me to understand it. But most of our foreign policy people knew nothing.

We did not even know the names of our own weapons. We used your names. We have been speaking of *Backfire*. By the way, why is it *Backfire* and not *Forwardfire*? [Laughter.] We did not know. But we used the Western name. I never saw a *Backfire*, actually. Or rather, I saw one photo later in an American magazine. [Laughter.] But I once tried to ask Gromyko why they couldn't take our diplomats who really involved in the negotiations to some factory, or to some airfield, just to see what kind of bombers existed, in what form, so that we would know what we were talking about? It was impossible. It was a top secret. Why? Viktor recalled how many years later on we called it the Tu-22 instead of the *Backfire*. Tu-22M—this is what we called the modernized version. But at the time, we never knew what it was. Everyone just called it "*Backfire*." We didn't know how to say that in Russian, so always in my telegrams I only used the word *Backfire*. I didn't use a single Russian name for bombs or missiles or planes. They were secret. So this was the mentality. And little by little began, subconsciously, to think that you really knew more than we, because we used your terminology, we use your designations for our missiles. All of this was because there was a great gap between the military and the diplomats—a gap in communications, not a disagreement. What could I or others tell Detinov? "Look here, this particular missile should be prohibited"? Or, "This missile should be accepted as equivalent to that one, in a ratio of one to five"? What kind of argument could I have against what he said?

The military had good intentions. General Grechko also had very good intentions. But he was against giving up anything, because he learned his lessons from the Second World War. That's why it was difficult.

The Commission of Five did a great service to us. When I became a Secretary of the Party, I participated in these kinds of discussions. It was [first name?] Sokolov at that time;

myself from the Party; a fellow named [first name?] Kryuchkov; and somebody else. An interesting discussion was going on, too. But the military just impressed on us that they had all the knowledge. Our job was to talk about what kind of relations we wanted to have with the Carter administration. I know you have a system that is much better than ours; but at that time we didn't have any education in military things. None at all. No one attempted to educate the Foreign Ministry on military matters—except, perhaps, on a friendly basis, one-on-one. I would go to someone, and he would tell me what I needed to know, but he would say, "Please don't tell anyone that I told you." This was the situation. It made things very difficult.

That's why we now have this disagreement. They are trying to convince you that they had a nice plan, and Sergei said there was no planning at all. Actually, if you accept my explanation, the truth was in between.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you Anatoly. Harold, and then David.

**BROWN:** It seems to me there are two separate but related issues here. On the military: in the first place, it's clear that very tight compartmentalization—the separation of the Foreign Ministry and most of the other parts of the government from strategic issues, and especially from military's development and deployment programs—hampered the development of overall policy in the Soviet Union. But separately, I think that a distinction needs to be made between the ability to plan weapon systems and to understand the narrow balance between one weapon system on one side and one weapon system on the other side—which clearly was done in the Soviet Union—and longer range strategic planning in an attempt to understand where the competition was going, and what it signified—which apparently was not very much done in the Soviet Union, whereas in the United States there was a good deal of it; perhaps not as much or as effective a kind of planing as the Soviet Union thought was going on in the United States, but some planning nonetheless. What McNamara did, what Schlesinger did, and what I later tried to do was to look at things from that point of view. That capability—which, again, was probably not nearly as effective as it may have looked from the Soviet Union—was helped a lot in the United States by the relative lack of compartmentalization on these issues, and by the existence of large numbers of academic people and people in think tanks who were

civilians but who communicated with the military and with the political side—with the State Department and with the National Security Advisers dating back to the late 1950's and early 1960's. And that did, I think, make a difference to the United States, and in a sense acted as a catalyst for negotiation, for the formulation of positions, and perhaps also for the outcome. That didn't prevent the United States from making plenty of mistakes, from Vietnam—which perhaps was the most damaging one—to subsequent failure to understand what was going on in the Persian Gulf, and so forth. But at least there was a sort of plan, and so the centrally planned society, in this matter, turned out not to be the Soviet Union, but the United States.

What lessons are there in this for the future? Well, I think that the detailed balance of strategic weapons, which appeared so important in the past, is now much less relevant and surely less central to the future. But there are going to be, I think, a lot of political and military issues in the world. There are right now: some of them are between Russia and the United States, or at least affect both countries. And we need to have this sort of planning, whether it's done in think tanks or whether it's done in the National Security Council in the U.S., or whether it's done in the State Department, or in the Defense Department, or a combination of all of those. I think that's one of the appropriate lessons for the U.S., and the need for something of that sort in Russia is probably also an appropriate lesson. So that when we in the future—or even the present—are dealing with questions like what to do about North Korean nuclear programs, or what the U.S. position should be on relations between Russia and Ukraine, or what to do about Iran and Iraq as future possible threats, this kind of planning, and a proper understanding between the military people and the civilian strategists and diplomats, will enable the U.S. to handle these situations more effectively. The lack of it, I think, was damaging to the Soviet Union in the past; the capability for it probably helped the United States, although that capability was far from fully effective in the United States.

**LEGVOLD:** Harold, thank you very much. I think that's an important and very constructive comment. David Welch, and then others on this side. David?

**WELCH:** I gather from the discussion so far this morning that there may not be an answer to the question I posed last night, and with which Bob started the session today. Or if there is

an answer, perhaps we simply cannot get at it here. But I would like to try to restate the question, and see one more time whether we can get at it.

From the American negotiating record it is fairly clear that the U.S. side was guided by a particular set of strategic concepts and ideas, of which the single most important was the concept of *crisis stability*. American leaders were keen to ensure that the SALT II agreement would lead to force structures on both sides that would minimize the incentives for a first strike in time of crisis. Now, the question is this: was there a similar dominant theme, or dominant strategic idea, behind Soviet negotiating positions? And if so, what was it? When the United States came to the Soviet side with the set of proposals, and the Soviet side decided that this part was acceptable, or this part was unacceptable, what were the criteria that they were using in order to make those decisions? What made something acceptable or unacceptable? What Sergei Tarasenko said earlier suggests that he, at least, did not think that there *was* a set of guiding strategic ideas, or guiding criteria. Is that the case?

LEGVOLD: Thank you, David. I think that's very helpful. Viktor Starodubov, you are next on the list; would you take a crack at that, as well as responding to the other questions?

STARODUBOV: I am ready to respond, but I am afraid that then I would not be able to ask my questions. We also have questions.

LEGVOLD: Did you want to ask a question now?

STARODUBOV: I would just like to speak out. I think that we have abandoned our topic a little bit, or the goal of this conference. If I am not mistaken, the goal of this conference was to find out how and why the two sides—the two governments—each of which desired good bilateral relations and decreasing nuclear danger before 1977, came to 1980 with a situation when our relations were terrible. This was formulated in the paper which we all have received. This suggests that there was a certain year—1977—after which all problems in U.S.-Soviet relations began, and that after a certain threshold, both sides didn't seem to want the decrease in nuclear danger any more, or to improve bilateral relations. I think that we have yet to

discuss it. Can you really take 1977 as a threshold year after which Soviet-American relations deteriorated? It brings to my memory the speech that the previous U.S. President, [Gerald] Ford, made when he said that he did not accept the word “détente” any more, that he would from then on only use such words as “from a position of strength.” I think that was already a clear indication of a deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations, because the word “détente” had a very important political and military-political meaning, a very positive meaning. We seem to have gone into a detailed discussion about Brezhnev and Carter; but maybe we should not focus specifically on Carter and Brezhnev, but instead look at those underlying causes that forced Carter to change his position to a more harsh one toward the Soviet Union. We can discuss why the Soviet Union, in its turn, took some steps that the Americans did not like. If we could answer these questions, then most probably we would move towards understanding what happened in that period at a deeper level than if we just discussed whether Carter was good or not, or whether Brezhnev was sick or not.

Maybe I am wrong—if so, then let my colleagues from the other side of the table refute what I am saying—but we noticed that the worst periods in U.S.-Soviet relations always followed new American military programs, and every year when the defense budget was passed. We always knew, as soon as there was some aggravation of the situation, or a “heating up” of the atmosphere, that new military programs were about to come, and we had an instruction to keep track of them. That was really so. However, one thing supported our hunch: usually immediately after such a “heating up”—after a lot of noise about “falling behind” on the U.S. side—new military programs and defense budget increases followed as a rule. That was especially clear in the recent years, after Carter. The situation was very much like we have here at the conference: we always had to explain our actions, speak apologetically, as if the Soviet Union was the only one to blame for the deterioration of the relations.

I don’t want to leave this impression here, like it was really the case. That’s why when I abstained from any comments on the previous question, I actually wanted to pose another question, from our side. Could you give us any hint: what were the real reasons for the deterioration of Soviet-American relations—I mean, from the American side? The reasons on our side, I think, we have already discussed. We told you all we could. Thank you for your attention.

LEGVOLD: Victor, your comment has stirred Marshall Shulman, Cy Vance, and Les Gelb to a comment, and I want to turn to them in a moment. But I want to say the following, so that there is no misunderstanding what we're trying to get at in this morning session. Very soon we will turn to this broader question of the relationship and what influenced it outside the arms control framework itself; but it does seem to me important to understand what may have been basic conceptual differences on the part of the military in the U.S. and on the part of the military in the Soviet Union in this process, because the military played such an important role. All of us around the table know that there were competing interests and that that became the focus of the negotiations; but what's important to understand is whether that, in turn, was partly driven by—and even distorted by—different concepts that underlay them. And that's all we're trying to get out at this point. It is not a matter of pointing to the Soviets and blaming them for their behavior. So, if we could take another crack at that, then we will move on to the broader set of issues that you so rightly raise, Viktor. Marshall.

SHULMAN: Victor raised the point that a toughening of the U.S. position in the negotiations seemed to accompany increases in the military programs. But it seems to me that it's worth taking a note in our discussions of the undeniable fact that increases in the military programs also accompanied *progress* in the negotiations. On repeated occasions, when we were approaching negotiations that looked promising with the Soviet Union, the price of that progress was for us to agree to additional military programs—for example, the agreement to proceed with the R&D and eventual deployment of MIRVs. That was part of the price paid in order to get the positions accepted by the Chiefs or the military services for progress in SALT. And similarly on many other programs, such as the MX. A deployment program for MX was part of the price of SALT. So the unfortunate effect of the arms control negotiations was to raise the level of military competition oftentimes.

LEGVOLD: Cy.

VANCE: In response to what was just discussed in the last two interventions, I want to go

back to something that I was talking about earlier and try to put things in perspective. And that is this: events were deeply influenced in the period from '77 on up through '80 by the domestic political situations in the two countries. And as I tried to indicate earlier on, the rising tide of conservatism in U.S. politics—and, on the Soviet side, the aging political leadership's deterioration in health—interacted on the international plane with the turbulence of international politics. I would submit that as far as the leadership is concerned in the United States, there was no stepping back from the intent to try to find a way to reduce weapons and move towards a more stable relationship. And I would guess, and from I have heard here, that the same was the feeling in the Soviet Union. So, I do not accept the proposition that, simply because there was a deterioration of the situation that existed at that time, the leadership in both countries was trying to walk away from trying to find a better way to live together in a more peaceful world. That's where I would take issue with General Starodubov.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Cy. Les Gelb.

GELB: I think a lot of good things have just been said. Let me take a couple of minutes to pull them together and ask some questions.

There were lots of reasons why progress occurred and why it didn't occur. Cy just pointed us back to a very useful corrective: namely, domestic politics. We can put a lot of theories on our behavior, but in truth much of what we did or didn't do had to do with political considerations, and what individuals in positions of power felt their strengths and weaknesses were at a particular time. People had their own strategies about SALT as well, and I would like to urge Cy and Zbig and Harold to talk a bit about what was in their heads, what their strategies were—what they saw as the purposes of SALT, and of arms control generally.

Finally, I would like to get back to a point made earlier about the U.S. side's effort to pull together all the military programs it had into a doctrine, into a way of thinking about strategic power, into a way of thinking about how to relate weapons development with arms control. If anything was driving military doctrine in our country—strategic thinking—it was this idea of *crisis stability*. And the point here is simply to try to figure out how our forces and your forces would not lead to a situation where in a crisis either side thought it could gain real advantage from

striking first. And much of the calculations that went on on our side—the thinking, the analysis, the eventual proposals to your side; what we wanted to see limited or eliminated—had to do with this idea of crisis stability. I think it would be useful if Harold described that, and if we could have a specific response from the Soviet side as to whether your thinking was along these lines, or whether you had another conception that was driving you—or whether there was no conception that was driving you, and you were simply building up your missile forces. But—one final point—that said, I believe now—I believed during those negotiations—that neither side, given the state of our relationship, was prepared to give up anything of consequence. Neither of us trusted the other enough to make big leaps. And a lot of the negotiations were just dancing around waiting for greater historical currents to lead us into more opportunistic agreements.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much, Les. Harold is next on my list on this specific point, then Zbig. Bob Pastor and Vlad Zubok, I will get to you.

**BROWN:** As Les Gelb has said, stabilizing deterrence was perhaps the most important goal pursued by successive U.S. administrations in the strategic arms negotiations, and to a large degree in their weapons development and deployment programs. That consisted of improving crisis stability, as Les has said, and one other element that I will mention in a moment.

In a hypothetical situation of very high tension, perhaps even involving combat between conventional forces—and conceivably even the use of tactical nuclear weapons on someone else's territory—the incentives for striking the other side's strategic forces first in order to produce a more favorable subsequent balance during the conduct of a thermonuclear war might be high. Set aside the conviction that many of us had that a thermonuclear war would inevitably lead to complete destruction on both sides; this theoretical question then became very important. And the desirability of reducing those incentives loomed very large in American strategic theory, in the SALT negotiations, and in weapons development. Stabilizing deterrence also included reducing or avoiding the inauguration of new weapons systems or strategies that could erode deterrence. So, high accuracy of missiles which then would be able to destroy the silos of the other side's intercontinental land-based missiles was one thing that caused us

concern. We wanted to emphasize submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which are less vulnerable and therefore less likely to give the other side an incentive to strike first. Even airborne alerts, which had other problems, were designed to improve crisis stability. This goal was in conflict with what some other strategic thinkers in the executive branch, in the military, and in Congress in the United States valued highly: namely, an improved war-fighting capability—that is, an advantage over the other side that would lead to an imbalance that gives your own side a decisive advantage. These two things were not compatible; these two goals were not compatible. They were in conflict in American thinking, and perhaps also in some U.S. actions during this period. But in every administration—in the Kennedy administration, in the Johnson administration, in the Nixon administration, Ford, and Carter—the side that favored stabilizing deterrence through crisis stability and through weapons development prevailed. It is easy to point to specific weapons development and deployment decisions that went against that; but the predominant view, and the general strategy, was for crisis stability and weapons systems stability.

I'd like to ask General Detinov whether the Soviet side understood that, accepted that, believed that, and acted in that way; or, if not, what other comparable general principle was the basis for Soviet policy and Soviet actions?

LEGVOLD: While Nikolai is deciding whether and how he wants to respond to that, Zbig is next on my list.

BRZEZINSKI: I would like to respond to Les Gelb's challenge and indicate what my own thinking on the subject was, and perhaps also try to provide some indication of what I think I know the president's thinking was—and the two are not the same. I shared the view that Harold articulated that the preeminent concern in the strategic relationship was the maintenance of crisis stability, and that this ought to be one of the major goals of the arms control process. Crisis stability would presumably also enhance deterrence, and that was an important element of the overall global posture; but inherent in that was also the importance of *survivability*—that is to say, what might be the circumstances if crisis stability was so strained that we had to fear that we were getting into hostilities, or perhaps there would be a preemptive effort to achieve a

one-sided advantage—or, short of that, to be in the position of effecting some degree of political intimidation? Related to it was also a very important element of maintaining alliance cohesion, and that element began to intrude into the arms control process, particularly in the connection with the SS-20 phenomenon. Alliance cohesion certainly complicated that. All of that, in my own view, was related to the more general goal of maintaining strategic equivalence in a very dynamic bilateral relationship which was competitive and adversarial at the time—adversarial in the sense that the two systems were competitive, viewed each other as competitive, and increasingly competed globally.

My conviction was that if we could maintain strategic equivalence with the Soviet Union, and deny the Soviet Union the capacity to reach out for something that might be perceived as strategic superiority, then in that context the longer-range perspectives were favorable to the United States, and not to the Soviet Union. I felt that the ideological and geopolitical competition that would continue to be waged could be waged with a high degree of confidence. We undertook early on in the administration a comprehensive review of the American-Soviet relationship—particularly these competitive aspects—in order to determine what were the most reasonable prognoses. And if I recall correctly, and summarize correctly its findings, the basic view was that we had rough strategic equivalence, but that it was being threatened by the military competition in which the Soviets had, it appeared to us, greater latitude in the enhancement of their strategic forces than we did, for a bunch of different domestic political reasons. But in the other aspects of political competition, the U.S. was actually favored. We were a more dynamic economy—technologically more advanced, potentially more appealing politically, particularly if we could articulate effectively certain concepts that would have an increasing ideological appeal worldwide (and that, clearly, is related to the human rights issue). All of that led me to the view that if we could maintain a stable strategic relationship through arms control, we would be, in fact, in a better position to compete in all of the other domains, and we would increasingly be able to put the Soviet Union on the defensive ideologically and geopolitically.

Now, I'm not sure that this was entirely the president's view, and it certainly was not in the beginning. In the beginning, the president was committed, as I said earlier yesterday, to the idea of human rights and arms control not being incompatible: that arms control would create

opportunities for a breakthrough in the American-Soviet relationship pointing towards a more generalized accommodation. I think the president, unlike myself, thought that arms control would lead to a generalized accommodation. And much of his impatience with the process, and resentment over the delays—resentment which was not directed entirely at the Soviet side; it was just as frequently directed at Harold, at Stan, at Cy, certainly myself, whom he viewed as being occasionally too hard-nosed in the negotiating process—was derived from the president's hope for this generalized breakthrough in the relationship which he thought would lead to a greater progress within the Soviet Union towards human rights, democracy, and a more generally stabilized international situation.

As time went on he began to shift, and he began to become increasingly concerned about the direction in which events were taking place—about specific Soviet moves. More and more he was inclined to accept the idea that we would have to do certain things: first of all, on the strategic level, to enhance our position—for example, the decision to deploy the MX was made in part to gain domestic support, but it was also in part a recognition that some strategic enhancement by the United States was necessary. And he certainly began to move in a direction of accepting the idea that détente and ideological and geopolitical competition were not incompatible ideas. I think that certainly became the more dominant perspective in the president's thinking by late '78 or '79—certainly very much so by 1980.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Zbig. Not only does that help us at this point in the agenda, but it does anticipate the larger issues we are going to turn to. Before I come back to any one on the Soviet-Russian side for a response to this, the next person I have on the list is Bob Pastor.

**PASTOR:** Actually, I think I'd like to defer my comment right now. It's a broader comment, and I think it relates to the nature of the security dilemma in which both sides found themselves. I think I'll wait perhaps until the next session.

**LEGVOLD:** Raise your hand again then in the next session so I get you back on the list. Vlad?

ZUBOK: My remark is also broad in scope, but it's closely related to the discussion that we are having here—the problem of how both sides viewed each other, and the concept of crisis stability. That concept certainly reflected some important truths about the strategic balance; but more so it reflected the perceptions of the U.S. side about what was the nature of the Soviet leadership and—what is more important—who would succeed the current leadership in the Soviet Union.

In the same NIE that Dr. Brzezinski cited, which became available in November 1977, we find a full prediction about who will succeed the Brezhnev generation. The analysts came to a conclusion that actually the new leadership—the younger leadership—would probably be more risk-prone, and more aggressive. There was some chance that they might turn back to domestic problems, but this chance was definitely small. I wonder why in this case the analysts failed?

That leads me to even a larger observation: that basically, in the case of SALT II, we see the crisis of the old Cold War mode of negotiations which worked all right for SALT I, when both leaders met, said nice words about each other, and signed SALT I. Societies were not involved; nor were larger groups, the press, Congress, dissidents, or dissident groups inside the Soviet Union. But certainly this process could not be continued during the period of SALT II. To conclude SALT II in better shape, and sooner, both sides had to change perceptions about each other, and those perceptions, as we keep hearing from the participants at this table, were quite deep-seated.

For example, from General Starodubov we hear that Soviets tend to regard the Americans, and the American system, through conspiratorial lenses. Everything that was happening there could be explained by plots, conspiracies—even in the documents about Afghanistan, preceding the invasion of Afghanistan, we keep hearing about the invisible hand of Washington acting everywhere. So, the question to Ambassador Dobrynin is: did you try to dispel that conspiratorial mood in the Kremlin, and why didn't you succeed?

I also have a question for Dr. Brzezinski, or maybe to General Odom: why did you fail to realize that the new leadership of the Soviet Union would be increasingly concerned by the failing domestic economy, by all those accumulated problems back home? CIA experts met

with National Security Adviser Brzezinski on December 30th, 1976, and they told Dr. Brzezinski about a growing reliance on technology in collecting intelligence. Maybe this increasing reliance on technological means of intelligence led you to distort the truth about what was happening, and to miss what human intelligence and defectors from the Soviet Union had to say? Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thanks very much, Vlad. On the questions that were being posed just before this—the issues that were being posed—would Nikolai, or Viktor Starodubov, or anyone else—maybe Sergei—want to comment on this question of the concepts the two sides used—or, as Harold Brown put it, the principles that guided their approaches—most particularly, crisis stability? Viktor, you are next on the list.

**STARODUBOV:** If we speak theoretically, the concept of crisis stability was accepted by our side. Not only accepted, but we were following it. But you will never find this term in any of our military publications. Crisis stability was considered to be an American term, and we did not accept the term—not because we did not like the term, but because its meaning, as the American side interpreted it, was not shared by our side. The reason is the following: every side put its own understanding into this term, crisis stability. On our side we thought that if we used that terminology, it would have meant that we accepted its American meaning. We did not want to do this, and I think, it was the sole reason why nobody on the Soviet side ever tried to use this term.

What was the matter here? What was so unsatisfactory for us in the way the American side presented this concept? In one word: its one-sidedness. The American side, when speaking about crisis stability, always began with listing ICBMs as one of the most destabilizing weapons. And then MIRVed ICBMs. And then the absolutely worst ones: heavy MIRVed ballistic missiles. This, they were saying, was the most destabilizing kind of weapon. But what does it mean in reality? It means the Soviet heavy missiles. It all came down to the Soviet heavy missiles. On the other hand, long-range cruise missiles were considered almost a harmless weapon as well as heavy bombers. If you look at this schema, you will see that the U.S. had three times more heavy bombers than the Soviet Union, and in cruise missiles they

were ahead of the whole planet.

Meanwhile, from our point of view, these kinds of weapons deserve a closer look. As it looks from our side, when you have forward-based planes, when you have aircraft carriers, and ships with cruise missiles, which can be moved to the Barents Sea, to neutral waters, does not this group of armaments destabilize the situation? What if a conventional war had started, and we began to see the cruise missiles flying? What kind of warheads would they have on them? Try to imagine what the other side should decide. If those were nuclear-armed missiles, then most probably they are targeted for the ICBM launching sites in the first place. You may disagree with me, but try to understand our way of thinking by putting yourself in our shoes. Then, what do you do? Start a nuclear attack before our weapons are all destroyed, our launching sites are hit? Or maybe wait until they are hit and then try to respond with what is left? Now, what do you think, which kind of weapon is more destabilizing? Don't you think that those kinds of weapons are destabilizing? But Americans never admitted that. Had they admitted that, we could have come to that conversation on more open terms, more professionally. I am simplifying a little bit, of course, giving examples, in order to make it as clear as possible for everyone. That's why you cannot say that the Soviet Union did not pay any attention to crisis stability. It is simply incorrect. We were equally interested in preventing the war from starting accidentally—in preventing nuclear war by all means. And that's why we were concerned about stability in every situation, but especially in a crisis situation, when nuclear weapons might be used, sometimes even without authorization. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Viktor, thank you very much. Nikolai?

**DETINOV:** I would like to say literally a few words.

In order to understand this very complicated question you need to consider the following circumstances. First, the Soviet Union and the United States had asymmetrical weapons, and that was primarily defined by the specifics of the geographic situations of the countries. The role, the importance, and the capabilities of strategic weapons in the two countries were very different. For example, we were behind the United States in the effectiveness of our heavy bombers. There were and there still are heavy bomber bases all around Soviet territory. We

do not have such bases anywhere near U.S. territory. Second, we were behind the United States in the effectiveness of our SLBMs. We have very limited access to the high seas. The United States had the whole Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and both oceans were open for submarines. At that time they also had submarine bases near Soviet territory, in Scotland, and in Spain. That's why the build-up of the strategic weapons in the Soviet Union was mostly in the sphere of ICBMs. And when we were told that ICBMs were the most destabilizing weapons, and that their number should be cut, we could not agree with that.

Second: let's recall the U.S. decision to build 1,000 Minutemen and 655 SLBM launchers. That decision and its implementation put the Soviet strategic potential in a terribly unequal situation in relation to the United States. And we had to catch up with the United States in some way. Of course, it was primarily ICBM development that we pursued. Remember, Kissinger said in a 1972 Moscow press conference that the Soviet Union was deploying approximately 250 ICBM launchers. We implemented our program of building strategic weapons at such a rate in order to achieve parity with the United States; and we had reached parity by the middle of the period that we are now discussing. At that time there was a series of signals from the U.S. side which showed us that the United States could not accept the fact that the Soviet Union was reaching the goal of parity with the United States. Again, recall the Kissinger speech in Moscow, at the 1972 press conference, when he said approximately the following: "The Russians have a few more launchers than we do. So what? But we have twice as many warheads on strategic missiles, and we are ahead of them in developing MIRVed missiles. By the end of the moratorium period we will have three times more warheads than the Soviet Union." The United States was very unhappy when the Soviet Union began developing MIRV technology very quickly. We decided to put them on our heavy missiles because it was the simplest and the easiest way to increase the number of warheads. And when U.S. analysts began to consider our MIRVed heavy missiles as a factor undermining crisis stability, we objected to them. We indeed objected to the idea of limiting the number of ICBM launchers in any way—including MIRVed ICBMs. We thought that that would lead to a change in the strategic situation, and that parity in strategic weapons would be destroyed. We saw the U.S. proposals in this respect as a direct attempt to destroy the parity which we had just achieved.

When we analyzed crisis situations, we focussed on the notion of parity. We were very attentive to all changes in the strategic sphere so as to preserve strategic parity. And we were really not striving for any superiority. What Brezhnev said in Tula reflected our approach to building up Soviet strategic forces. We never attempted to achieve a first strike capability. We were starting from the understanding that strategic weapons are primarily needed for deterrence—for preventing anyone from attacking the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons.

**LEGVOLD:** Nikolai, thank you very much. Now I'll take two very brief comments to wind this up, and then we're going to have coffee. First Sergei, and then from Harold.

**KONDRASHOV:** In a few brief words I want to describe how this situation was reflected at the Belgrade meeting.

At the Belgrade meeting, it was very clear that the United States wanted to revise the Final Act adopted at Helsinki. Let me quote from the statement of a member of the United States delegation at Belgrade: "If the basic human rights of every citizen of every nation are not observed, there can be no lasting peace, there can be no permanent security." And further: "The question of peace through disarmament is an important topic, but it is not an appropriate subject for this meeting." At Belgrade, the Soviet delegation and other delegations—delegations from countries friendly to the Soviet Union—were ready to accept new solutions in the area of human rights. But when we sought to discuss matters of disarmament, and have the Belgrade meeting acknowledge the importance of disarmament, we were flatly refused. There was a flat refusal to go forward on that issue. That created a situation at Belgrade where we were not in a position to adopt a comprehensive document encompassing the balance of the Final Act as it was adopted in Helsinki. That's the first subject I wanted to touch upon.

Somebody mentioned Afghanistan. I would be ready to raise this issue, if we wish to discuss it now; but I think that's an issue which we will deal with later on.

**DOBRYNIN:** In Oslo. [Laughter.]

LEGVOLD: Not that long, Anatoly. Harold.

BROWN: Three points. First, it's no accident—*ne sluchaynost*—that U.S. forces had a connection with the concept of crisis stability. That could be for two reasons. It could be that the doctrine of crisis stability influenced to a substantial degree what forces we developed and deployed; or it could be that we came up with the doctrine of crisis stability in order to justify the retention of the forces we had. It was mostly the former. I mean, the doctrine came and then influenced the force structure. Not entirely, but largely.

Second: what I take away from what General Starodubov and General Detinov have said is two things. First, the Soviet position was largely reactive. That is to say, they looked at U.S. proposals—they looked at the principles or objectives suggested by the U.S.—and they reacted: negatively sometimes—most of the time—occasionally positively.

DOBRYNIN: You were more aggressive than we were, as I said.

BROWN: Right.

The third thing that I take from this is that there *was* a Soviet principle, the principle of parity. Now, that's a principle that I used myself fairly often. It's certainly the principle that I used in defending the SALT I agreement in Congressional testimony—and I believed it. But parity is a concept that is even more subject to interpretation and differences than is crisis stability. Do we measure parity by numbers of warheads? Numbers of launchers? By throw weight? You remember how much difficulty there was when certain Americans wanted to measure parity by throw weight. Now, in fact, parity is not a line, it's a very broad band, as I said when I was defending various SALT agreements. But the fact that's it a broad band makes it subject to a great deal of interpretation.

But I think, actually, that I've gotten something out of this conversation, because what I understand is that the concept of crisis stability was looked at with some suspicion by the Soviet side as a criterion, or as an objective. But parity was much more welcome, because it could more easily justify Soviet programs.

LEGVOLD: Very good, Harold. Thank all of you for the morning session this first one. Now we are going to have coffee. I propose that we break for twenty minutes. I will ring the bell again at ten minutes after the hour.

## **MAY 8: MORNING SESSION 2**

LEGVOLD: All right, I would like to call everyone back to the table. Are people ready to take their seats?

All right, now we turn to what is labeled the extrinsic obstacles to the agreement. But I think that understates what we're about to talk about. We have Mark Garrison to lead off on the American side again, and then Sergei. Mark?

GARRISON: Viktor Starodubov anticipated this discussion much earlier by asking why, after a good year in 1977, things went wrong in 1978. And Cy Vance also pinpointed the importance of domestic politics—the imperatives that the domestic politics created—for President Carter. We really do have a challenge in this session, I think.

First of all, we want to try to get a feel for the breadth of issues outside of arms control that affected the SALT process, and to do it in enough depth to get an idea of which of these issues will be worth examining in some detail in later conferences. The possibilities are obviously many, including domestic issues such as human rights, and old standby international issues such as the Horn, China, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the conventional balance in Europe, and perhaps less obvious ones such as Nicaragua, Iran, or others that might come up.

The challenge, I think, is magnified by our evolving understanding of the functional linkage in the relationship. And in that respect, there is a very useful article in your materials by Robert Strong about President Carter's Annapolis speech in June of '78. The main thrust of the article is to examine whether there was, as alleged, a split between President Carter's advisers in the preparation of that speech. And he concludes that the evidence shows that there was not such a split as seemed to the public. But more important, I think, for our

purposes, is that that discussion illuminates the tension that existed on both sides between advocates of compartmentalizing arms control from other aspects of policy, on the one hand, and advocates of linking arms control—implicitly or explicitly—to these other issues.

Now, I have to admit that back in those days I was a compartmentalizer, because I thought there was little hope of changing the Soviet Union on things like human rights. And, in any case, getting a handle on nuclear weapons was too important to tie to other issues. The two governments, I think, we can fairly say, played both sides of the street on this at different times, talking compartmentalization or linkage as suited their purposes. The U.S. tended to say that SALT must stand on its own, but the Soviet Union must understand that human rights, or Africa, affects U.S. public and Congressional opinion. Carter said as much at Annapolis. And we've seen at this session how the Soviet side linked arms control and human rights, both in a positive and in a negative way. I suspect that today we'll get into how Moscow linked SALT to China—at least for a while, in '78.

With the end of the Cold War we see that there is a more fundamental kind of linkage, spearheaded by Carter and pursued by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: that everything is linked to everything. Another way of putting it is that the relationship is the sum of its parts. But in an imperfect world, of course, each part takes on a life of its own. So we have to assess the specific gravity, or the relative importance of each part. And that's especially true in the period that we are talking about. That's what President Carter was grappling with in his Annapolis speech.

With hindsight, maybe now we can be more accurate in weighing the relative importance for each country of each part of the relationship—and that's my question to both sides. To the U.S. side, it might be put this way, but it could be put other ways: what now should we say was the relative importance of human rights, Africa, and our cumulative assessment of the Soviet Union as a negotiating partner? And were we correct in eventually signing SALT and pursuing better relations with the Soviet Union in the absence of improvements in those areas? And there are similar questions, I think, that could be put to the Soviet side.

LEGVOLD: Thank you very much, Mark. Sergei?

TARASENKO: In these days, in our time, it is not very stylish to cite Lenin; but I would like to invoke Vladimir Ilych's authority nonetheless, who in the very beginning of the Soviet regime said that there are two policies: the policy of the Comintern, and the policy of *Narkomindel* [the Foreign Ministry]. Under normal circumstances, Lenin said, when these two policies did not contradict each other, they should be carried out equally, with equal fervor. But Lenin also said that when those two policies conflict—when the interests of the Comintern, the ideological interests, contradict normal foreign policy goals—the Soviet state should give priority to foreign policy, to the normal goals—the goals and interests of *Narkomindel*.

Unfortunately, in the history of our country, those two lines of policy were always present; at least, we always used some things for the purposes of our ideology, for ideological propaganda—things that produced not the best image of the goals and intentions of the Soviet Union in the sphere of international relations. But it would be incorrect to ascribe to the Soviet Union some sort of global plan, or global conspiracy, to set out on global expansion—a plan to impose certain things, to advance Socialist ideas, and so forth. I consulted Kornienko about this, and he had a very strong conviction about this issue. Sometimes, of course, this had been done; we are not denying that. We are not saying that the Soviet Union—especially Soviet Russia in the early period—always abstained from that. No; there was a substantial number of actions of that kind. But they fell out of the zone of pure foreign policy, as we saw it. And in the recent times, the Foreign Ministry won the right to make what we called “the big foreign policy,” which concerned relations primarily with the West, with China, with Japan, and with India. Gromyko was particularly sensitive about India; he felt that India was an important country, and that it should be in the Foreign Ministry's area. The major part of our policy toward the Third World was sort of given away to the Central Committee and to the International Department of the Central Committee. There was a certain exchange arrangement here. It was believed that the Foreign Ministry should not especially interfere with the zone of the dominant ideological interests—party interests, and party ties—and that the main role in that “zone” was reserved for the ideological considerations. That often happened to be the case so in real life. I can give you several examples, maybe later, if we have time, when the two policies contradicted each other—for example, Gromyko preferred not to preclude [first name?] Ponomarev and the International Department from carrying out certain actions,

and in return they would not seriously interfere with the so-called Big policy, the Big policy of the Foreign Ministry.

I understand that there might have been an impression that there was some sort of general center in Moscow, which provided leadership for all of this, and that had some expansionist plans, and so forth. But here we are dealing with a mirror image. In Moscow we had this image at all levels of our government: that the United States was interfering everywhere; that American globalism was a powerful force; that whenever anything happened anywhere, the hand of the United States must have been involved. The hand of Moscow and the hand of Washington were very similar images on both sides. We saw each other in a very similar way. And, of course, there is one element in all the topics which we will probably discuss today: the patron-client relationship. This is the same old question: whether the dog wags the tail, or the tail wags the dog. Very often we had to face these problems. I think the Americans also had them. But in a situation of confrontation—even one that arose by accident—both sides felt an obligation to defend their ideological positions, and they took stands on behalf of their clients, even when it was not in our interests. If a client of ours did something against our interests, we nevertheless felt obligated to support it. Many things had happened that way—accidentally. And they would assume their own dynamics, and strongly affect the perceptions about each other's intentions. This was unfortunately unavoidable. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** I want to thank both Mark and Sergei for these opening comments, which, I think, were particularly useful this time; they were very good, very rich. The only thing I would point out is that we've paid a price for it: they have gone on at length, and therefore I want Harold Brown, who's the first on my list, to set a good example for the rest of the session by being brief.

I want to say one other thing before we begin the discussion. As I said from the very beginning, the conference organizers and I have not wanted to put any kind of straightjacket on the conversation; we haven't wanted to try to constrain it too much. But in this topic our primary interest is the way in which this broader set of issues influenced our effort to make progress in the area of strategic arms control. It is not to explore all of the elements of these problems themselves; those we will save for a subsequent meeting. That's a fine line, and I

know that people will cross it; but if you can think about this as much as possible in the context of the implications for SALT, we would appreciate it. Harold?

**BROWN:** I'll try to set a good example. It's a relief to turn away from the details of SALT and to the broader political questions. I think that Zbig Brzezinski introduced a very good point that I'd like to elaborate a little bit: namely, that the political relationship drove the success or failure of arms control much more than the other way around. The political relationship comprised the international issues that Mark Garrison described, plus human rights, and, of course, the arms control negotiations themselves. But this was all in the context of what I considered at the time—and I haven't completely changed my mind—a global competition for the world influence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union—both as nations, and as representatives of political and economic systems. As I cast myself back to that time, the obvious question from the U.S. point of view was, is the Soviet Union out to dominate the world or not? And the answer wasn't all that clear.

Now, it seemed to me that the Soviet leadership didn't get up every morning and ask itself, "Okay, what do we do today to dominate the world?" But it clearly mattered to them—as it did to the United States—which system would predominate in the world in the future. The question of which system would win in the long run was important to both sides. I felt that that was very important to the Soviet leadership, and that they were anticipating a favorable verdict of history which they would help along.

Well, that verdict has been rendered—at least for the time being—and it has been rendered in the opposite direction. But at the time, it wasn't clear what would happen at all. The U.S. and the Soviet Union, both were engaged in a competition for world influence. The U.S., as the status quo power, tended to react, from our point of view, to the actions of the Soviet Union as the aspiring power. But as the PD-13 material which Zbig referred to—and which you have a copy of, at least in the form of the minutes of the Special Coordinating Committee—did suggest, and as I at that time believed, the U.S. could have confidence that its system would prevail providing that there was no war and that the Soviet Union would be unable to exercise political intimidation through military superiority. In the event, maybe I wasn't confident enough; but that is the way I felt about it. All of these attitudes, and the

evaluation of the competition, affected political opinion in the United States, and that affected arms control negotiations very strongly. It also affected a lot of other things. It affected U.S. reactions to situations in various areas of the world.

The view of those who were opposed to arms control in the United States may have reflected a greater concern about Soviet military capability and the Soviet threat. I had considerable concern about that, but not nearly as much as, say, Scoop Jackson or Richard Perle. That difference may have reflected a different view of the competition between the economic systems and political systems per se. Or it may have reflected—and to some degree it did reflect—their lack of confidence in U.S. ability to negotiate and to hold up its end in a diplomatic competition with the Soviet Union.

All of this is very general, but I think it may be relevant.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Harold. Zbig?

**BRZEZINKSI:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to know if in your judgment the previous intervention set a standard for brevity that I should follow? [Laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** Only for cogency. Not brevity.

**BRZEZINSKI:** I want to respond to the question you've raised about the connection between the political competition and the SALT negotiating process by means of a perhaps somewhat schematic rendition of what I think transpired. And I'll use for that purpose the concept of linkage, because that was an important aspect of the problem.

I would say that initially, on the American side, there was absolutely no linkage between our negotiating posture and political aspects of the relationship—i part because the president thought that an agreement on arms control would be the mechanism for a breakthrough for a general improvement in the political relationship. That was his hope and his expectation. And I would say that that was our position roughly in '77. In '78, with the geopolitical issues becoming more acute, we still maintained the formal position that there was no linkage. We did not alter our negotiating positions in SALT because of geopolitical considerations, but we

began to place more emphasis on a parallel geopolitical competition, and to give more attention to what the Soviets were doing, or to our own initiatives of a competitive type. And then thirdly, and finally, when the geopolitical relationship really started deteriorating, we still maintained the formal position that there was no linkage between SALT—our negotiating position and what we hoped to achieve in SALT—and the geopolitical position. And in fact, in our internal discussions we never altered our negotiating position because of linkage considerations. But the political realities in the United States started to impose a linkage on our freedom to make compromises and concessions. We had to start asking ourselves, what will happen in the ratification process? And, I think, it did start constraining our SALT negotiating position—or, alternatively, getting us to do things which otherwise we might not have done in regards to the strategic equation of which SALT was a part: namely, for example, the MX decision. The MX decision, which was reached before Vienna and the conclusion of the SALT II agreement, was heavily driven, in addition to its own strategic merits, by the thought that this would ensure a higher degree of probability for SALT ratification, which otherwise was very problematical in the United States, largely because of the geopolitical concerns.

So, in that sense, linkage was coming in by the back door, even though we tried to protect the SALT negotiating process from any direct linkage with geopolitical issues.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Zbig. Sergei?

KONDRASHOV: Thank you. First about the linkage. I must tell, I must say that in a our quarters there was also no direct linkage between SALT negotiations and the human rights issues. But certainly, as you say, the atmosphere was influenced by one aspect or another.

But I want now to draw your attention to a new aspect that manifested itself at Belgrade. In Helsinki, it was agreed that every nation speaks for itself. At Belgrade, for the first time, we observed bloc politics: a NATO group, a group of Western European states, and the bloc of Socialist states, if you want. That was the first time we observed these bloc politics. And, more than that, because of this first, very vivid manifestation of bloc politics at Belgrade—

DOBRYNIN: When was this?

KONDRASHOV: October of '77 to March of '78. Dissatisfaction at the results obtained at Belgrade was expressed by most of the Western delegations. The French delegation, and many other delegations, expressed their dissatisfaction with the results achieved at Belgrade. And that, for us, was certainly very significant. We saw that Europe was actually dissatisfied with the kind of a political line imposed upon them from the United States of America. And that, certainly, led to our decisions, especially in the security field, to mobilize our efforts in Europe, through different channels, to influence the political situation in Europe, to split Europe from the line adopted by the United States on strategic weapons and on other disarmament issues. That is my first point.

Second point: China. In '69, we had these bloody events in the region of Damanski—you probably remember the name of this island—and then you received Deng Xiaoping in the United States—

LEGVOLD: Deng Xiaoping was replaced. What year are you talking about?

KONDRASHOV: That was '78-'79.

DOBRYNIN: It was in '78. Deng Xiaoping came to the United States in '78.

LEGVOLD: Damanski island was much earlier—

KONDRASHOV: Certainly, but the issues of our relations with China were not yet solved.

GARRISON: Deng Xiaoping came in January 1979.

KONDRASHOV: This is my report, which was sent by our Ministry to the Central Committee of the Party on the 15th of February 1979. It is entitled, "Reflections on the Visit of Deng Xiaoping to the United States." Before Deng Xiaoping's visit, you were discussing the issue of

emigration from China. And in the course of the negotiations, he asked, "How many millions of Chinese do you want?"

**BRZEZINSKI:** Specifically, he offered us ten million. [Laughter.]

**KONDRASHOV:** Yes, I recall. Certainly, you see, that was at the time when our policy with regard to emigration was rather rigid. So, we thought that this was a demonstration for us, this discussion which you had at that time with Deng Xiaoping. But for us, even at that time, Soviet-Chinese relations were at a crucial juncture, because they were far from settled. Later on we came to some sort of understanding; but that time was a crucial point.

Finally, I will say a few words about Afghanistan. I wish to say that I'm speaking in my own capacity and giving my personal views. Maybe I will be corrected by my friends. The point is that Afghanistan, in the period of '78, '79, and '80, was a country with a bitter struggle between different tribes and political groupings. And then we saw the emergence of a very sensible political leader: Taraki. We thought that the Afghan situation would now be calm enough not to distract our attention from other, more important issues. And you certainly must be aware that Afghanistan was always, from tsarist times—from the imperial time—a very important issue in our foreign policy—in the foreign policy of imperial Russia. In 1904 we received the Afghan ruler in St. Petersburg and in Moscow; later on, we always paid great attention to the situation of Afghanistan. Why? Because in Afghanistan were living tribes, some of which are now living in Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and in other regions. And so, I repeat, Taraki came to power, and from our point of view, he was a very sensible leader.

Promptly, he was murdered. He was murdered by a group of officers led by a person who had entered into negotiations with United States. So, for our leadership, there was a possibility that United States was acquiring a foothold in Afghanistan that would influence future policy there. We were aware of the negotiations were between this particular political group and the United States of America. And, certainly, at that time, in our government circles, there was the view that the United States wanted to a foothold on the underbelly of the Soviet Union, which we could not possibly allow. That led to a decision to take measures which you know—all of you—with regard to the Afghan situation.

From my personal point of view, we certainly have disregarded the history of Afghanistan—the British experience, for example, when the British wanted to impose their rule there. Outside interference has never been successful in Afghanistan, and the government of our country—unfortunately—disregarded that. And our intervention in the Afghan situation has led to the consequences that you all know.

DOBRYNIN: And now everybody has forgotten about it.

KONDRASHOV: As of now, yes.

So you see, the fear that Afghanistan could become another forward base for American armaments was a decisive for us in the actions which we undertook. That was the situation prior to our intervention. The leadership of the country was not in a position to accept the possibility of American influence in the underbelly of the Soviet Union. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Sergei, I thank you very much for that. Again, let me repeat, however, that we are five speakers into the second session, and although I would not want to deprive the historical record of a single one of the ideas that you people have introduced, with the exception of Zbig's admirable example we have not been brief enough in our comments. I will start intruding or intervening in your comments if they go on this long. I apologize for it.

Now, let me explain what I've got—

BROWN: But these are all very important points.

LEGVOLD: They are very important points, Harold, you're right. And we do want to hear them out; but as briefly as possible.

I have Sergei Tarasenko, and then Jim Blight—I'm sorry, Viktor: Viktor Starodubov, and then Jim Blight, and then Sergei. And we proceed from there. So, Viktor Starodubov, please.

STARODUBOV: I would really like to talk about how to be brief for about ten minutes in the beginning of my speech; but I will abstain from that.

Mark mentioned our relationship with China. Yesterday somebody on the American side—I

don't remember who it was, exactly—said that the U.S. did not play the China card; and more than that, that the U.S. was openly dealing with China through diplomatic channels. But for some reason I remember something else: that in those years—in 1977, and especially in 1978—there was a special U.S. envoy in China named Woodcock, who was engaged in negotiations in China. What the negotiations were about, I guess, is known only by Woodcock himself and the administration. There were also special representatives of the top American leadership in China. These negotiations were very private.

Of course, you knew what kind of relationship we had with China. And when the United States was discussing things we had no information about in China, that inspired certain thoughts in the Soviet leadership. It did not help improve our relations and our mutual understanding. Were these actions directly connected with the SALT process?

My colleague here [indicating Brzezinski] says that there was no linkage. However, even he mentioned that there was no linkage in the beginning, but there was at the end. And it was mentioned that there were also programs, like MX, that were related to SALT. In February, the Secretary of Defense approved the development of the Tomahawk [cruise missile]. Then in a very short time there was a decision—practically within a week—to develop the Mk-12a warhead. Then they decided to develop very long-range cruise missiles. And then in June the Senate approved the allocations for the neutron bomb. In August, the president signed a directive about increasing of the U.S. military strength in NATO. We thought that those decisions—and especially the decision on cruise missiles—were made with the goal of confronting the Soviet Union with a *fait accompli*, just like with MIRVs—to establish strategic superiority over the Soviet Union.

Were these developments linked to the negotiations, or not? Whether we wanted or not, all those factors were taken into consideration. After considering and analyzing all those details, we in our defense establishment, always had long discussion about which future direction to choose. Was this not a signal to arm ourselves? Did it make sense under these circumstances to disarm, like in our negotiations? Of course, all of this had an effect on Soviet decisions about new military programs. That's why I think that the question that Mark raised, about linkage between extrinsic factors and the SALT process, is important. Of course such linkage existed. And as far as I understood from what our partners here have been

saying today, nobody has tried to deny it. But then the question becomes: was that simply a result that neither side really desired? Or was it done deliberately to slow down the SALT negotiations? If we could get any answers to this question, it would clarify the situation substantially. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Viktor. Zbig on this point, and then Jim Blight.

BRZEZINSKI: I think I'll wait.

LEGVOLD: Jim?

BLIGHT: In the interest of brevity, I'd like to do two things that are a little different: one is that I'm going to ask a question, and the other is that I'm going to ask a question for two of us. This evolves out of a conversation Dr. Peter Bourne and I had during the break, and there are two parts to it.

One is, on the Soviet side, in regard to Jimmy Carter. On the heels of dealing with Nixon, and Ford, and Kissinger comes a president who appears to be absolutely dead serious about making human rights, and his own way of thinking about it, a major part—if not *the* major part—of his foreign policy toward everybody, but specifically toward the Soviet Union. I wonder what the evolution of thinking was on the Soviet side with regard to this very odd president—this very strange guy who has no real precedent (I think, at least) in the period in which all of you would have been dealing with the United States?

DOBRYNIN: What kind of evolution are you talking about? He came from the very beginning with human rights. There was no evolution. He came with these views, period. We had to begin with his views. And he stayed with these views. That's all. There was no evolution.

BLIGHT: Thank you, Anatoly. My question was whether *your* views evolved at all? Did you at first, for example, think he wasn't serious? Did you think that this was a ploy? Did you think that this was some kind of tactic, and did your view eventually change to one in which

you would have said, "Well, the guy seems serious"? Or was it the other way around?

And then on the U.S. side too, I would like specifically to ask Dr. Brzezinski, who spent so much time with the president, about his own views on the applicability of his deeply felt convictions about human rights to the Soviet Union, and to Eastern European countries. Did he come in with the view that his own experience applied directly to that part of the world? As president, did he learn some lessons along the way that would have convinced him that maybe he had to draw back from some of these issues?

**LEGVOLD:** Sergei Tarasenko is next on the list.

**TARASENKO:** I'll try to be brief. I have three comments, one of them of a personal character. I would really regret if our participants today leave this room with an impression that all people in the Soviet Union perceived the issue of human rights in foreign policy very negatively at the time. I will tell you about myself. I felt humiliated as a diplomat with a career of ten years when I had to get an exit visa, to go through a procedure of certain checks and clearances. If they did not trust me, then they did not need me here. I remember conversations with my Ambassador, Anatoly Fedorovich; and I think he was not happy with all of the Soviet practice in the human rights area either—I mean very routine, very basic rights, like freedom of travel, and freedom of information. We weren't against reading American and any other newspapers and books. When books are banned—I can tell you that very many people in the Soviet Union were extremely unhappy about that. That's why, when that question was raised, I think, it inspired a certain response in the society. Maybe not among bureaucrats; maybe not among people who were involved in that as a matter of duty; but in the society.

And I would say that there existed some reverse linkage with SALT, with the negotiations. The people began to understand that if we moved ahead with disarmament, then changes in the human rights sphere would come inevitably, and our situation—the situation of every citizen—would improve as a result. And I think that there emerged some sort of public support for SALT in society, because we saw the road to liberalization of certain things in the negotiations.

My second comment is related to the effect China had on the negotiations. I thought there was a direct connection. As far as I understood, we on the political side—I can only speak about the Foreign Ministry—were interested in moving as far ahead as possible in the negotiations, in order to prevent as much as we could the possibility of the U.S. and China developing closer relations. In other words, we thought that a breakthrough in the disarmament sphere would create a more favorable situation for us in our position vis-à-vis China. This is the kind of linkage we had with the Chinese question. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much, Sergei. Now Zbig in response, and then Odd Arne and then Sergei, and then Dan Caldwell. That's the list at the moment. Zbig?

**BRZEZINSKI:** I'll make two comments: first, in response to the question about Carter and human rights; and second, a brief comment on Afghanistan.

On human rights: what Carter said during the campaign, is what he was hoping to implement as president. And what he said during the campaign certainly gave the Soviet side a preview of his thinking on the subject. He was of the opinion that human rights was the new political reality of our time—if you will, the new historical inevitability of our time. He thought that it was connected with human progress, with greater political consciousness, and that no part of the world could be immune to that process. He was also conscious of the fact that, for the United States, it was a good idea to be identified with at a time when the Soviet Union was saying that the scales of history were tipping in favor of socialism, and that the inevitable triumph of communism was only a decade or two away. So there was a certain political utility to it. But for Carter the point of departure was idealism, rooted in what Mary King was talking about last night: namely, his own experience in civil rights.

When he became president, in fact, he applied these principles much more stringently towards Latin American countries—some of which were friendly to the United States in foreign policy—than towards the Soviet Union. Insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned, he was quite worried about how to handle the human rights issue. He wanted to pursue it, but he didn't want to be excessively provocative. I remember that Cy Vance and I spent some time wondering how to deal with the Sakharov problem. There was a letter to the president from

Sakharov. President Ford had been criticized for not receiving Solzhenitsin. We felt we had to respond, but we worried how to do it, so that it wouldn't be overly provocative. And in general, on these issues vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the standard applied was far less insistent than elsewhere in the world. It only became sharper later on, in the context of the general geopolitical deterioration.

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, I have to say, General, that if your intelligence services concluded that we were engaged in some secret negotiations with Amin, which were meant to lead to a creation of American military bases in Afghanistan, then your intelligence services rendered your government a very major disservice—a very major disservice. If that is what precipitated your engagement in Afghanistan, with all of its consequences, then someone ought to investigate how that conclusion could have been reached. It was unfortunately not a diabolical plan by the United States to engage you in such a misadventure. So, that was really a misjudgment on your part. We had some discussions with Amin; remember that our Ambassador was killed earlier, and we wanted to stabilize the relationship. But the notion that we could somehow leapfrog not-too-friendly India, and not-too-friendly Pakistan—we did not have a good relationship with Pakistan at that time—and establish some sort of military bases at the southern underbelly of the Soviet Union, really verges on the absurd. I can tell you that very frankly. So, if that was the conclusion which precipitated your action, then that was really a tremendous historical error.

Once you did it, we viewed it as a serious challenge. What motivated you in doing it didn't particularly preoccupy us; we were preoccupied with what the consequences would have been if you had succeeded. If you had succeeded, we thought that would put a lot of pressure on Iran, on Pakistan, towards the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. And it was at that stage that we reached the conclusion that we would do what was necessary to make your task as difficult as possible, if I may use a euphemism. [Laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** Next I have Odd Arne, and then Sergei Kondrashov will have his chance. Arne?

**WESTAD:** It's good that Sergei is coming in after me as well, because I think he may want to respond to some of the issues that I want to raise.

Very much in continuation of the discussion that we've had so far, I would like to say that one of the things that really surprised me in the documents, and particularly in the MemCons, was the way the Soviet side handled the issue of linkages, and the obvious concern that there was on the American side about Soviet activities in several areas, but in particular, in the Third World. And there was one particular conversation that struck me. It might be quite instructive if we get responses from the Russian side to how this was treated internally within the Soviet decision-making process. This is in May '78, when Gromyko meets Vance, and among other things he is touching on the situation in Ethiopia. After Vance has inquired concerning the situation in Ethiopia, Gromyko responded by denying outright any degree of Soviet involvement. And this came right after the winter of '77-'78 when, I assume, it was fairly well-known to the American side that at a very high level the Soviet Union had already engaged itself in Ethiopia. And we know today, from Soviet records, that there had been a very high level of involvement on the military side, something which is actually discussed in that MemCon of Soviet commanders taking part in the operation on the Ethiopian side.

So, I just wanted to challenge the Russian side here to discuss that a little bit in terms of negotiation strategy on Gromyko's side, on the Foreign Ministry side. It doesn't seem to me that this was really a way to develop contacts, even if he wanted to get away from the topic—by just denying it outright, and thereby forcing the American side to draw its own conclusion.

From the military side, if the Generals who are here are willing to respond to this, I would be interested in hearing what they saw as the advantages by this kind of involvement, in terms of what we've been discussing here—the strategic arms situation and the developments in the SALT talks.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Arne. Sergei.

**KONDRASHOV:** Two points. First, I would say that we had no doubts about the sincerity and convictions of President Carter in the area of human rights. But at the same time, I must tell you that we were also sure that this issue was brought forward for tactical reasons. Our assessment was based upon the very simple fact that if United States were genuinely interested in pursuing the human rights issue, all over the world, then the first step it would

make would be to sign two covenants on human rights which they did not sign. Later on President Carter signed one of the covenants; but they were never ratified. So, I repeat, we were convinced of the personal convictions of President Carter on human rights in general—and I must say there certainly was a feeling among many of our citizens that we had work to do in human rights, because I do not want to deny that we had many tasks to fulfill, and many obligations to fulfill—but the character in which this human rights issue was put forward at Belgrade, especially by Judge Goldberg, was provocative. All the time he was trying to put us on the bench of the accused. His statements, and the statements of the members of the delegation, were formulated in such a way as to require from a response of equal alacrity and sharpness. And that certainly led to a point at Belgrade where there was no possibility of a positive decision—and not only because of *our* unwillingness, I should add. I'll describe you the situation. The United States delegation put forward one document; the French delegation put forward another document; the neutrals put forward another; the Soviet Union put forward another. Altogether four documents were on the table in the last day of the Belgrade meeting, and practically speaking there was no possibility of reaching an agreement. That is the first point.

Then, on Afghanistan: I am forced to point out certain facts. As I said earlier, Taraki was in power—to our satisfaction, and to your dissatisfaction, I would say. At the same time, negotiations were developing between Amin and the American side, on various issues. One subject of the discussion was an agreement to allow civilian and military aircraft to land in Kabul and in other airfields in Afghanistan. And by the hands of Amin and his close associates, Taraki was murdered. How could we accept this solution? How did it look to us? You are quite right in saying that there was no plan yet to build a military base in Afghanistan—at least, no such plan was known to us. I quite agree; we had no such information. But the very fact that this group of officers who were negotiating with the American side killed Taraki, of course, was already enough for us to assume what future developments could be. And that led to our decisions, and to our actions in this field. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Sergei. Now I have Cy, and then Anatoly—and then Dan, I'm coming

to you. Cy?

VANCE: I would like to say something, and I'll be very brief; but I do want to say a word or two about President Carter and human rights. Right after Carter was elected, he asked a number of us to write down on paper our view of the policies which should be the guiding principles for a new regime. I think four of us responded to that. Further, we had discussions with him about it, each of us separately. And I remember that, before he selected me to be secretary of state, we had a long conversation covering a lot of issues. And one of the issues that came up at the very beginning of that discussion was human rights.

As Zbig has said, there should be no doubt about the fact that Carter believed that human rights were the reality of our time. He also believed—as I, and many of the rest of us believed—that human rights was, and should be, a central objective of a Carter foreign policy. As has been said before, he was committed to human rights for a number of reasons, including his own experiences. But both he and I, I know, believed that for too long human rights had not been at the center of American foreign policy. The time was long, long overdue to change that. And he made it very, very clear then that we had to address this issue, and to make it central to the policy of the United States.

So, nobody should have any question in their mind, in my view about the seriousness of his commitment to human rights. I felt that was also accepted by those he chose as his cabinet members. They believed that, too.

Now, was his human rights policy put forward for tactical reasons? I'm not quite sure what Mr. Kondrashov was saying; but certainly I think it was *not* motivated by tactical reasons. It was clearly motivated by a deep conviction, which he held very central to himself and to the policy that he wished to have as President of the United States.

LEGVOLD: Thank you Cy. Anatoly?

DOBRYNIN: I would like to answer the question which was put by Blight—to answer your question about the evolution of our views about Carter's human rights policy. We might put it this way: during the election campaign, we were under the impression that Mr. Carter was

serious about his position on human rights. We understood that there was a certain psychological or propagandistic purpose to it—that it was partly intended to put pressure on us—but overall we thought it was serious. What we didn't expect at the very beginning, quite frankly, was that he was so serious that he would allow it to interfere with our relationship. We felt it became a real factor in our relationship. At the very beginning we didn't really expect this, because we were still hoping to deal with this issue through a series of conferences—there was Helsinki, there was Belgrade—and through backchannels of the kind that we used to negotiate Jewish emigration with the Nixon administration.

So, we were really thinking along those lines: yes, we thought he was serious; but we had no doubt that we could handle it through different channels, to defuse this issue little by little. That was our approach. But then it became a greater and greater irritant, and inevitably a part of our relationship. It became a real issue more and more.

Personally, I believe that if the question of human rights had not become such an issue in our relations during that period, we probably could have finished the SALT talks and signed an agreement by the end of '77, or perhaps by the beginning of '78. This is my personal conviction. I think my Russian friends will probably agree with me. This was the view in my country, in my government—in our diplomatic corps, in our military, among the KGB staff, wherever you asked. But there was so much hype, and it became such a part of the public debate, that we began to suspect—there was no specific grounds, perhaps, for this; but it more and more became our conviction—that this was clever instrument or mechanism not only for putting us on the defensive from a propaganda point of view, but also to undermine the regime. It certainly undermined our discussion with you on SALT; because why should we be eager to reach an agreement with a negotiating partner that was trying to undermine our regime? That was the evolution which took place in our thinking.

I could give you just one example, for instance. Once, when Gromyko met with Carter—in September '78—there was a famous discussion about Scharansky—famous, I mean, in our Russian circles; I don't know how famous in yours. I never saw Gromyko so mad as at that time. Never in my life. We came back from a talk with the president, and he said—he was a cultured man; he didn't normally use strong words—but he said, “What kind of man is he with this ‘human rights?’ Why won't he discuss things we can agree on?” He meant SALT. “He

is always bringing up human rights, human rights, human rights—what for?” He complained to me as if I was a representative of Carter. [Laughter.] But he was really angry.

I am sure that he thought that he was right. I don’t argue this point. I am simply answering your question about the evolution of our view. Yes, there was an evolution. Sergei is right to say that many people in my country got interested in this campaign for the human rights. Others were not so enthusiastic. Some thought that Sakharov and Solzhenitsin were fighting for liberty; others thought that they were acting contrary to the interest of our country, because they tried to push two countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, into conflict. There were both ways of thinking. But we came to think that the human rights issue was being used to undermine our relationship, and to destroy SALT. You said there were people in your country who were against SALT; it looked to us as though they were trying to prevent it. Human rights was one way to prevent it, because people became so angry that we couldn’t find common ground to discuss.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much, Anatoly. Now, Les has a two-finger on this—a direct intervention—but Les, if you forgive me, I’m going to go to Dan Caldwell, who has been waiting very patiently, and then I’ll come back to you, and then Viktor Sukhodrev, who is also directly on this point. And then Ilya, and then Vlad. But Dan is next.

**DAN CALDWELL:** I’ve been struck with two aspects of the discussion this morning that may put things into a broader context, and may also have some implications for Russian-American relations today and in the future. The first aspect is the temporal dimension—and that refers to something that Sergei Tarasenko referred to yesterday: how Soviet-American policies have often been out of synch, both in a strategic sense—on an administration-by-administration basis—as well as on a more tactical level. For instance, in the human rights area, initially—as Dr. Brzezinski pointed out—the United States didn’t want to link these issues. The Soviet Union *did* link human rights and arms control. Later, the United States—or at least some in the U.S.—didn’t want to link Soviet behavior in other parts the world and arms control. And that became an issue. It was the same problem.

The other aspect I’ve been struck with this morning is the question of asymmetry—not the

much-discussed asymmetry of Soviet and American military forces, but the asymmetry of American and Soviet societies. All of the American decision makers here had standing behind them, and casting a shadow on all these discussions, domestic political considerations, and also the U.S. Congress, Henry Jackson, Richard Perle, and others. On the Soviet side there weren't the same countervailing sorts of factors.

And just one other point on this whole question of human rights: I have great respect for, and I accept, Dr. Brzezinski's and Mr. Vance's characterization of President Carter's deep-seated acceptance of human rights for idealistic reasons. Added to that, though, was the electoral attraction of human rights and how that created such a contrast with the Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger approach—*realpolitik*. Carter's approach, I think, was more in keeping with American values emphasizing moralistic factors in international relations.

I think some of these asymmetries in the structure of the two societies were important. Indeed, I would think that they are still important today, and are still relevant for Russian-American relations in the future.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Dan. Les?

GELB: My remarks follow right on the heels of yours. I think that the atmospherics really are critical, because if in law the specific determines the general, in politics the general determines the specific. Political leaders, in one way or another, wake up each day and put their finger up to the air to see which way the wind is blowing—as does everyone involved in high-level political decisions. I was also a journalist, so my perspective on this is inevitably going to be somewhat different from that of others around the table; but I saw two conservative tides running at the same time: one in the United States, and one in the Soviet Union. Our conservative tide clearly was foreshadowed in the '76 campaign; it was absolutely foreshadowed there. It was foreshadowed in Reagan's challenge to Ford; in the decision by President Ford to drop the use of the word "détente"; and by Ford's decision to disinvite Henry Kissinger from the Republican convention.

[UNIDENTIFIED]: And to drop Rockefeller.

GELB: Yes, and Ford's decision to drop Rockefeller as his running mate. It was also foreshadowed in Carter's speeches during the campaign, because Carter was not running as a traditional liberal on Soviet-American issues. He did emphasize human rights, and he did criticize Kissinger during the campaign for ineffectiveness—correct me on this, Zbig—for not being tough enough in dealing with the Soviets, not only on human rights. So there was a strong conservative tide running, and it got stronger in '77 and '78—so much so that people on the American side who were looking for ways to work things out with the Soviet side found it increasingly difficult.

I thought, from where I was sitting, that the same kind of conservative tide was running in the Soviet Union, although perhaps for different reasons. Maybe you felt that you had finally reached strategic parity with the United States, and thus you felt as muscular as we did. Perhaps you were about to flex those muscles in various ways. I think that was a consensus judgment in Washington. If you take a look at one of the documents in here—PRM-10, Evaluation of Soviet Capabilities and Motives—you'll see the consensus view that the Soviet Union would be more likely henceforth to use military power in support of its political objectives. So, we felt that you felt more muscular, and that you were going to push us more. So both of these tendencies were rising at the same time.

On our side—and this is a gross oversimplification—but on our side there were two general strategic reactions to this. One was that the Soviets were going to be more difficult to deal with, and so we had to get tougher—much tougher—in order to prove to them that they had to take us seriously, because we were reaching some sort of strategic crunch point. On this view, arms control was the worst signal to send to the Soviets in this situation, because it's a signal of weakness—it's trying to hold on to the Soviet military coattails, and it makes us look as though we aren't fit politically to compete with you in this new era. So there was a general run against arms control. What happened during this time was not simply that SALT II slowed down, but all the other arms control negotiations were either derailed or slowed down permanently for the rest of the administration. The real effect—the real linkage between the atmospherics and the arms control—was not so much between those atmospherics and SALT, but between those atmospherics and the rest of the arms control agenda. And the linkage was

not direct; it was not a matter of policy. It was political. That is, people were less willing to make concessions because of the atmospheric trends.

On the other hand, on our side there was also a strong impulse—particularly in the State Department—to say, “Yes, difficult times lie ahead; but this is all the more reason to try to close out an agreement on SALT as quickly as we can, because we need this cushion. We see difficult times ahead, and we need to create some positive aspects to our relationship, so that when the negatives come, they don’t get out of hand.” But throughout this period, there is no doubt in my mind that the trends in both countries contributed powerfully toward (a) slowing down the SALT process; (b) making the whole arms control process more of a dance for each side to keep whatever strategic programs it was already developing; and (c) making this inevitably a period in which both sides had to lose opportunities, because no matter what opportunities we saw, they were powerfully overridden by the political tides.

LEGVOLD: Viktor Sukhodrev is next, and then Ilya after him.

SUKHODREV: Just a brief observation to follow up what Ambassador Dobrynin said, and before that what Sergei Tarasenko said, on the influence of the human rights issue—especially as regards Gromyko and his personality.

Gromyko was just as wedded to his convictions of the total inadmissibility of any influence from outside, let alone interference in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union, Carter was to his espousal of human rights. So, when Gromyko knew, inevitably, that the issue of human rights would come up when he was talking either to Secretary Vance, or more especially, perhaps, to the president, he steeled himself to that. Secretary Vance will recall that as soon as we got to that subject, Gromyko’s whole demeanor would change. I mean, his usually dour face would become even more so; his tone would change—it would become mentor-like, didactic, sometimes verging on rude. Gromyko was usually very correct in his dealings with people; but on this subject he could really be almost rude. He had a firmly held conviction against interference in domestic affairs. Hence what Ambassador Dobrynin said about him been really boiling mad is quite right.

Now, on things like Africa, let’s say—you were asking about his attitude to that—he would

discuss these things very calmly. SALT was always the centerpiece of his discussions with American officials; but when the discussions would turn from SALT to these other matters in Africa or elsewhere—in Latin America—where the two countries' interests were at loggerheads, he would discuss them. They were for him just other foreign policy issues. These were legitimate things to discuss. Sometimes he would just stonewall, of course, as was the case when the president brought up the question of Ethiopia. Gromyko just stonewalled. He was a past master at stonewalling. He said something like, "We have no Soviet Napoleon in Ethiopia"—and he could do that; he could just clam up like that. At the height of the massacres in Cambodia, for instance—the Pol Pot massacres—the American side tried to draw the Soviets out in a kind of cooperative effort to try to stop these atrocities, but Gromyko would stonewall just by saying, "We have no information about massacres; we have normal relations with Cambodia." I mean, everybody knew that there were no relations between the Soviet Union and Cambodia to speak of; but he would say, "We have normal relations, and that's that." These were two phrases that he would repeat over and over again.

But following this discussion with Carter, in which Gromyko retorted very harshly to Carter's attempt to bring up the issue of human rights, Carter surprised everybody—I think even Secretary Vance—by inviting Gromyko up to the second floor for lunch. This caused a commotion on both sides. Gromyko started asking Ambassador Dobrynin for advice. Frankly, my heart sank. We had just had two and a half hours or so of debate, and this was going to continue. I had been looking forward to some nice hospitality at Dobrynin's Embassy—

**DOBRYNIN:** But I was always for lunch with Americans.

**SUKHODREV:** Yes, but this was to be a lunch with only three participants. Actually, Carter had wanted it to be just the two of them: him and Gromyko. And Gromyko, well as he knew the language, still asked Ambassador Dobrynin to ask the president whether I could go along. So I did go. And we had some lunch—a hamburger and some salad—and we met one of Carter's grandchildren. Carter introduced him and said, "This is James"—

**DOBRYNIN:** His mother; his mother was there.

SUKHODREV: No, not his mother; his nanny. And Carter said, "This is James." And Gromyko said, "Oh, Jimmy." And Carter said, "No, I am Jimmy; that's James." [Laughter.] But it was a very nice lunch, even after that harsh session. I made no MemCon of that, because it was a nice man-to-man talk. I think Gromyko dictated a short cable to Moscow, indicating that he liked and appreciated the gesture.

DOBRYNIN: About this informal lunch; yes, he did report it. He even said some things in detail.

SUKHODREV: Yes, but he did that himself. This was a completely unscheduled meeting. And afterward, Carter figured differently in Gromyko's book.

DOBRYNIN: He liked it.

SUKHODREV: So, that was just a small psychological—

ZUBOK: When was this?

SUKHODREV: I think it was after the meeting in May '78.

DOBRYNIN: Yes; '78, I think.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Viktor. Before turning to Ilya, let me put something to the group. By and large, we've been speaking generally about the force of these issues over the period without beginning to pin them down to the specific evolution in the way in which they may have changed shape in the course of the period we're discussing. Well, that's not been entirely true; Zbig has suggested something of the evolution in the administration. And Anatoly, in responding on the human rights issue, suggested an evolution. But let me begin pushing us in that direction in these last twenty minutes by turning to you, Zbig, with a specific question on

this score: I heard you at Columbia in the Spring of 1977, when you came back to speak to one of the Tuesday luncheons at the Research Institute—this was a point at which you were actually making good progress; it may have been early Fall, I'm not sure; it would not have been during the Summer months—but in any case, you were making pretty good progress with the Soviets on the Middle East issue. And you were quite content with your capacity to work with the Soviets on this particular Third World issue. I had the impression as I watched things unfold in the Fall, however, with the problem over the Ogaden beginning to emerge in September and October, that that had an immense impact on your own thinking. Les referred to the agreed conclusions within the—what was it called?

GELB: PRM-10.

LEGVOLD: PRM-10, yes. You concluded that, in fact, the Soviet Union was now likely to begin using its military power in order to pursue political objectives. That flowed from some of the conclusions that you and your predecessors had drawn about the Angolan intervention. But I take it that the Ogaden intervention really confirmed in your mind that these things were true. It had an impact that took you in a different direction from where you were headed earlier, and led you to different conclusions than those you had reached in dealing with the Soviets on the Middle East. Am I right in thinking that?

BRZEZINKSI: Yes, basically, you are right. I felt that on the Middle Eastern issue, we and the Soviets were working well together. In fact, personally, I had no objections to the American-Soviet statement which caused such furor in the United States. I thought it was a statement of fact, and that we should have made it, and that we should have stuck with it. I regretted the fact that the president—for domestic political reasons—under considerable assault, backed out of it. That, perhaps, had some impact also on the Soviet view of the collaboration on an important regional issue. I don't know what Toly and others might have to say on this subject. Perhaps it made the Soviets much less certain that we could work together on some of these regional issues. But I still thought that, as long as we worked together on the Middle Eastern issue, the prospects for movement towards peace on that particular matter would be

enhanced.

In that context, the Soviet involvement in Ethiopia struck me as a departure from what I thought was a positive evolution in the relationship. A very hard-nosed stand taken on that subject by the Soviet leadership further aggravated my perception of the problem. I have to say that the president, *à propos* the evolution of his assessment of American-Soviet relationship, was shaken very much by the meeting with Gromyko, and by the fact that Gromyko lied to him directly.

**DOBRYNIN:** About what?

**BRZEZINSKI:** About the Soviet command structure and the presence of senior Soviet military people in Ethiopia, which he categorically denied were there. At that time we had very accurate information—very accurate information—as to who was there, what they were reporting to Moscow, the names of their officers, and so forth. And this had the kind of an impact on Carter which reminded him of Kennedy’s conversation with Gromyko about the Cuban missiles. It made him feel, “Well, here we go again.”

So, I think, you are right in saying that that did have a significant impact on our position, and more so on my thinking personally than on the president’s. But it also had an impact on the president’s thinking.

**LEGVOLD:** Ilya Gaiduk.

**DOBRYNIN:** Zbig, just as a matter for your own information. About Kennedy and Gromyko and Cuban missiles. It’s just historical footnote, really; but during this conversation Kennedy didn’t ask a single question about missiles in Cuba. Nothing. So it wasn’t a question of deception or no deception. He wasn’t shown any photo, or any signal; he was not told, “We have information on missiles in Cuba,” or any such thing. There was complete silence. And then two days later the secretary of state spoke with me, and I said, “Why you didn’t you speak with Gromyko when he was here?”

LEGVOLD: Ilya Gaiduk.

GAIDUK: Thank you. I would like to go back to the Afghan problem—specifically, to its impact on Soviet-American relations. However, since I understand that this problem is not a priority for this conference, I will be brief, and I will try to contradict—to pose some dissenting remarks in regards to—Sergei Alexandrovich Kondrashov’s presentation.

Thank God, a substantial number of documents has been declassified now on Afghanistan, including very high-level documents. And I must say, as a dissenting opinion to Mr. Kondrashov, that, first of all, the Soviet leaders were far from excited about Taraki. They clearly saw all his shortcomings, and the fact that Taraki was removed from the political arena—from the political stage—in Afghanistan, did not represent a great loss for the Soviet Union. It was not perceived as a big loss.

Secondly, the Soviet leaders knew that there was no threat from the United States—I mean, of a U.S. intervention, or of the establishment of American military bases in Afghanistan. There was no such danger at that time, or in the near future. Of course, they understood very well that Hafizula Amin was ambivalent on several important questions; but they did not perceive him to be an American spy, an American agent, or an American puppet. In some cases, Amin was, so to speak, “more of a saint than the Pope himself.” I mean, he was—as the documents show—more Soviet than the Soviets in his reforms in Afghanistan.

One more point. Only three months before the invasion—before December 1979 (Professor Westad might correct me, but I think it was in October or November)—Amin again and again appealed to Moscow with a request to send troops into Afghanistan—Soviet troops. That in itself shows that Amin was in no way a puppet of United States’ imperialism, as we used to say at the time. That’s why even if the United States had had any effect on the decision to intervene, that influence was indirect. That invasion fitted nicely into the general context of the growing confrontation during the period. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Ilya. Now I have Vlad Zubok, then Mark Garrison, and Bob Pastor.

ZUBOK: Thank you. It’s exceptionally interesting to listen to the recollection of veterans at

this table; but we scholars, who have certain access to documents, would be interested also in your comments to some specific documents which we managed to discover.

Let me bring up but one interesting document, which is speech by Brezhnev to the Politburo at the Politburo session on June 8, 1978. That is an interesting day, because it practically coincided with President Carter's U.S. Naval Academy speech, in which Carter said that the Soviets had to choose between cooperation and confrontation. So, Brezhnev's speech was practically on the same day, given the time difference between the two countries. That speech was about the deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet relations, and it says that the primary source of this deterioration was the growing aggression—I'm quoting—"of the foreign policy of the Carter administration, the continually more sharply anti-Soviet character of the statements of the president himself, and of his closest colleagues, in the first instance those of Brzezinski." I continue the quotation: "Judging from appearances, Carter is not simply falling under the usual influence of the most shameless anti-Soviet types and leaders of the military-industrial complex of the U.S.A.; he is intent upon struggling for his election to a new term as President of the U.S.A. under the banner of anti-Soviet policy and return to the Cold War."

This is an exceptionally interesting statement. It might be a kind of watershed in Soviet perceptions of what the Carter presidency actually stood for. We discovered in Averell Harriman's papers that Ambassador Dobrynin kept asking him, "People back in the Kremlin cannot figure out what the Carter administration stands for in terms of U.S.-Soviet relations." So, if this is a watershed—and I would like to ask this question to the Russian participants—did it produce any effect on long-term Soviet military planning, on the anticipation of the future, and on attitudes towards SALT? Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** I think Vlad's question is a very good one. But it's part of what may have been a very important moment in the administration: May and June of 1978. Zbig's visit to China was in May, and the Annapolis speech was in the first part of June. This speech by Brezhnev was a speech to the Politburo; this was not a public speech. Then the *Pravda* article in the middle of the month, which was authorized at this Politburo meeting, seemed to be reaching some judgments about where things were going on the Soviet side.

As Mark mentioned this morning, we've got a very contemporary analysis of the origins of

the Annapolis speech by Professor Strong. It might be worth looking at these two months in somewhat greater detail than we are right now—looking at the interaction between what was happening on the two sides.

Bob—no, I'm sorry, let's see; Mark Garrison's next.

**GARRISON:** I don't want to derail the Chairman's effort to direct the discussion to some of these issues. But I would like briefly to come back to the question of Gromyko, because he obviously was a pretty important figure in these discussions. Both Anatoly, with his anecdote about Gromyko's reaction to Scharansky, and Viktor's discussion of the way Gromyko handled himself, raise the question of how much of Gromyko's conduct was Gromyko, and how much it reflected pressures on him—that is to say, his relationship with Ustinov, with Andropov, with the rest of the Politburo, and to some extent, Brezhnev's remaining in trance?

Just to sharpen this question, I want to quote what [first name?] Alexandrov-Agentov wrote about Gromyko in assessing him and his role. He said that after power on foreign policy had more or less shifted to Gromyko as Brezhnev's health declined, the near-monopoly of Gromyko on foreign policy, and Gromyko's innate tendency towards uncompromising toughness and a certain dogmatism—which did not slacken with advancing age—began to have a most negative impact. That puts the emphasis on Gromyko's personal approach to this stuff. And my question is: to what extent was that important as compared to the internal dynamics of the political situation?

**LEGVOLD:** I'll turn to Viktor on this if, Viktor, you'll be very brief, because we are nearing the end now.

**SUKHODREV:** I wanted to say in response to what Mark has just said that it was a purely human trait of Gromyko's that he just hated anything he saw as an attempt to interfere in domestic affairs.

There was an interesting episode during one of his visits to New York for a meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. Every delegation sends a list of those who have come for the session to the Secretariat. The lists are published, and they are the basis on which the people get

their passes. Since Gromyko was there, he was nominally the head of our delegation. And while he was there, the guys in the administrative section came in with the lists of people who were there for him to sign. And suddenly he blew up and said, "Why should I let anybody know who is on my delegation?" I mean, that was the kind of suspicious mind that he had.

He was dogmatic and suspicious. Sergei mentioned yesterday what happened when Gromyko had not been informed by Andropov about what he and Sergei agreed to with respect to Scharansky. This episode was with Secretary Shultz, by the way; and Shultz mentioned Sergei by name as the person who had told him there would be a solution to the Scharansky problem. Gromyko knew who Sergei was, of course; but he totally disproved it, and again turned rude and just threw the whole question aside, out of hand. That was typical for him. It was very much a personal thing for Gromyko. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Let me make the following suggestion now. I have on the list Bob Pastor, and Sergei Kondrashov, and Marshall Shulman, all of whom want to comment on issues that have recently been raised. I am going to put this off until this afternoon, for reasons that I'll come to in a minute. There are a couple of remarks that I would like to make, and then we have some announcements.

This afternoon we will be turning to the Vienna summit and the period into the Fall of 1979. I notice, in the history of this, that in 1978 the side that seemed to have the largest number of grievances that fit within the category of things that we are talking about were the Americans. This is not to assess who was right and who was wrong, but simply to say that, in terms of the pattern of grievances, there were more on the American side than on the Soviet side. There were many more issues that we are talking about here. In the spring of '78 there was Shaba, there was series of further human rights cases; there was the ongoing problem of the Ogaden; there was the June 8th speech by Brezhnev in the Politburo, the Annapolis speech, and so on. The one area, I think, where the Soviets began to have serious grievances on their side, was Zbig's visit to China in May. By the Fall, the balance of grievances began to change, as you go through the issue of the Soviet Brigade in Cuba (which, I think, ended up being more a Soviet grievance than it was an American grievance). The scale balanced out on the external dimension. This is something we want to consider this afternoon.

After lunch, we will continue with what we were talking about now, and then go to Vienna and the post-Vienna events. Since we will lose the principals on the American side tomorrow—we lose Cyrus Vance, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Harold Brown at the end of this afternoon—one of the important things that we want to do tomorrow is begin thinking about the lessons of all of this. I will welcome the introduction of reflections much along the lines of Cy's earlier today, when we were talking about the military dimension and the broader issues of political-military strategy for the future. I think Bob Pastor may help us on that score when we go into it; so we will begin with him after lunch.

## MAY 8: AFTERNOON SESSION

LEGVOLD: Welcome back for the afternoon session. We are now talking not only about 1978 and early 1979, but also about the Vienna summit itself, the signing, and then what followed into the Fall of 1979. We have until 4:00 o'clock this afternoon, but we will lose Zbig at 3:15, so I will give him as much opportunity as he wants in the course of the next hour, and then tomorrow, after the principals have left, we will decide what all of this means. That will be the session tomorrow morning.

DOBRYNIN: I think it is unfair.

LEGVOLD: You think what is unfair?

DOBRYNIN: They will talk, and then we will have the responsibility. [Laughter.]

LEGVOLD: That's right; but, Anatoly, that's the way it always is. [Laughter.] *Takova zhizn.*

All right, now the list begins with Bob Pastor, and then I have Sergei Kondrashov, Marshall Shulman, and then we're off. Bob?

PASTOR: Well, actually, I wanted to ask a very specific question at this time, rather than raise the broader question of lessons. The specific question focuses on the issue of the Horn of Africa. This is the one issue that really has not been addressed by the Russian participants: the extent to which the intervention of Cuban troops under a Soviet General in Ethiopia was considered in terms of its potential effect on U.S. calculations, on U.S. decision making—how it would affect SALT, U.S.-Soviet relations in general, or whatever.

DOBRYNIN: Can I answer in one sentence?

LEGVOLD: Yes.

DOBRYNIN: In one sentence, I hope; because otherwise we will get into a long, long story.

I know—and my colleagues know—that you Americans attached the greatest importance to our adventures in the Horn, in Somalia, and so forth. Why is it that nobody Russian speaks about the Horn? I can explain why. Because nobody gives a damn for this Horn, really. [Laughter.] At that time, and today, I should say. That's why they were sitting quietly; they didn't know what to say about the Horn, exactly. If you want to press us, what can I tell you? It is a matter of minor importance. We will be glad to hear the importance you attach to this issue; but from our perspective, it was of very small importance. [To his colleagues:] Do you agree with me?

KONDRASHOV: Absolutely; absolutely. This is a general statement. [Laughter.]

BRZEZINSKI: Can I ask a question?

LEGVOLD: Zbig.

BRZEZINSKI: If it was so unimportant—

DOBRYNIN: You'll be late for your plane. [Laughter.]

**BRZEZINSKI:** Yes, if you say so. [Laughter.] If you thought it was so unimportant, then why did you assist in the transportation of large number of Cubans there? Why did you arm them? Why did you put in a command and control system, including a senior General, and a command staff? Why did you do all of these things, if it was so unimportant?

**LEGVOLD:** All right, Anatoly; Sergei Kondrashov is next, and he'd like to respond.

**KONDRASHOV:** Well, it's a very simple issue. If there was a local situation in Ethiopia, or if there was a local situation in some other country in Africa, it was treated as a local situation. It was not in our minds tied to strategic weapons or other important issues requiring our attention. It was not related in any way to the major topics which were under discussion. It was regarded as a local situation.

**BRZEZINSKI:** So it was an act of international philanthropy? [Laughter.]

**KONDRASHOV:** Well, you see, in a way, yes. In a way, yes. Because we felt that there was a local struggle going on there; the Americans were paying attention to this local situation, so we paid attention to it, too. And if we saw that we were in a position to help in any way—for example, by putting a General there who could act on the spot—that was okay, we did it. You see, it was a purely local situation. It did not have any repercussions on a larger scale.

**DOBRYNIN:** It had repercussions from their side.

**KONDRASHOV:** From their side, that's right.

I have a very brief remark in view of this statement by Ilya Gaiduk, who saw in my Afghan intervention some discrepancies with the information he has. Well, I wish to tell you that I'm guided by the very simple principle that if we have to reveal the real truth of international developments, we have to rely on diplomatic information—on information in the open sources, and certainly on information available to the security services. So, I'm sure by the time we meet—

you, or somebody else—in Oslo, and look at the Afghan situation, then more documents will be disclosed—more documents of the secret services will be disclosed—and the picture will be more complete. That's all I wanted to say.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Sergei. Before I turn to Nikolai, who also wants to speak on this—then Marshall is on the list—let me reconstruct an impression that I'm now getting from what I hear in earlier comments, and then in these most recent comments on the Ogaden, on the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. This morning, Sergei Tarasenko said that there was a basic division in Russian foreign policy between the Foreign Ministry, which had control of the large foreign policy issues—that is, the West, Japan, and India—and the International Department, which had authority over a lot of these Third world activities. Now, Anatoly and Sergei suggest that as far as this other activity was concerned, it was to some degree random, and inconsistent. What does that say then about Soviet foreign policy in general? Was this essentially an incoherent foreign policy as a result of these different factors that you've introduced? Or is there something more to it? Even though your interpretation of what was actually involved in the Ogaden may be quite right, in terms of a broader pattern of things that were happening, was it essentially incoherent? Or was there something more? And I don't mean to suggest a devil's interpretation of what the something more might be.

**DOBRYNIN:** If we get into this discussion, we will need another two or three days—just to explain what is involved in your question. We cannot just say “yes” or “no,” “I accept” or “you are wrong.” Because if I said you are wrong, you will only disagree with me. That's clear.

**SHULMAN:** Not if you agree. [Laughter.]

**DOBRYNIN:** Maybe someone will agree. But your question really is too big. What do you mean, consistent or inconsistent? It's a matter of interpreting policy. Was the foreign policy of the United States consistent? In some respect yes, in others no; if you look from one president to another president, it will look very much inconsistent, but it may not necessarily be. Do we blame you for this? Were we inconsistent in our foreign policy, because we were

involved in the Ogaden and Somalia? It is a complicated question.

LEGVOLD: It's not a question of placing blame; I am trying to understand what the essential nature of the problem was.

DOBRYNIN: What Tarasenko said about the structure of foreign-policy making in our government was basically right: the Foreign Ministry dealt more with some areas, and the Party with others. What I think he really meant to say, besides what he said, was that there were some issues which we really considered of utmost importance to the government, or to the country, which was handled as a Big policy—for example, relations with the United States. And then there were some things which were not so important. Nobody, of course, said that Ethiopia, Ogaden, and the Third World were unimportant to us; but we knew that these were not issues about which we argued much, which we regarded as basic to our policy. Yes, it happened; we played a role in the Horn, in a rather opportunistic way. We were involved in certain things. In many cases opportunity would arise. Someone in the Third World would say, "We are Socialist; we are for Socialism," and someone from the Central Committee would say, "I have known this guy for 15 years; I met him in seminars," and so on. But nobody in the foreign policy apparatus would know him. So, they would begin to support this fellow. It has happened. The same thing happened with Ethiopia.

Cy mentioned about the General. I really don't know what the name of the General was; maybe my friends will tell me. As far as I knew from the information from the Foreign Ministry, we had several advisers there. But I didn't know any of their names, so I am not so sure whether Gromyko knew the name of our commander there, either.

BRZEZINSKI: We did.

DOBRYNIN: But it doesn't mean that when he said, "I don't know," he was lying.

BRZEZINSKI: What? He is a public policy maker.

**DOBRYNIN:** But it was not necessary for him to know all of these military operations. This is important for you to understand. Maybe this sounds very strange to you. This has really happened in the Foreign Ministry. I'm sure that Kornienko didn't know all the details—who our commander was, how many advisers we had there, and so forth. We knew we sent equipment and advisers; but there were many things we did not know in the Foreign Ministry. Because in minds of the Foreign Ministry people, it was a second-rate operation—I mean, in a global sense. In the United States, yes, it became a really big issue. And I should say that the Foreign Ministry became more attuned to this African situation because of you—I mean, not you personally, but Americans, always needling us and asking, “What you are doing?” The people in the Foreign Ministry began to check with our people from the Defense Ministry, asking them, “What's going on there?” And then little by little, everybody was involved, including the Politburo. This is how it happened historically.

So, one remark I would like to make is that you shouldn't look at this adventures as a special plan which was really specifically thought out like a move in a big chess game. Yes, we were involved; we didn't deny it. But the importance we attached to it was secondary. For you it was not secondary, because you thought it was a part of the overall plan to disrupt everything and promote the dominance of the Soviet Union. And we accept that you really believed that.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Anatoly. Nikolai is next, and then Sergei Tarasenko, and then Marshall, and then Phil. One second, before you begin, Nikolai; let me underscore something that comes out of this most recent exchange, because historically it's quite important, although it's a very specific point. Anatoly believes that it's quite possible that Gromyko simply didn't know, when he met with you people. Zbig told us earlier that this had a very important impact, because the president thought he was being lied to by the Foreign Minister. And, in some ways, he compared it—perhaps out of his own misinformation—with Gromyko in the Cuban missile crisis. So, it had a very great impact, and if you think about what's involved here, it's important.

**DOBRYNIN:** Of course Gromyko knew that we had our advisers there. But I doubt that he

knew the names, who our commander was. This Zbig knew, but I am not sure that Gromyko knew. I doubt that he knew, because I know about his knowledge of military things, especially in remote areas. He knew a great deal about the United States, but he did not know much about remote Africa. He may have participated in the decision, if it was proposed during a Politburo meeting. Somebody from the military or Central Committee probably said, "Look here; we need to send some soldiers and some equipment there." So it could be that he said, "Yes, all right." But when the president told him, "We have information that this General is in Ethiopia," I doubt if he knew the name.

**BRZEZINSKI:** No, no, no.

**DOBRYNIN:** No, he didn't name him, your president, he just asked him. So, Gromyko said: "I don't know." And then the president was thinking: "O-ho. The same conversation took place between Kennedy and Gromyko." But there not a word was mentioned about missiles at that meeting. Later on someone asked [Dean] Rusk, "Why you didn't ask Gromyko about the missiles in Cuba?" and he said, "I don't know." So when I was in Moscow after this crisis I asked Gromyko—it was at a conference in Moscow, and one of the American participants ask me, "Ambassador, did you know about the missiles in Cuba," and I said, "No, I didn't." So they asked Gromyko why he didn't tell me, and Gromyko looked at me and said, "You didn't know? I am surprised!" And I asked, "Why are you surprised?" "You didn't ask me," he said.

So, this matter of "not asking" sounds anecdotal, but it was the case. Gromyko didn't know the specifics.

**BRZEZINSKI:** He called the presence of a Soviet General in Ethiopia "a myth."

**DOBRYNIN:** If he is speaking in general, then, of course, he was not saying the truth.

**BRZEZINSKI:** That's what he said.

**DOBRYNIN:** But if the question was, "Exactly who is this General?", then he probably did not know. I am not trying to defend him, but simply to say that if he denied that we were there, of course that was not good.

**LEGVOLD:** Zbig.

**BRZEZINSKI:** On that, Toly, I'm absolutely prepared to believe what you're saying: namely, Gromyko, perhaps, didn't know specifically who was in command in Ethiopia—although he had to know, I think, that there was a Soviet troop presence in Ethiopia. But what I find disturbing in that context, is the notion that a great power such as the Soviet Union, engaged in sensitive negotiations with us, and in a complicated global relationship, would be engaging in a policy of some scale, of some effort, and indeed of some risk with a very important segment of the government not knowing about it. I mean, that, I think, is a serious problem; because that indicates that compartmentalization really involved, to some extent, fragmentation of policy. In an important sector, you, Gromyko, and others responsible for the foreign policy of a great power didn't really know what one hand was doing. I find it very hard to imagine in that case how the Politburo operated. Presumably, the Minister of Defense didn't on its own decide to send a military mission of some importance, and to transport Cubans, arm them, and sustain them. This kind of fragmentation, I think, was probably part of the problem that we are discussing here.

**DOBRYNIN:** Just to clarify for you: I only doubt that he knew the name of the General who was the commander on the ground. I don't doubt that he knew of the presence of our advisers and troops. This he definitely should have known, because the decision to send troops or advisers to Africa would definitely be a decision taken by the Politburo. And he was a member of the Politburo, so he should have known about it. I don't recall exactly what talk this was, but if he denied our any presence there, then of course he was not telling the truth. But if he denied knowing who was the commander, I could accept that, because he probably didn't know. This is to clarify your point about fragmentation. All the important decisions dealing with the outside world, involving troops, or soldiers, or equipment, were taken by the

Politburo, of course.

BRZEZINSKI: But that leads to a further difficulty: namely, that to the extent that that decision of yours—however taken—had implications for us, our discussion of it with you was rendered more difficult by the fact of the denial.

Now, we had some disagreements among ourselves regarding the implications of this. Some of us took them less seriously and said, “Don’t exaggerate the importance of it.” Some of us said, “No, this has potential implications which we cannot ignore.” So, we had disagreements among ourselves. But whatever our disagreements, we still approached you on it. And when we did, you simply said, “Well, that’s not the case.” And that made it much more difficult even to deal with the problem, because you simply said, “There is no problem. We aren’t even there.”

DOBRYNIN: Well, I agree with you, but—

SUKHODREV: But we had a different view. [Laughter.]

BRZEZINSKI: Yes, but that’s exactly—

DOBRYNIN: This is the only case you mention in which Gromyko misled the president. I don’t want to defend him; but I don’t want to make a big case of it, and I think you don’t want make a bigger case of it than it is, either.

LEGVOLD: If you look at page IV-513, you can read the actual quotation. It’s somewhere in between the exchange that you are having right now. I’ll read it to you. The record says—

DOBRYNIN: I have it here.

LEGVOLD: I know, but others may not have looked at it. I want to read it to you so that you understand what’s going on here. Gromyko continued his response to the president on the

African matters. He called the presence of the Soviet General in Africa “a myth”—in Ethiopia, “a myth.” “Had the Soviet Union been invited to send a General there, it would have refused. There was no Soviet Napoleon in Africa.” That’s what he said.

All right, now I’m going to turn to next Nikolai, and then to Sergei Tarasenko, and then to Marshall.

DETINOV: I think that in order to better understand the events of this period, and the questions that we are now discussing, we need to go back a little bit. If you recall, in the process of working out the SALT I agreement, there was a very irritating moment: that is, the war in Vietnam. But both sides were capable of leaving that out of the negotiating framework, because both sides were genuinely interested in reaching an agreement, which would improve the security of our countries.

However, in the period which we are discussing now—in the period of negotiating SALT II—unfortunately, such issues as developments in the Horn of Africa began to assume global importance, which directly affected the negotiations, and especially the U.S. approach to the negotiations. Why did it happen that way? It seems to me that it was primarily happening because the president and the U.S. administration began to feel tremendous pressure from individuals—and very influential ones—who disagreed with the idea of Soviet-American negotiations itself, with the proposals that the U.S. delegation introduced. And at some point the administration gave in; it began to link the negotiations with external international developments. All this, naturally, did not help us in the negotiations.

LEGVOLD: Thank you very much. Sergei Tarasenko.

TARASENKO: I would like to explain a little bit about the mechanics of decision making in the Politburo. For a long time I was with Shevardnadze, and all these documents went to me. You should keep in mind that not all the papers which were adopted by the Politburo had been discussed by all the members of the Politburo. For example, take delivery of arms to Angola, to Ethiopia, or to somewhere else. Somebody from the Defense Ministry would come in with a folder and a piece of paper saying that we had received a request from so-and-so, and they

were asking for so many automatic rifles, machine guns, tanks, and whatever else. And that paper would go to the Deputy Minister. If it was about Latin America, it would go to the Deputy who was in charge of Latin America. If it was about Africa, then it would go to the Deputy on Africa. It would never go to Gromyko himself, or to Shevardnadze, in my time. And the Deputy would sign it. What Shevardnadze did—I remember it—was he prohibited Deputy Ministers from signing such papers. We organized the Department of Disarmament, and all papers were to be sent through that department, and to be reported to the Minister himself.

Very often, certain members of the Politburo were on vacations, on business trips, and the like. There were several groups, and during voting the paper would not be necessarily sent to every member of the Politburo. It had to go to the first three signatories, and after that they tried to gather whoever was around. And Gromyko or Shevardnadze would not necessarily know that a certain decision had been made.

This is, of course, a bad way of doing things. I understand that it does not make us look good—stupid, maybe. But that was the way it was.

A second thing: I was on the American desk, and I was in charge of exactly this kind of multilateral negotiations—on Africa, and all those things. All the information we had we received from Washington. The Ambassador would send us a telegram—or Mark, or somebody else, would come to our department from the embassy, and say, “Listen, there is something wrong there.” Then we would begin to ask our military, or the KGB, what was happening. And they would say, “Nothing is happening.” You had to ask very specific and clear questions. Very specific. For example, if you asked, “Do you have advisers there?” they would say, “No, we don’t have advisers there”—because in our internal documents, they were called “specialists,” not advisers. [Laughter.] I mean, you had to know exactly, linguistically, whether to ask about “advisers” or “specialists.” [Long laughter.] That was a terrible problem. We often found ourselves in a very stupid situation. That was the practice.

LEGVOLD: Marshall?

SHULMAN: I would like to try a few modest and tentative thoughts on the basis of this

morning's discussion.—starting back with the initial prompting that Mark Garrison gave us—to try to understand why things happened the way they did.

First of all, I'd like to pay tribute to the quality of the human interchanges at the table. I mean, obviously some of the old issues are still there, and in some ways we are still replaying some of the old differences. But for the most part we've achieved, I think, a level of human interchange which is remarkable. One can only be struck with sadness that it was not possible at an earlier time to have this kind of interchange, when it could have affected the understanding of what was happening on the other side.

The first thought I had listening to this morning's discussion was the importance not only of the technical asymmetries in our force structures that Cy and Harold Brown have spoken about, but the terribly critical importance of the differences in the ways in our general conceptual approaches to the effort to control nuclear weapons. What became clear to me in listening to the discussion from our friends from the Russian side was that this was a period when the professional military people involved were largely of the World War II generation, and they were just gradually absorbing the implications of nuclear weapons—some still thinking in terms of nuclear weapons as a more advanced form of artillery—and essentially were applying them in rather bureaucratically- determined ways first of all the deployments, and then to the arms control negotiations.

Now, what was different on the American side was that there was a large input into American thinking from the civilian sector. I mean, many of the defense scientists were the ones who were doing the major writings in journals about strategic concepts: the notion of deterrence, for example; the notion of sufficiency; the whole notion, really, of SALT came out of the contributions of many who were not professional military people to start with, but people who came from the civilian sector—either academics, or people in government. Many of them had positions of responsibility, and some of them had worked on nuclear installations. But the major contributions in the great period in American life of the development of our conceptual thinking about arms control—about the notion of deterrence in the '60s—came essentially from civilians. In contrast to people like myself, Zbig, and others, who were studying the Soviet side, the literature on the Soviet side about these matters was written largely by professional military people, rather than by civilian theorists. And that in itself created an enormous

asymmetry in the approach, and it meant that, for reasons that were illustrated in the discussion today, there was a great disparity in the way in which the two sides approached the notion of SALT; what they sought from it; what they thought about the necessity of it; and the possibility of finding greater security by means of negotiating crisis stability—negotiating in a way that would enhance the security of both sides. I think that was a major difference, and to me it was the most striking thought that came out of this morning's discussion.

Secondly, on the question of the compartmentalization of SALT that Mark asked us about: obviously, for people who cared about the danger of nuclear weapons and who sought to find out how to bring it under control, it made sense to try to compartmentalize and protect that set of negotiations. But what we have seen in the course of our discussions is the absolute impossibility of compartmentalization. As a practical matter—whether you describe it as direct linkage, or indirect linkage, or whatever—the fact is, as our discussions have illustrated, that it is simply not possible to divorce negotiations about nuclear disarmament—or any other form of arms control—from other issues in an environment of conflict, whether those issues are human rights, developments in Africa, Afghanistan, or whatever else. It simply is not possible. And I am not speaking only of the practical question of whether you can get ratification in such a climate, which Cy spoke to earlier, or of the rising conservative tide in the American life. This comes as a sad acknowledgment on my part, because I was one of those who believed that we should try to protect SALT and separate it, and not let it get tangled up with other issues. But I recognize—and I think this morning's discussion brings it home to me powerfully—that it simply is not possible to talk of dealing with issues like that in the absence of a reasonable degree of tranquillity in other aspects of the relationship.

Thirdly, we are not now trying to get at the merits of the extraneous issues; Bob has suggested that what we are concerned with is how these other issues, like Africa and Afghanistan or human rights, affected the SALT negotiations—so we are not now talking about the merits of Ethiopia or Angola. But I think what we have done here is to lay out something of an agenda for future discussions in this group which do need to get into the merits. The discussion illustrated that there was a difference in views, which had its echoes in American politics, of whether the period of activism in Soviet policy during the '60s and the '70s was simply (as some have described it) accidental or opportunistic, or whether it represented some-

thing more than that. Now, in a sense, it reflected the growth of Soviet capabilities. I mean, this is the period when the Soviets began to have a global navy; they began to have the logistical capability to intervene in Africa in a way they hadn't been able to do earlier in the Congo crisis, when they simply couldn't reach the conflict going on there. Now the Soviets had global reach, and global interests. They had the means of becoming a global presence. And as Gromyko said in one of the speeches I remember, "We are now involved in the world. There is no problem in the world that cannot be resolved without our participation." And I think it was true. The growth of Soviet capabilities in that period was significant.

That does leave the question, however, of how to interpret the succession of events. Now, to some extent—as Cy said in his opening remarks—this was a period of extraordinary turbulence. We were still in the period of decolonization; we were witnessing the collapse of the last European colonial positions in Africa—the Portuguese, which led to the unrest in Angola and in Mozambique, and then subsequently, other post-colonial areas. But I think a worthy question for discussion in our future meetings is the extent to which these interventions in Angola, in Ethiopia—perhaps Shaba?—represented just a response to opportunities which were not created by the Soviet Union, but were seized by the Soviet Union; or—and that was the issue that was debated in the United States—whether this should be seen as a part of a larger intent, a larger global strategy. This was the debate that we had in the United States: how to interpret it. Just to cite an analogous problem, I had been in the government earlier, during the Korean war, when we went through a similar argument: how to interpret the Korean war; whether to see it, essentially, in terms of its local significance—as a salient of the Asian mainland; or whether to see it as a part of a worldwide offensive. And the prevailing view at the time in the United States, about which I had my doubts, was that this marked a more general offensive, as seen in the light of events in Indonesia; as seen in the light of the greater militancy of the Japanese Communist party; and, as a matter of fact, as seen in a remark that Gromyko was alleged to have made in Europe: that what happened in Korea could happen in other divided countries—which, of course, sent shivers of apprehension through Germany, and which led then to the meeting of foreign ministers in New York, at the Waldorf, at which Acheson presented the proposal for remilitarizing Germany and incorporating it into NATO.

Korea is an interesting illustration of how an event can be interpreted as a mere local affair with local significance, and also as part of a general offensive. The effect the latter interpretation had on international relations and on American policy was profound. Similarly, in this sequence of events in Ethiopia, Angola, and then *a fortiori* Afghanistan, the interpretation of it as feeding into a broader strategic pattern resonated in American politics. There were differences of opinion in America, but nevertheless this was an important factor.

Now, fourth—

LEGVOLD: Marshall, I've got to ask—

SHULMAN: One more point; this one. Vlad Zubok asked the question earlier, citing documents, about differences in personalities. Now, what was significant to me was not that there were differences of personality, but that the administration was essentially representative of differences in American political life at that time. The fundamental issues about the how to interpret the Soviet Union, and what to do about it, were essentially unresolved issues in American life at that time, as they have been ever since. I mean, there were those who saw the Soviet Union essentially as responsive, and as open to measures of conciliation, willing to increase the level of cooperation and reduce the level of competition. There were others who did not—who saw it, as someone described it earlier, as driven toward a more hegemonic role in the world. Those issues were unresolved in American life throughout the whole period, really, from the end of the war on. And they led to different conclusions; they pointed in the direction of different policies. Some—those who accepted the more aggressive interpretation of Soviet behavior—were less enthusiastic about arms control, and felt that it would essentially work asymmetrically against us. They felt that it would tend to disarm public opinion, reduce support for military appropriations, and make us more vulnerable to deception on the Soviet side. On the other hand, those who saw the balance between cooperation and competition as being susceptible to influence favored negotiations, and believed that it would be possible to move that balance over the long term. That disagreement remained essentially unresolved in American life, and perhaps is still there today.

But the interesting thing, I think, about the differences that you see reflected in the

documents is that it was just not a matter of individual personalities, but of fundamental differences in American political life generally about the nature of the Soviet Union, what was happening in it, which assumptions to base our policy toward the Soviet Union on, and how to respond to it. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Marshall. I want all of you to understand the act of courage that that represented when I interrupted Marshall. It wasn't just a Chairman interrupting a speaker; that was a student interrupting his former teacher. [Laughter.] For the rest of you, I want you to know that I have less trouble interrupting. [Long laughter.] Phil Brenner.

**BRENNER:** In many ways these documents are really very important, and this session certainly couldn't have been held without the documents. For one, they remind people of things they said and did; and in many ways they help other people ask the right questions. So I do think that the National Security Archive deserves great credit, and many thanks to the people around the table who helped get some of these documents out—because they would not have been released without your good efforts to get them out. So, thank you very much.

As we look at what we've learned this morning and this afternoon, I want to go back to what Cy Vance said our purpose here really is: it's to think about the lost opportunities. And we have essentially three hypotheses that have been put forward about the lost opportunities. Before he leaves, I think, we ought to come back to that issue—to what these hypotheses are, and to try to think about them.

One hypothesis was essentially proposed by Les Gelb, and that was that the conservative trends in both societies, in effect, determined what was possible and made it impossible to realize the opportunities that might have been there.

The second hypothesis is that specific issues or events—one event being the apparent lie by Gromyko to President Carter about the General in Ethiopia; or the trip by Deng Xiaoping; or misunderstandings of what it meant to have stability—led to a breakdown in trust between the two sides, and that the accumulation of mistrust made it impossible to resolve lingering differences.

The third hypothesis is that there was a breakdown in trust that made it impossible to deal

with the specific events. This is the obverse of the second. As distrust mounted—and in part it may have been because of the conservative trends that Les talks about, or because of a Shaba incident, or an Ethiopian incident—it became more difficult to talk to each other, and you were less inclined to believe what the other side says.

So, we have essentially three competing hypotheses, although there is some overlap between them. And I don't know that we can choose between them directly now, but I thought a summary at this point would be helpful.

LEGVOLD: I'll let people weigh in on that in whichever way they choose. Geir is next.

GEIR LUNDESTAD: I thought I would also try to move the discussion forward a little bit, and also summarize some of my impressions from these two days; but I'll do it quickly.

Yesterday, we discussed the SALT talks very much in terms of their own dynamics. And it seems to me that the SALT talks *can* really be explained pretty much in terms of their own dynamics. You had the deep cuts proposal; you had the May and September meetings; you got the negotiations back on track; but then you ran into these frightfully complex issues, like encryption or circumvention. If you want to be extreme, you can explain the process in terms of its own dynamics. But today, of course, we have been introduced to these extrinsic obstacles of all kinds—underlying forces, specific events, human rights, the Horn, Afghanistan, whatever. But I feel that we haven't really been able to make the connection.

There is a connection; and we can see this very clearly, of course, in the light of what happened after the Cold War. We see that when the overall political climate changes, then you can see very, very dramatic results. But in the Carter years—the years we are talking about here—I feel that we have not really been able to establish these connections as closely as possible. We are really talking about separate tracks here. I would like to challenge you to try to be as specific as possible: how, exactly did these events, these developments, affect the negotiations? It seems obvious that there would be an impact, particularly in 1978; but, on the other hand, as these events keep piling up, you move towards Vienna, and there is an agreement in June 1979. So I must say that I still have a very strong impression that we are moving on two separate tracks. They are, of course, related; but we haven't really been able

to establish the connection.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Geir; I think, that's a very useful intervention, and turning to Harold who is next on the list, I would add to it. Not only do we not know specifically how this other dimension influenced the unfolding of the SALT process, but we don't know *when* things happened. And it would be helpful if we could begin identifying that, as you begin sharing your own sense of it. Harold.

**BROWN:** I would say that the external conflicts had an influence on timing more than anything else. I think that SALT II would have been concluded earlier without them. And I think the reason is that political decisions that I spoke about yesterday—in which a political leader says: okay, these details are important, but they are not important enough to prevent me from making a decision that we're going to concede or overlook them—are much harder in a situation of external competition, where there is serious concern about domestic reaction to them. I would note that we did get a SALT to agreement which, though it was never ratified, was observed; but I think, we would have gotten that earlier, and some of the details probably would have been overlooked or overridden by political decision, because there would have been more trust on the U.S. side.

I'd like also to make three points about lessons for the future. That way I won't overlap with Marshall, who was talking about missed opportunities in the past. First lesson: select, and then stick to, a small number of priorities—among other reasons, because the outside world will add numerous short-term priorities in the form of crises.

Second—and this is one I think I learned something about in last two days—transparency in what is going on on the other side, and democracy—that is, the influence of public opinion on foreign policy—both have advantages and disadvantages. Transparency helps reassure you—gives you additional trust, perhaps. But at the same time, it creates confusing voices. Certainly, the Soviets looking at the United States had to consider not only Jimmy Carter; they had to consider Scoop Jackson and Ronald Reagan as well. And as we see now in the United States, when we look at Russia, we hear a lot of competing voices. Whoever is in charge now, we don't know who will be in charge five years from now. In the same way,

democracy and the special interests that it creates put pressure on foreign policy. We've seen how it did so in the case of the United States. There was some of that in the form of constituencies in the Soviet Union, as well, and there are likely to be more of them in Russia in the future, as we think of regional disputes and regional conflicts—areas in which both Russia and the United States will be operating, whether they be in South Asia, or in Central Europe, or wherever. We need to include those concerns in formulating policy.

My third and last point is a remark that I choose to take as a lesson—that is, as a fact to be aware of—rather than as a cry of despair, which it might be thought of as being. And it is exemplified by some of the things we have heard about Soviet behavior and policy in the Horn of Africa. And it is at least as true (although we haven't discussed it) about American behavior with respect to the Soviet brigade in Cuba. It's a remark attributed to Axel Oksentierne, who might be described as the Brzezinski of Gustavus Adolphus, and goes as follows. He spoke to his son and said, "Oh, my son, if you only knew with how little wisdom the world is ruled." [Long laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** Dan Caldwell has agreed to do what Mark Garrison has been doing earlier on the American side to help us move directly to Vienna and what follows. As I said earlier, we'll lose Zbig in a few moments, so, Dan, please be brief in what you have to say on that, and then we let Zbig comment in any way he chooses after you've spoken.

**CALDWELL:** There are, I think, three episodes we can focus on in the last formal session in which we're going to be focusing on SALT. One is just prior to the summit meeting. And we have in our briefing books a memo to Secretary Vance, written by Marshall Shulman and Bob Berry, concerning the list of topics that Marshall and Bob Berry thought that the United States could possibly present at the summit meeting. It's an ambitious list, and the Soviet side was not interested in pursuing things other than had already been agreed to. In some ways it's reminiscent of the March '77 proposal; and yet this was discussed in June '79.

The second area we can spend a lot of time talking about is the summit itself. One of the interesting questions here is the state of Mr. Brezhnev's health. It's clear from much that has been written about the summit meeting that Mr. Brezhnev was not in good health, and I would

raise the question of who was making the decisions about SALT II at the summit meeting on the Soviet side.

Lastly, concerning the aftermath of the summit meeting and the ratification campaign, I have some remarks that will partially reflect some of Geir's comments. Despite all the problems that we heard about today and yesterday—despite all of those problems—I'm convinced on the basis of research in the Carter library, and of interviews with members of the Carter administration, members of Congress, and so on, that as of mid-August 1979, if a vote had been taken in the United States Senate, the treaty would have been ratified. But at the end of August, the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba was discovered and publicized, raising questions in the minds of many on Capitol Hill about the wisdom of going ahead with the SALT II agreement. That caused a delay in the consideration of SALT II. A second external event became important, I think, in a general sense, raising questions about the competency of the Carter administration's foreign policy: and that was the takeover of the American Embassy in Teheran—and also the loss of the American intelligence sites in Northern Iran—in early 1979. And then lastly, of course, was what I think of as the final nail in the SALT II coffin: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

So, there is a great deal to talk about, in terms of the issues concerning the time immediately preceding the summit itself, during the summit, and then finally, during the ratification campaign.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much, Dan. Zbig, would you like to comment?

**BRZEZINSKI:** I'm going to be brief, in part because I have no choice; I have to leave.

**LEGVOLD:** But Zbig, I've just been told that you have a little bit of a cushion. You have another fifteen minutes before you have to leave.

**BRZEZINSKI:** I have to leave at 3:15.

**JANET LANG:** We built in a little bit of a cushion, so if you want—

DOBRYNIN: Oh, dear! [Laughter.]

BRZEZINSKI: I will not use it all up.

One preliminary comment about the period prior to the Vienna meeting pertains to the extraneous issues and why they were important in affecting the climate of the discussions, and certainly the domestic context in the United States. I have to say, for myself, that I cannot think of a single negotiating position from the U.S. side being altered by external factors. I don't think we changed our SALT position on any single fact whatsoever because of these extraneous factors; nor would we have delayed reaching an agreement because of them. Even though we discussed them; even though we were concerned about them—and our opinions differed about how serious they were—if there had been agreement earlier, we would have reached it. Our position never hardened because of them; we never altered our position, or rejected a Soviet proposal because of the Horn, or any other issue of that sort. And that's important to recall. It simply never arose.

As far as Brezhnev's condition is concerned, I can tell you how it was perceived from our side, and perhaps draw some implications for the future. This summit meeting in Vienna began with us sitting across the table from each other, and Mr. Brezhnev pointed his finger across the table, like this, and said: "Here is the man responsible for the collapse of détente"—pointing straight at Cyrus Vance. [Long laughter.]

DOBRYNIN: Maybe it was his sense of humor. [Laughter.]

BRZEZINSKI: Well, actually, our impression of him was that his health was failing; that he had times when he was not really following the discussion in an acute fashion. But there were times when he was all of a sudden very alert, very engaged, and I think several of us had the same feeling of admiration for the determination with which he engaged in that effort on behalf of the Soviet Union, despite obvious evidence of human frailty and age. He went up and down. And I thought that, in that meeting particularly, Gromyko had a rather warm caring attitude for him—the way he would kind of help him, and whisper to him, and so forth.

SUKHODREV: He would turn pages for him.

BRZEZINSKI: That's right. Carter did attempt a wider discussion with him—I believe with you present, Viktor. I wasn't present there; our translator was present, and he found it very disappointing. That simply did not work at all. So, we were essentially confined to the agreement on SALT in Vienna, and had the Cuban brigade issue not intervened, perhaps it would have been ratified prior to the Afghan events. But I'm not quite sure that the Afghan events would not have had an impact on the ratification process, because of the reaction of the United States.

I regret that I will not be here for the discussion of the Cuban brigade; but I do think that, from our point of view, it was the worst handled episode in this very complex relationship.

VANCE: It was not our shining moment.

BRZEZINSKI: That's right, exactly. And that certainly had an impact in terms of loss of time.

This brings me to my final point, which is that rather early on in the administration, I proposed to the president—and he proposed to the Soviet side—annual summit meetings, detached and divorced from negotiating agendas. Perhaps this was premature at the time, given the depth of the disagreement between us. But I was of the view—and our last two days has reinforced it—that some generalized quasi-strategic discussions between us were needed. They would have introduced some greater degree of transparency in our mutual perceptions, and perhaps a greater degree of understanding. I think the difficulty that we had in communicating, for example, on the question of the meaning of the Horn operation illustrates what happens when there is even no minimal understanding of each other's strategic assumptions and views regarding global change. I would not be at all surprised that, if we had had such discussions, from the Soviet point of view the human rights issue might have assumed a somewhat less threatening character—because Carter, as I have said earlier, at least initially did not think of it as an ideological campaign against the Soviet Union. I will not hide the fact that that thought occasionally occurred to *me*. [Laughter.] But he did not. And

I think in that setting—a broad discussion of the nature of the relationship between two major powers in a rapidly changing world—perhaps some of these misconceptions and particularly acute suspicions would have been somewhat reduced, especially if this had become an institutionalized practice.

I realized it would have been difficult to get it going, because of the importance of the negotiating issues, and perhaps also because of the degree to which some of the professional foreign policy advisers might have felt that this would intrude on the negotiating process, which they preferred to handle rather than to let the top leaders handle. I suspect that on the Soviet side there was ambivalence and concern as to how Brezhnev might handle a negotiating relationship on his own. I have to say that I was very frequently uncomfortable and fearful when the president would be interrogated by Toly in one-on-one sessions. I was uneasy that the president would be making commitments, or indicating positions which perhaps shouldn't prematurely surface. Those around the top leaders usually feel uneasy about top leaders negotiating on their own. But still, I think had we moved to something of the sort that has now developed in the American-Russian relationship—regular meetings, divorced from negotiating agenda, not tied to grand agreements—it would have been a useful step forward. It's a pity we couldn't do it. We did propose it, though; and eventually, over time, that practice has emerged—I think all to the good.

**DOBRYNIN:** Just one remark. From our point of view, there was a linkage theory between a summit and SALT. This is atypical. Usually we denied linkage. But actually, our position, from the very beginning, was that we should first have an agreement on SALT, and only then summit. It was the position of Gromyko and Brezhnev.

**BRZEZINSKI:** That's right. And that's why at one point in the correspondence between Carter and Brezhnev I told Carter that I thought he ought to stop proposing the meeting. Because I developed the sense that at your end that was becoming bargaining leverage against us. So I urged Carter to drop the demands for the meetings. But whenever he would see you, he would always at the end say, "I would love to have a meeting with the Secretary General."

**DOBRYNIN:** In the middle of '77, more than four times you made a proposal for a summit.

**BRZEZINSKI:** Right. Which was three times too many. [Laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** Let me turn to the Soviet side in the context of the current discussion. Up to this point we have been hearing the American side saying that there were a series of developments that affected the general context within which SALT was negotiated, although Zbig has been clear—and it looked to me as though the other principals agreed—that at no point was any given arms control decision or proposal directly affected by your reaction to the Horn or otherwise. [Voices of dissent from the American side of the table.] In any event, I will let that part be clarified. Up to this point we have been hearing the American version of how the international context affected their decision making. My impression is that throughout much of the spring of 1978, the summer of '78, even into the fall of '78, by and large, the Soviet side would just as soon not have had international events affect SALT. If that's true—or if that's not true, correct me—but if it is true, then by the late summer of 1979, or maybe even sooner, was the Soviets beginning themselves to worry about the international context and letting that influence the approach—the timing, and so on—of their own SALT position?

**BROWN:** I agree with Zbig that we did not change our positions in SALT as the result of external events—Somalia or others; but I believe that the president would have changed some of our positions—or would have overridden some of the concerns about telemetry, for example, and would have accepted formulations that would have produced earlier agreement—had there not been some of these external events. In addition, I think the president would not have given such weight to arguments that were made by me, for example: “We can't change that position because that will prevent ratification, or because the Chiefs won't go along.” In an atmosphere—

**BRZEZINSKI:** He wouldn't have approved the MX, either.

**BROWN:** Zbig points out that he probably wouldn't have approved MX either, under those

circumstances. But in an atmosphere of less adversarial relations, I think, there would have been some changes—not big ones—in the U.S. position, and that would have meant an earlier agreement.

LEGVOLD: Sergei?

KONDRASHOV: Just in connection with this question: At this time I will just describe how the decisions were reached at the highest level in our country.

Usually two, three, or four days before a session of the Politburo, we received the agenda for the next Politburo meeting, with enumerated questions for the meeting. And we had to prepare for Andropov positions on every issue which was there. I do not remember a single case when, for instance, a SALT issue arose in conjunction with Ethiopia or anything else. Certainly, these issues were discussed at the Politburo; but separately. If any agency—the security forces (I mean the Ministry of State Security), or Foreign Intelligence, or any other office—felt that in connection with the SALT discussion any other subjects should be brought up, they were able to supply the Politburo with the necessary information. But again, and I do not remember any occasion when, for instance, the decisions on SALT were connected with another subject, such as the Horn of Africa.

So, I would say that although all problems of an international nature certainly were discussed at the Politburo, I had no impression that some local issues were influencing the SALT decision to such an extent as to prevent some major decision.

LEGVOLD: Let me—excuse me, Sergei.

KONDRASHOV: That is one thing. But I think that, for future negotiations, we have to think of some of the general topics. What do I mean? At the end of the war, the Soviet Union relied for its security on the after-effects of our big victory. But then we saw that we could not rely on our position in Europe, because the United States made every possible effort to diminish our position—in Germany, especially. Then next stage was the armaments race. Naturally, that created for us new problems. And we are engaged into deliberations about

what our position should be. I'm certainly speaking primarily about the atmosphere in the Security Forces and Foreign Intelligence service—we were thinking about our tasks in view of this new situation, when the armaments race was developing. But then the strategic weapons came, and that is the third stage, so to speak, when our leadership was conscious that the international situation primarily depended on strategic weapons. And that is the new task before us. So, I think, that we have to analyze the general development of the international situation in the Carter period, because the Carter period was already the third stage of international development after the war. We were conscious of that; and we were also conscious that in some stages the United States profited—in Korea, for example, as Marshall Shulman mentioned. At this very moment we were preparing new incentives for the reunification of Germany. The new proposals, you remember, '51 and '52 were put forward by Soviet and DDR leaders—to have general elections in Germany, and so on. But you stopped that; and more than that, West Germany was taken into NATO, and that certainly put an end to the possibility of reunifying Germany at that stage.

So, I wish to say that the Carter-Brezhnev period was crucial with regard to finding future bases of agreement on strategic weapons. Certainly, both sides missed this opportunity. Or, at least, to the extent that we thought that it would be possible to have an agreement if both sides were able to find a mutual accommodation, it was a missed opportunity. Thank you. That's just a general remark.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Sergei. Les?

GELB: I didn't learn any lessons from the last two days—

DOBRYNIN: He already knew it all.

GELB: —Because I don't think anything that's come up here is anything we all didn't know. I enjoyed it—[Laughter]—because it was good conversation, and in some cases it cleared up some of the little mysteries that we all wondered about—who was talking at the other end of the string, what they might have been thinking, and so forth. In some cases the mysteries

have deepened, because there were complications that we did not know about. I think, the conversation was terrific from that point of view.

The lessons, however, are the lessons we all understood pretty clearly before we stepped in here. The choices of our circumstances were highly limited. You have described the leadership of an advanced gerontocracy unable to see a good deal of what was put before their eyes. You have described a political system that made decisions in a terribly rigid fashion. And you had even less coordination, less trust, less cooperation in your bureaucracy than we did in ours.

I don't think there was a problem of misperception. We opined here around this table that, if we only had perceived each other in a different way, things would have been different. I don't think that times allowed for different presumptions. There were people in the Carter administration who perceived you more or less the way you have described yourselves. There were. Your explanations sounded like a lot of the explanations for your behavior that we heard in the State Department. So, there were some people who perceived you that way. There were others who didn't perceive you that way at all. Who really thought there was some sinister plotting? And who—even if they had talked to you—would have believed there was sinister plotting? Nothing you could have said would have changed their minds about why you were building SS-18s and -19s, why you went into the Horn of Africa (even though you were backing our former ally, and we were backing your former ally), or why you went into Afghanistan, however reasonable your explanation may be. All the conversations from here to eternity at that point would not have changed their minds. And many on your side would not have been persuaded by our good will. Obviously, we couldn't have had two interlocutors who were more interested in working things out than Cy Vance and Andrei Gromyko, or Cy Vance and Anatoly Dobrynin. So, I don't think it's a question of misperception, or a lack of conversation. These things would have helped in various ways to prepare the future, but I don't think they would have had much of an impact on SALT II.

As Harold said, and as a number of people said during the course of the two days, we did the SALT II agreement in two and a half years. This was an agreement of incredible complexity. It laid the groundwork for everything that was to come, and it was done under the most difficult of circumstances—in two and a half years. Maybe, had we had fewer political

complications, and less atmospheric linkage, we would have gotten it in two years. But it was still quite an accomplishment under the circumstances.

Now the only lesson I think I derive from my experience in government dealing with all these issues, apart from the conversation today, was this: that if you have a leadership that feels strongly about an idea—for example, about SALT II—at a moment in history where that idea runs counter to the currents of history, that the leader must be incredibly gifted, dedicated, and disciplined to overcome those historical currents. If Jimmy Carter wanted to head off the difficulties that were mounting in Soviet-American relations, he would have had to have had a much more focused national security/foreign policy agenda—one that, first and foremost, established greater confidence in his administration's handling of foreign affairs. Because as long as there were doubts about the ability of the administration to handle difficult situations, we wouldn't have been able to make the decisions that cut through hard problems like SALT II. And for the Carter administration to have done that would have required accepting some of the conservative agenda up front in order to establish real conservative credibility. It would have meant earlier rather than later coming out with the support for 3% increase in defense spending. We did it by the end of the first year; it could have been done earlier. It would have looked like it was done under pressure, but it was a way of establishing *bona fides* in this area.

**BROWN:** Remember, he went in with a \$6-8 billion cut.

**GELB:** Exactly.

Second—hooking up with the Chinese. We knew that was something you wouldn't like. But then again, the ground could have been laid in different ways, and certain people—like Cy—would like to have had the groundwork laid in different ways. But this was another part of establishing that the administration had a strategic concept, and could handle our politics. And in that context, we could have pushed forward with the SALT II agreement, I think, with far less concern about our ability to sell it and ourselves to Congress and the American people.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Les. I appreciate this comment. If you permit me, I don't mean to

argue with you as traffic cop, because I personally take the larger thrust of the point that you are making. And I think it's essentially correct. But at another level, Les—although this is a somewhat abstract point, I think it has considerable practical significance—you said the issue was not one of misperception, yet you described a situation in which, in both governments, there were powerful elements that operated with enormous misperceptions.

GELB: But they wouldn't have believed it anyway. They would not have thought those were misperceptions. They didn't know.

LEGVOLD: He said that they would have believed it in any event. But my point is, in terms of the relationship, had there been any way to overcome them—had there been any circumstance in which those misperceptions had not existed—then there would have been quite different possibilities. Now, maybe it's unthinkable that it could have been any other way—

GELB: Yes; I think that's what I would say.

LEGVOLD: Cy Vance.

VANCE: I agree with much of what Les has said, and with much of what Harold has said. I agree with the proposition that the currents of history were running against us, without any doubt. But I think also that time was running against us. And the extrinsic factors that came into play in this thing took time away from us. Every minute that was taken away from us made it more difficult to get ratification. And I think we therefore paid a really very heavy price for having had these distractions coming from the extrinsic factors.

LEGVOLD: I have a clear list. Bob?

PASTOR: I would disagree with Les as well. I think that there are lessons to be drawn both—

GELB: "You as well"? Who else disagreed? [Laughter.]

PASTOR: Shall we have a show of hands? [Laughter.] I think there are lessons to be drawn from 1977-81—and the broader period—of contemporary relevance; but I'll leave the latter for a later hour. I think in this particular case, there were sizable misunderstandings, as Bob Legvold pointed out—very substantial misunderstandings and misperceptions on both sides—that had enormous implications. The failure of the Soviet side to understand the need to come back to Secretary Vance in March of '77 with some proposal was a serious lost opportunity. All of the issues that we are wrestling with and talking about today are, in part, issues in which one side did not take fully into account the perceptions and the concerns of the other side. And that failure to take them into account and to understand them better, I think, affected both the pace of change, and ultimately, the outcome. At the end of the Carter administration, the relationship was in tatters, with serious consequences for both countries throughout the 1980s.

So, I think the hard part is drawing out the lessons not only of relevance then, but of contemporary relevance. Harold Brown mentioned three. The one that I would emphasize is transparency. Transparency can permit both sides to explain behavior, which is explicable to both sides today, but was inexplicable at the time. And transparency permits a degree of accountability in the system that in the long term requires each side to defend its position in the court of domestic and international public opinion. I think the decision to go into Afghanistan would have looked different in a system that was more accountable. So I think that there are lessons in this case, that could, if we learned them, permit an exchange like this to occur at the moment of maximum misunderstanding when it is both most difficult and most necessary.

The second, broader question, concerns the contemporary relevance of these issues in the post-Cold War world—a world that looks so very different from the fierce competition of the 1970s between the United States and the Soviet Union. Tocqueville predicted 160 years ago the competition between the U.S. and Russia; and even though at this moment in time it seems absolutely inconceivable to consider that any future competition between the U.S. and Russia could occur, competition is inherent in the international system—it's a basic element in

the international system—and, therefore, lessons drawn from the past are of relevance today. And in that light, the critical question is the extent to which the democratization of Russia would introduce the degree of transparency that might obviate—or, at least, alleviate—any future competitions.

LEGVOLD: Les wanted to come back, and then Vlad Zubok.

GELB: Your last point contradicts your first point. Your last point is very wise: it's that there are such things as real conflicts of interest. There are real points of conflict of interest. And it's possible that nations have different vital interests that clash. You ended with that; but you started with the notion that if we only didn't misperceived each other, things would have happened differently, say, in March. We told the Soviet side we loved them before March. [Laughter.] They heard it all over the place. In public statements, too. They had reasons not to accept what we were saying. They had other things they could point to. And that's almost always going to be the case, particularly in any difficult issue. And I don't know how many times these two gentlemen [indicating Vance and Dobrynin] talked to each other before March; I don't think that anyone could have done more to dispel American motives than Cy did. But the question is how the Soviet side perceived what we were doing, no matter how we described it to them—because there wasn't sufficient trust for them to accept the explanations.

By the same token, whatever Anatoly would say maybe some of us would find terribly persuasive. But at least as many thought it was Soviet propaganda. I assure you that you could have perceived it from here to kingdom come: it wouldn't have changed a thing, given what was happening at that time.

Now, transparency wouldn't solve either of these things, either. We were transparent. All of the debate was in public. The Soviets could have looked at us—and they did, inside out. And whatever they didn't see, we told them about. And it still didn't change their notion of what we were up to. There are still those here who felt that felt that we were trying to corner them—that we were trying to keep our advantages in strategic arms and get rid of their advantages—and who felt that we had one standard for our bombing of Vietnam, but another standard for their going into Somalia. And these views are built in a period of history where

major powers have major conflicts of interests.

PASTOR: But the question is whether transparency in Russia would have affected their perceptions and their policies—

GELB: But it didn't happen.

LEGVOLD: What role, Les, do you leave for human intervention?

GELB: There is a role for human intervention, and an important role. But you need incredibly gifted and disciplined leadership to run against historical tides. And I think that that's what we didn't have on either side at that point. In the case of Jimmy Carter, he was trying to do great things without the preparation for doing them. In the case of the Soviet side, I don't think they were ready for a turn in the relationship yet. There were big changes brewing deep underneath the ground in that country that emerged many years later; but I don't think they were prepared to go much faster than they did. Correct me if I am wrong in that perception.

DOBRYNIN: Well, on SALT we were prepared to move much faster than you—on SALT.

LEGVOLD: Vlad Zubok.

ZUBOK: I would like to add a polemical note to what we have been discussing. What has really changed in Russia today, besides the fact that we elected our president and the word "democracy" is played everywhere? In terms of transparency, we keep learning from newspapers about various involvements of Russian troops in Tadjikistan, in Georgia, and in other areas. They are not widely discussed; they are not widely debated. The constant stream of misunderstanding popping up between the Clinton administration and the Yeltsin administration makes me think that virtually everything that we have been discussing at this conference is relevant to the current state of U.S.-Russian relations—with one major exception, probably: nobody is interested in the strategic balance today; everybody is interested in non-proliferation and nuclear hazards; dealing with Chernobyl-type accidents, and so on and so

forth. The major issue is the cultural gap—how to deal with accidents emerging from human misunderstanding. Much of what Americans take for granted raises a lot of questions in the Russian mind, and *vice versa*. So the major question is: could there be any mechanism for getting around this?

Perhaps it is just like what one person said on the trip Malcolm Byrne and I were on to Moscow, trying to retrieve some documents from Moscow archivists. The meetings went pretty badly, and at some point I said to Malcolm, “Well, it looks like we are on a repetition of the Vance mission to Moscow. We are completely misunderstanding each other.” And then another friend of ours said: “What you need when you deal with Russians, are three words: patience, perseverance, and understanding.” Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** There is nothing worse than for a Chairman to prolong a meeting until it’s official adjournment, when everybody else is exhausted. We are nearing that point of exhaustion. Mark has raised his hand, but I think it might be—I’m sorry, Viktor Starodubov had raised his hand before, too. So, Viktor and then Mark: you’ll end up with virtually the last word for the day.

**STARODUBOV:** Thank you. In some part I would like to support what Pastor has just said, and also I would like to say something about linkage. For me it is not very clear, the statement that the American side had not changed anything in its position because of external events. Let’s take, for example, the aforementioned Cuban brigade, as Brzezinski said. Had it not been for that campaign, we would have probably signed the treaty and had it ratified some time in August. But it seems to me that some linkage is already distinguishable here. You may say that we are not speaking about this, but about the positions in the negotiations—the prepared positions—which did not change as a result of external factors. But here I have some doubts; the linkage didn’t have to be direct. I am not talking about the kind of linkage where, for example, something Soviet turned up on the Horn of Africa, and the United States would immediately have a new position in Geneva; no, I am not speaking about such linkage. I see linkage in the following schema: the increase in the number of opponents of the treaty followed the developments of the external events, and they linked these events with the treaty.

I can give you an example—a very concrete example, which everyone probably knows: the U.S. Department of Defense agreed to support ratification only after Congress increased their defense spending by 5%. What is this? The increase—the request to increase the defense budget—was, of course, related to international developments, and that was linked to ratification. And you remember that the administration not only had to promise, but had to deliver on that request.

I would like to cite—it is very short; only four or five lines—a thesis, a document that I prepared to report to my superiors on the results of the final stage of SALT II: “The specific feature of the American tactics was the following: as soon as the work on the remaining questions would be coming to an end, they would introduce a new question. The questions on functional characteristics, the definition of new types of ICBMs, the definition of the order of their testing, the definition of the range of cruise missiles, and so on, have been introduced in that way.” And the last thing I would like to draw your attention to is the fact that the final version of the treaty and the accompanying documents were reconciled in the last night before the signing of the treaty. In other words, had there not been a fixed date for signing of the treaty, decided before, that work on the treaty could have taken considerably more time. Maybe we would still be working on it. In the background there was a political decision to sign the treaty in Vienna in the period from the 14th to the 18th of June. It seems to me that if we come to the conclusion that nothing from outside of the treaty itself hampered the process of negotiating arms limitations, then it would seem like the ball in the middle of the plague. I don’t think it is at all possible, and I don’t think it would be correct. It seems to me that it would be correct to make the following conclusion: that if both sides sat together to work on the issues of their security, they needed to, in a way, show some restraint in their actions outside of the negotiating room. This would be, it seems to me, the more correct conclusion, than the one that no external event should be linked to the negotiations. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Viktor. Mark Garrison.

**GARRISON:** When we had a preliminary run at these questions at Pocantico Hills last year, Viktor Komplektov, who was at that meeting, said almost exactly the same thing that Les Gelb

said today—which is one more reason for me to disagree with Les. [Laughter.]

DOBRYNIN: It was a combined operation against you. [Laughter.]

GARRISON: I just want to point generally to Zbig's comment that, at the beginning of the administration, Jimmy Carter saw SALT as the way to achieve a general breakthrough in the relationship—to move to a completely new relationship. Finally, in the summer of '79, he got the SALT agreement. My impression is that he still nursed the hope that that agreement would lead to a general breakthrough and improvement in relations. The perception—my perception, at least—was that the Soviet Union was absolutely determined that that would not be the case—that this was going to be a signing of the SALT treaty, and that was all. Nothing else.

Now, the question is, was that simply Gromyko's nastiness? Brezhnev's incapacity? Or was the Soviet attitude conditioned by having been pushed around on a number of issues, which they thought, affected their vital interests? Perhaps I'm wrong, but what comes to my mind is the China question—which, after all, did affect Soviet security interests and other interests. American China policy is something that was within our ability to modify. I'm not talking about not moving forward in relations with China, but doing it in a very carefully way, de-emphasizing the military and security-related aspects of it that so bothered the Soviets. I do all of that speculating just to suggest that maybe somehow there are some lessons that can be learned by both sides in that kind of relationship. And perhaps tomorrow, when we start talking about the future, we can draw some lessons about that for the current and future problems. That's all.

LEGVOLD: Cy Vance.

VANCE: I'm going to be leaving, and I just want to say a few words of thanks—first to our Chairman, Bob: I think he's been absolutely excellent, and we are deeply in your debt; and—

LEGVOLD: Les has disagreed. [Laughter.]

VANCE: I also want again to express a profound admiration for those who have put together this meeting.

Finally, I want to thank all of our colleagues and friends across the table. It was wonderful of you to come all the way across the Atlantic for this, and we really do appreciate it. So, thank you very much. [Applause.]

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Cy, and Harold, and Les—three more people that we will lose. Les, I want you to know that tomorrow we are going to spent time explaining what the lessons *really* were, what the lost opportunities were. [Laughter.]

That does allow me to say a word about tomorrow morning, for those of you who are wondering where we go from here, after this full day. We will begin tomorrow by considering those issues and questions that were not adequately addressed in this session—and we'll take that very seriously. Then we will go on to a more systematic discussion of what we have begun discussing this afternoon. But again, I thank, all of you, for what was, as I said a moment ago, a very rich day, and we wish you good travel.

## MAY 9: MORNING SESSION 1

LEGVOLD: Let me call the meeting to order and welcome you to our third day. We will divide the morning into two sections. The first part will be devoted to questions that have not yet been answered—and there are certainly enough of those. Secondly, we are interested in an array of questions that we want to pose for the future—for subsequent meetings—which require more information and more effort on our part for us to be able to answer. So, I have in mind two kinds of questions.

In order to start your thinking, I would ask the participants from the Russian side to think about what it is that you would like to know about this period that you don't know at this point; and then I would pose the same question to the American side.

In the second half of the morning, we will then turn to the lessons of this meeting—the

lessons of the history as we understand it at this point. I will open that session with ten minutes of comments of my own, and then we'll go on, and wind up moving toward the second meeting of this group.

Okay, the floor is open.

**DOBRYNIN:** For questions, as you invited us; so I will not make a speech like yesterday, but just ask a question—two, rather.

One is simply for clarification. During the meeting in Vienna, President Carter gave to the Brezhnev a proposal which was written on a yellow pad—a proposal which was not really discussed there, but it was given there. We in the delegation looked at it, but really, it just kind of faded away. Do you know, exactly, what kinds of cuts you were proposing? I know what other issues were involved in this paper, but, I don't recall the cuts exactly. I couldn't find it in my own archives. What were the cut you were proposing there, in Vienna? They went beyond SALT II, which we had already prepared and signed.

And one observation—not to take too much time. Yesterday we discussed very actively—specifically, from your side—about our adventures in the Third World. You were rather aggressive, in a good sense; but I noticed that nobody mentioned there were at least two initiatives from our side on this—for example, when in January of 1978 we officially proposed to you that we mediate the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia together. We proposed to sit down—Soviets and Americans—with our clients. This was really a major effort. But it went practically unnoticed everywhere. You just pushed us aside. Politely—but nevertheless, you pushed us aside. I forgot yesterday to ask Zbig about this. In his memoirs he wrote that he remembered this, but that he thought that it was a bad idea for the Americans to take up this proposal. As he put it there [paraphrasing:], “If we had accepted the Russian proposal, it would have legitimized the presence of the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa.” And you don't want to do that.

By the way, the same happened with the Middle East. When we came with a proposal to do something, Cy signed this beautiful declaration on October the 1st, but then you put this all aside. And in the memoirs of the American participants, they very frankly said that they could not allow Russians to be active in Middle Eastern diplomacy, or this would legitimate them.

You said that, with SALT, you did not merely want to continue the policy of Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger; but in the Middle East you did exactly the same thing, because Kissinger wrote in his own memoir exactly what Zbig wrote: [Paraphrasing:] “My aim was not to allow Russians to participate in all this kind of mediation, because it is not their area, it is our area—an Americans area.” If you compare these two memoirs, it was almost exactly the same, word for word. The Carter administration took up where previous administrations left off on the Middle East, for instance, or on Africa. You chose not to cooperate. But at the same time, on arms control, you preferred to present new ideas.

So, my first question is about this summit meeting: could you clarify in a few words what this proposal was? And second, could you illuminate a little bit actually what the position of the American administration was on Soviet participation in Africa and the Middle East?

**LEGVOLD:** That’s something we could begin this morning; that’s a question that could be answered, if there are any Americans who might like to respond to it. Phil wants to come in on this point; am I right, Phil?

**BRENNER:** Let me read from Brzezinski’s memoir: “As hostilities increased, and as more Cuban troops went to Ethiopia, Gromyko suggested the classic Soviet solution to regional disputes: a joint U.S.-Soviet mediation effort pointing to a condominium. I believed that it would only legitimize the Soviets presence in the Horn, and suggested instead that we put more effort into urging the regional leaders and other African nations to call for a withdrawal of all foreign troops, and mediation by the African states alone.” It’s exactly what you just said.

**DOBRYNIN:** This is just what I said. By the way, we never used the word “condominium.” Condominium with the United States? It would be unbelievable, in our world view, to have a condominium with the U.S. over Africa or the Middle East. But Kissinger and Zbig were always were afraid of condominium, condominium, condominium—What condominium? When were we proposing condominium?

**LEGVOLD:** Would Marshall, or Stan, or Mark, or Bob want to respond to that? Bob?

PASTOR: [Returns to the table from the telephone:] Excuse me. President Carter was on the telephone; he was in Panama to give me a debriefing of what's been happening there, but he also asked me to communicate to all of you that we should all enjoy this conference. I told him I took notes for posterity; and he said, "Enjoy your revisionist academic critique of ancient history." [Laughter.] He was joking, of course. [Long laughter.]

LEGVOLD: Why don't we start to answer Anatoly's question, and if it looks as though we really don't have an answer, we'll work on that the next time. Marshall?

SHULMAN: I don't either have any knowledge of it, but I'll speak anyway. [Laughter.]

On the first question: I don't know the answer. I do know that there was a set of proposals, and I would assume that they are accessible. Maybe we should make a note about that, and seek them out. It's too bad that Cy and or Zbig have left; they might know.

On the second one, I think, really the quotation that was read from Zbig's memoirs answers the question of why the U.S. would not have responded to the initiative on negotiations on the Ethiopian-Somali conflict. Although there were differences on the American side about how to respond, I think that the prevailing view was that any negotiations of that type would have legitimized the Soviet role.

However, I'd like to add one point about this that is worth including in our records: and that is the importance of inter-adversary cooperation in situations of conflict—including the one between the Somalis and the Ethiopians. It was interesting, I think, that on several occasions there were matters of concern to us about the possible course of the conflict. Although the U.S. had helped in arming Siad Barre, we hadn't given him everything he'd wanted, and several times—on two occasions that I remember personally—we went to Anatoly and expressed our concerns. The first was when Ethiopian troops were sweeping through the Ogaden. We expressed concern lest there be a massacre in the Ogaden, because many of the people in the Ogaden had supported the Somalis instead of the Ethiopians. So, we were worried that there would be a massacre, and we went to Anatoly and said that we were concerned about this—that there might be a massacre. And Anatoly's response was,

essentially, “Why don’t you go talk to Mengistu?” But nevertheless, within a fairly short time, as I remember, he came back and said, “There won’t be a massacre.”

The second occasion was as the Ethiopian advance continued. There began to be occasional flights—Ethiopian flights—over Mogadishu, and we were worried that they would begin a bombardment of the area using their aircraft. By this time the Somalis were in bad shape; they couldn’t have done much about it. And again, we talked to Anatoly and said that we were concerned lest there be aerial bombardment of Somalia, and especially of the capital, Mogadishu. And at that time, I guess, our leverage came from the fact that we had not given Siad Barre all the weapons he had asked for, and that if there were unrestrained behavior on the part of the Ethiopians, we would give him more weapons. And Anatoly again said, as I remember—you know, “Why don’t you go talk to Mengistu? Why talk to us?” But nevertheless, he did come back in a relatively short time—I don’t remember how long, exactly, but I think it was within a few days or so—and he said, “There will be no aerial attack on Somalia.” And there wasn’t.

It’s an interesting example that even in an issue as highly contended as that one—as highly conflicted—nevertheless, it was possible to have what I would call inter-adversary communication. It set boundaries on the conflict, to see that it didn’t get out of hand—something neither side would have wanted. Although we had conflicting views, nevertheless neither side wanted to see it get out of hand.

Now, on the final point—

**DOBRYNIN:** Excuse me. Just one other illustration of what you said. You gave us two examples; but the third one was that you very much concerned that Cubans and others would cross the boundary and enter into Somalia. It was a major concern to you—I don’t know why, but it was. And you spoke with me—Cy first, and then you—and I didn’t refer you to the Cubans this time. [Laughter.] I brought you a very clear answer: not a single Cuban soldier will cross the frontier. Do you remember?

**SHULMAN:** Yes, I do. I think there’s an important lesson in there. It was never formally recognized that it was possible to have that kind of inter-adversary communication. Of course,

it had to be done privately and diplomatically; but nevertheless, despite all the other excesses of the time, there was a recognition that there were boundaries to the level of conflict that each side was willing to contemplate.

Now, just a brief comment on the final point with regard to the Middle East that Anatoly raised. I have a vivid memory of Cy Vance having signed in New York a communiqué with Gromyko referring to U.S.-Soviet co-chairmanship—

DOBRYNIN: Yes, on the conference.

LEGVOLD: This is the Fall of 1977?

DOBRYNIN: It was first of October.

SHULMAN: It was '77; I couldn't have dated it, but I remember the occasion. I can visualize the circumstances, because immediately after we signed that—although I believed that we were acting within the limits of our instructions—we got an angry call from Washington, protesting the fact that we'd signed it.

DOBRYNIN: Who? You and Cy?

SHULMAN: We didn't initiate the call, and both Cy and I were in New York—

DOBRYNIN: What an interesting case—

SHULMAN: The problem was that there began to be a reaction against the inclusion of the Soviet Union as a co-chairman. It had two sources. One was from the Israeli side; they were nervous about legitimizing the Soviet role. The other was from the U.S. side, where there was concern about the Soviet Union getting part of the action in the Middle East negotiations.

DOBRYNIN: How did you want us to participate?

**SHULMAN:** All we wanted of you was to say “yes” to anything we did. [Laughter.] No, at that time, there was an ambivalence on the U.S. side. And I think it changed with time. Again, it was part of what came out in our earlier discussion: there really was an evolution and development of the American attitude—and also of the president’s attitude. He started initially with the notion of wanting full Soviet cooperation, and then as events went on, his position on that tended to grow more reserved. And one of the reflections of that reserve was an uneasiness about giving legitimacy to the Soviet role in the Middle East. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Marshall. Arne?

**WESTAD:** Just on this very briefly: One of the things that fascinates me with the rivalry in the Horn of Africa, and the way it influenced general bilateral superpower relations, is exactly what we’ve now touched upon: the difficulties that both sides had in controlling the local clients in the area. I have been working together with Ilya on some of the records from the Soviet side for that period, relating to Ethiopia. And it was a very difficult, very complex relationship, as you said—as was the relationship between the United States and Somalia, with the Somalis not getting everything they wanted in terms of military hardware. Certainly, the same thing was the case in Ethiopia with the Soviet side. The Ethiopians came up with enormous shopping lists of what they wanted to get from the Soviet Union, and increasingly so as the conflict escalated. But in general, the Soviet Union was relatively moderate in terms of what it supplied, up to a certain level.

I had a question concerning this, which, I guess, I could ask of Admiral Turner. In the Horn, and particularly in Ethiopia, there seems to have been at this time—up to at least the end of 1977—a much more definite U.S. involvement than I thought there had been before I looked at the Soviet records. The Soviet Union was very worried about U.S. influence with the military leaders in Addis Ababa. And there seem to have been very clear KGB reports coming in of large groups within the leadership that seemed to prefer to cooperate with the United States than with the Soviet Union—particularly as the conflict with Somalia was heating up. Now, I was wondering whether this could have been an element in the firmness on both the

Soviet side, and in American policies as well?

LEGVOLD: Arne must be speaking about the summer months, then—or even into the fall.

WESTAD: Even into the winter.

LEGVOLD: Stan?

TURNER: Sounds to me like that was another bad KGB report. [Laughter.]

KONDRASHOV: I must say that the reports which we were receiving from our representatives in Ethiopia certainly confirmed the well-founded apprehension on our side. That's what I want to say. Thank you.

DOBRYNIN: Khrushchev once recommended to Kennedy that they fire all the intelligence people on both sides. [Laughter.] He said, "We'll save a lot of money."

TURNER: Seriously, Arne, I do not recall any particular effort here. There may have been something going on, but I don't think it was anything of any great import.

LEGVOLD: Marshall?

SHULMAN: I want to mention one factor. Apart from the question of the level of military support, what looms large in my memory is the concern we had about the naval bases that became accessible to the Soviet Union—Berbera, in the case of Ethiopia, and then two naval bases off Somalia, whose names I don't remember. As I recall, part of the military apprehensions at the time did not concern merely the level of military involvement in support of Mengistu after his coup, but also what this would do to Soviet naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean and in the Gulf region. Do you have any recollection of that?

**TURNER:** Actually, Berbera is in Somalia, and *we* took over a Soviet naval base in Berbera, as we became influential in Somalia. I think we were concerned about the Ethiopian/Eritrean naval base at Asmera—or Massawa, actually—and we were quite concerned that that would give them a good foothold on the Red Sea, and then from there on into the Indian Ocean. Up to that point, they had been maintaining a small force in the Indian Ocean, but they didn't have a logistics base for it, and this would facilitate their presence.

**LEGVOLD:** Jim Blight?

**BLIGHT:** By early 1978 the U.S. had publicly opened its negotiations with the Cubans, which resulted in the opening of interests sections in Washington and Havana. I'd just like to ask Bob—or anyone else here on the U.S. side—as this conflict in the Horn was becoming more and more sticky and difficult, what, if anything, was done in term of direct communication with the Cubans on the issue, rather than at a superpower inter-adversary level?

**PASTOR:** Well, I didn't know that we would get into this, otherwise I would have reviewed my notes for the dates and the specifics; so I'm going to have to provide a general answer to your question. And that is that the concerns about Cuban military involvement in Ethiopia began in the fall of 1977, and grew over the next years. Just to review the prior history very briefly: the Carter administration came in and made decisions within the first month—and advanced them two months later—to move towards a process of communication with Cuba, with the objective of normalizing relations. And in that regard, a number of signals were sent then, which had unintended consequences in the summer of 1979. One of those signals was to stop overflights of Cuba in early 1977. Another very important signal was to establish interest sections between both countries under the Czech Embassy in Washington and the Swiss Embassy in Havana, which we announced in April but formally established in September 1977. We began a process of dialogue with Cuba over the full range of issues, both on the diplomatic and on a secret channel. These actually continued throughout the administration. This dialogue was intended initially to move beyond the impasse that had been created two years before during the Ford administration, as a result of the Cuban intervention in Angola. It

was felt that that should not impede an opportunity to move forward in relations with Cuba.

However, we made it clear at the very beginning, which the president and others repeated privately as well as publicly, that any expansion of Cuban military activities in Africa would make it difficult—and, ultimately, he said that it would make it impossible—to move forward toward normalization. And when the first signs came of Cuban involvement in Ethiopia, those signals were sent both privately as well as in the public statements that President Carter himself made during that time. As you and I were talking about yesterday, there was a famous CIA report that was leaked to the *New York Times* in November 1977 about Cuban involvement on country-by-country basis. There was not much of a—

LEGVOLD: I have to interrupt you; there's an urgent call for you from Panama. We'll let you finish in a moment. Marshall?

SHULMAN: I'm sorry Bob just left, because this concerns Cuba. You invited us to lay out questions that we'd like to see explored. On this question of the Cuban involvement in Africa there are things that I would like to have a clear view of in retrospect. I had an impression at the time—and I wonder if my Soviet friends have any light to cast on this—that in the first episode—that is, dealing with Ethiopia; no, Angola—

LEGVOLD: Shaba?

SHULMAN: No. Let me see.

DOBRYNIN: Angola was first, it was before—

SHULMAN: Angola. All right, starting with Angola. My impression was that the initiative for the Cuban military involvement came rather largely from Cuba, and that it was expressive of a rather messianic view that Castro had in the international field. He made some soldiers available more or less by improvisation, rather than by design. And then they used them to help train [Augustinho] Neto's forces to be able to use the materiel that the Soviet Union supplied—the anti-aircraft and other weapons—that his people weren't trained to use.

When the second episode came, in Ethiopia, by that time, the procedure had gotten more routinized—at least, that’s my impression in retrospect. So the role of the Cuban troops, by that time, had fitted into the Soviet operational plan more than had been the case in Angola. And I wonder if that impression is correct?

LEGVOLD: Ilya?

GAIDUK: I base my comments primarily on the documents, and I must say that Mr. Shulman’s evaluation was correct. At least, from what I heard from Georgy Markovich Kornienko—and Sergei Petrovich knows about this—for the Soviet leadership, the involvement of the Cuban troops in Angola was to a large extent unexpected. Indeed, it was primarily Castro’s initiative. And as a result of the compartmentalization in the leadership—I mean, between the political and military leadership in the Soviet Union—there was a lack of sufficient communication between the two branches of the government at this specific moment. It turned out that Moscow found out about the decision to supply the ships and aircraft for transporting Cuban troops already after those troops had been transported to Africa. And when they tried to figure out what had happened, the military officials responsible for that operation said that they spoke with Castro, and that he told them that the question had already been resolved with Moscow. That’s why they approved the transportation.

As regards Ethiopia, here the scenario was better worked out—at least, that was my impression from reading the documents. After the experience of Cuban troops in Angola, the Soviet Union was ready to agree to work out a certain scenario for the involvement of Cuban troops in other regions of the globe. In particular, I’ve seen documents on negotiations the Soviet representatives in Ethiopia had with Ethiopian leaders. The Ethiopian leaders were asking for advice; they were asking the Soviet ambassador if it were possible to transport Cuban troops from Angola to Ethiopia to help them in their struggle. And even though the information in the documents was very limited, I had the impression that the Soviet Union was ready to agree to such an involvement because it would remove a certain responsibility from the Soviet leaders, who weren’t very excited about getting involved in the mess that was brewing in Africa. Even though they wanted to preserve their image as a fighter for oppressed

peoples, they did not want to be involved directly. They found the solution in Fidel Castro. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Ilya. Arne, are these documents that you and Ilya are talking about available to us now? If not, will we have them for the next meeting?

WESTAD: We'll be trying to get some of these documents for the next meeting. But I think it's completely dependent on the cooperation of the Russian archives—and, maybe even more importantly, the Russian veterans who are represented here. Their attempts to get these documents out of the Russian archives and make them available to the rest of us for the next meeting would help greatly.

LEGVOLD: And Sergei Kondrashov suggested yesterday, when we were talking about Afghanistan, that there would be more important documents available on that score. For us to go deeper with what we are doing here, we really have to have the documents available to all of us.

Sergei Tarasenko is next.

TARASENKO: Thank you. I would like to repeat to you what Kornienko told me in our last conversation about Angola. In the civil war, we supported one faction and the Americans supported the other one. Kornienko said that at that time, when it became clear that we had to define our position, a memo had been sent to the Politburo, signed by Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev. The memo said that the Soviet Union should not get involved militarily in the civil conflict in Angola: moral support, yes; political support, yes; but there should be no military involvement in Angola. Three days later, he got another memo signed by Ponomarev, Andropov, and Grechko—at least, I think it was probably Grechko—which said that our Angolan friends—at that time that was the term for it—appealed to us with a request to send a certain number of weapons. It was talking about small amount of firearms, mostly. That memo, I stress, had already been signed by three members of the Politburo without Gromyko, so they needed Gromyko's signature. Kornienko saw that that contradicted the

original memo, which had been signed three days before—that there should not be any military involvement. He went to Gromyko, and said, “What happened? I don’t understand. We had already agreed on this; everybody was positive that we should not do it.” And here we go again—this illustrates the relationships within the Politburo, as I understand them. When Gromyko saw that there were three signatures, for him to disagree meant that he would be in conflict with those important people. And, literally, as Kornienko told me, he was not very happy about Kornienko having raised that question. He said, “Well, leave the paper. I will think about what we can do.” But Kornienko’s impression was that he just signed that paper, and did not disagree. And that was the way it went.

Kornienko also told me the following. He had three folders on his desk, three folders for telegrams. One folder was for urgent telegrams, which required immediate decisions; another was for less urgent telegrams related to his region—to the issues for which he was responsible; and the third folder was for “educational purposes”—it merely contained various interesting materials. If had time, he would look into that third folder; if he did not have time, he would not look into it. It just so happened that at that time he looked into the third folder, and there was a telegram from Conakry—not from Havana, not from Angola, but from Conakry—in which our ambassador reported that the Cuban Ambassador had told him that Cuban airplanes would be flying through Conakry, and that they would make a refueling stop in Conakry the next day, en route to Angola. That was just one paragraph in the telegram among several, dealing with other issues. Our ambassador in Conakry didn’t even dwell on it. But Kornienko definitely was a person who paid a lot of attention to things like that. He immediately went to Gromyko and he said that that was the first time he had heard anything like that. He asked if there had been any decision on this. He asked how it all happened. Gromyko was surprised. He said, “I don’t know anything either; but let’s now try to do something about it.” And then Kornienko and Gromyko together called our military. The military said, “We don’t have anything there.” They called the KGB; there people said, “We don’t have anything either.”

Nonetheless, Kornienko, who understood the possible consequences of that situation, said that we should immediately send a telegram to our ambassador in Havana, for a talk with Castro. They draft a telegram; but the problem was, you needed a vote. You needed to get

the approval of, say, seven or nine Politburo members. It takes time to write a telegram and to send someone around to gather signatures. It takes at least a full day.

Finally, the telegram was sent. In that telegram we told Castro that we did not support the action. We asked him not to do it. We asked him to abstain. But at that time the planes were already in the air. The planes were flying while the telegram was going to Havana. The action had been completed.

After that, Kornienko tried to find out how it had happened. Our military were in Cuba; our planes were in Cuba; as Ilya said, it simply could not have happened without our participation. And this was when the simple explanation came up: our military in Cuba said, "We had no doubt that that issue was agreed upon somewhere at the highest levels—that a political decision had been made. We just did some technical work, some technical planning." This is an example of the senselessness—of the incoherence—of policy-making.

**DOBRYNIN:** With whom was Castro consulting in Moscow?

**TARASENKO:** As far as Kornienko told me, there were no conversations of that sort. Not with anybody. Of course, the Cuban military had contacts with our military, as usual; they probably said, "We need so many planes, and a flight plan"—and the two militaries worked together on that.

**DOBRYNIN:** [To Detinov:] That's an explanation which must be interesting for you to hear! [To Tarasenko:] But what you just mentioned may be a lesson for today's situation. There is a new development—and, I should say, a very welcome development: leaders, at the very top level, speaking with each other by telephone. It's a very good development. The President of United States and the President of the Soviet Union can just pick up the telephone and conduct business.

Back then, the Foreign Ministry knew nothing of what going on. There was a lot of improvisation. What Sergei Tarasenko mentioned is probably correct. I recall this actually happening. I'm sure this worked out among the military, there in Havana. Probably the Cubans said to our military, "Look here, we need planes now; we need to get our people to

Angola.” And our people would say to themselves, “That sounds all right.” So they little by little they would help out the Cubans, and word would eventually reach Moscow through a telegram.

I can give you another example; I don’t recall the month, exactly, but there was to be a certain important meeting with the United States government. I was in Moscow. Our military had a plan every year for maneuvers; I think you have the same kinds of plans—what and when to conduct military exercises, and so forth. We met to prepare for our meeting, and the subject of the maneuvers came up. And in the middle of this, we discovered that in two or three days, a squadron of atomic submarines was to arrive in Cuba. It was completely out of the blue. It had been approved in December; this meeting was in the middle of the year. Nobody in the Foreign Ministry knew about it. And our Defense Ministry was sure that Gromyko had been told in December. If he knew, he forgot about it. This would have been a top secret at that time, so only Gromyko knew about it. Kornienko found out about it by accident—just in time to cancel it. Otherwise, we would have had another Cuban crisis—not a Cuban brigade crisis, but a Cuban missiles-on-submarines crisis.

So the point which is important for us to understand for the future is that sometimes things happen really by accident, without careful thought, as Sergei has said. As a practical matter, in diplomatic relations, you have to try to find out a little bit better what our top people know—little by little, of course. They are not obliged to tell us what they are talking about; but at least on the working level it’s useful to know what they are talking about. It is better not just to be confronted with a situation.

**LEGVOLD:** Jim wants to comment on this right away, and then I have Marshall, then Sergei. Before doing that though, I would observe, Anatoly, that yesterday Harold Brown used this word—the one Russian word that people in Washington came to know: “*ne sluchaino*.” Maybe the word they should have known was, “*sluchaino*.” [Laughter.]

**BLIGHT:** Just an anecdote from the Cuban side just to complete the circle on what Sergei was telling us, as far as Kornienko’s view of what happened in regard to Angola are concerned. A couple of years ago Castro told us that he got an urgent message from Moscow part way

through this airlift to Angola. I may have the numbers a little bit off, but the message said something like this: "Dear Mr. President; we have heard that hundreds of Cuban troops have disembarked in Angola. This is terrible. Please explain this, and please remove them."

**DOBRYNIN:** This was sent to whom?

**BLIGHT:** This was from Moscow to Castro. And Castro responded, "Not hundreds, but thousands are already there."

Now, my second point is something to think about for the next conference. As Anatoly said, not thinking deeply at high levels can sometimes get people into deep trouble. On the other hand, I would submit that a lot of deep thinking about this went on—but it happened in Havana, not in Moscow, and not in Washington. And if we are dealing with third areas, I think it will be important to understand, at least in retrospect, something that may not have been understood in real time: the perspective of those who are actually doing the thinking on the ground in these areas.

**LEGVOLD:** We going to turn next to Marshall, and then Sergei, and then I'm going to invite other questions that have nothing to do with what we are talking about now. Marshall.

**SHULMAN:** Before I put another question about Cuba and Africa on the table, I want to respond to what Anatoly just said. There is another question—perhaps for examination in our later meetings—having to do with American military maneuvers, too. I can recall several instances in which we scheduled what we called "ferret" exercises—these were exercises in which our aircraft would approach the Soviet border in order to elicit radar responses, so that we could identify the radar stations—and the question arose many times whether the direction of those flights ought to be toward the Soviet borders, or away from them. We had debates within the American government about the threshold that we should approach in eliciting the Soviet response for intelligence purposes. This is something that others know more about than I; but it maybe we want to put it on the docket for future examination.

I do want to raise another question, which I find interesting, about Cuban-Soviet relations in

Ethiopia: and that concerns the difference between Cuba and the Soviet Union with regard to the Eritrean independence movement. My recollection of the period is that this raised a very interesting ideological question. The Cubans recognized the Eritrean independence movement within the framework of what were called “national liberation movements.” Therefore, they refused to have Cuban forces participate in the Ethiopian campaign against the Eritreans. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did not. The Soviet Union did assist the Ethiopians in that campaign. I wonder if that recollection of mine is correct?

LEGVOLD: Sergei?

KONDRASHOV: With regard to our involvement in Angola, and Cuban involvement in Angola, for the sake of clarity I want to say the following: Certainly, our service knew beforehand of the intentions of Cubans to help Angolans. We knew; and the military also knew about these plans. That information went to Moscow; so, practically speaking, the whole leadership knew about this forthcoming development.

At first, it elicited no response, as often happens. The information was there; we knew about the coming development; but then this issue was discussed in the Politburo in connection with the demands of Angolans to help them. So, these issues were discussed at the same time, and a decision was made to take note of the intentions of the Cubans to help the Angolans. That was confirmed on the Politburo level.

At the same time, a decision was made, as far as I remember, not to be directly involved ourselves in Angola. Viktor Pavlovich may want to add something to that; but what different agencies should do from our side was also decided at that time—what sort of help to give: either moral support, or machinery, or military pronouncements, etc. It was all more or less decided. Nothing happened without the knowledge of the leadership of the country. And Castro certainly exchanged views with our leaders, I don’t quite remember how it was at the time; but in any case, he wasn’t making any secret of his intentions.

So, I would say that it was quite true that we didn’t want to be involved in the Angolan situation ourselves; but we knew about Cuban intentions. That is what I wanted to say for the sake of clarity.

LEGVOLD: Sergei Tarasenko, and then Arne.

TARASENKO: I would just like to comment on what Sergei Alexandrovich has just said. You know, there was this psychological problem. I worked with [first name?] Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Minister, and then with Shevardnadze. And I remember that once every two weeks or so, we would receive information either from the Committee on State Security, or from military intelligence, that something was about to happen—a coup was about to happen; a war; an American invasion—in such and such region. Generally, nothing happened. So over time, we stopped taking this information into consideration any more. Yes, in many cases, the information was received; but it just so happened that—perhaps because of our psychology—we said to ourselves, “Well, we had the same information before, and nothing happened”—and we would discount it. You have to take this psychological factor into account also, because it is evident we have different interpretations. Yes, there was some information; but Kornienko says he didn’t know anything; Gromyko said that he didn’t know anything, either. Just imagine the volume of work that the Foreign Ministry leadership had: heaps of telegrams, heaps of papers. They were getting huge amounts of paper from the Politburo alone. There was no way for the leadership to read through all of it. And because of internal rules, access to that information was very limited. Deputies could not see those papers. The Minister was supposed to look through them—maybe the First Deputy and their assistants; two or three assistants—and that’s all. So we see a purely human problem interfering: the capacity to assimilate information.

I remember that you had that problem during the war in the Middle East. Anatoly Fedorovich remembers it very well—when the American side had complete information about the coming attack of Israel by Syria and Egypt, but nobody in the American leadership paid any attention to it. The same was true on our side in these cases. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Thank you. Arne?

WESTAD: I know, Mr. Chairman, that we probably need to move on to other issues; but just

in terms of clarification, I think, what Georgy Kornienko was talking about was the very first dispatch of Cuban troops to Angola in June of 1975, which did not include more than two hundred to three hundred troops. The chronology is very important here. The Soviet decision to get involved in this—not directly, but by sending military advisers, transporting Cuban troops, and supplying military hardware—came after the Ministry of State Security supplied the Politburo with advance warning of the South African invasion. On the basis of that, the Politburo decided that they would reevaluate the pressures that had come from the Cubans for further Soviet involvement in Angola. But this is much later; now we are talking about September of 1975.

**LEGVOLD:** Before we leave this, let's let Bob pick up where he was interrupted, because his points were directly related to this.

**PASTOR:** Well, as I was saying, the Carter administration deliberately decided not to reinvolve itself in the Angolan issue, but rather, in our discussions with Cuba, to make clear from the beginning that any expansion of Cuban military activities in Africa or elsewhere would have an inhibiting effect on progress toward the normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba. This was the central issue. There were other issues on the agenda which are not of an immediate interest to this conference.

There was an evolution in 1977 and in 1978 with regard to our policy towards Cuba, and the principle element that led to that evolution was the perception of an expansion of Cuban military activities, particularly in Ethiopia, which came in the fall of 1977. As more and more information came in, the concerns grew to the point that Carter himself made it very clear that any expansion of Cuban military activities would make progress towards normalization impossible. And, of course, we did see that expansion.

One of the reasons that the issue came to a head is partly related to the fact that the administration could not come up with an agreed response to the intervention in Ethiopia. This increased the frustration level of Brzezinski particularly, because his particular proposal regarding Ethiopia had been rejected, but the concerns were wider than Brzezinski, and they spilled over, not only into U.S.-Soviet relations, but into U.S.-Cuban relations as well. This

was so because in 1978, in contrast to Cuban involvement in Angola, no one could argue that Cuban involvement in Ethiopia was autonomous. You recall the debate then, and among academics since, about whether Cuba was acting on its own, or as a surrogate of the Soviet Union. In the inner debate in the Carter administration, that specific question was not seen as being as important as the simple fact that Cuba would not have been able to act without the support of the Soviet Union; therefore, it was playing a role in advancing Soviet interests in Africa as well. That was the point that was of main concern to the U.S. government. The fact that Cuban forces in Ethiopia were under the command of a Soviet general, or some other high military official, was, of course, a very obvious difference with the earlier intervention in Angola. The hard issue, of course, was how to respond to that.

**LEGVOLD:** I'm a little concerned about our time. We've got about thirty-five minutes, and we really have not raised very many questions at this point. I would suggest that we use these last thirty-five minutes now to begin turning to the wider range of questions I mentioned at the outset. I want to encourage the scholars to intervene and ask questions that they think have not been resolved, and indicate where they think we need information to address the questions that are of concern to them.

I would also make the observation that this discussion, which started with the Horn and went back to Angola, demonstrates to us how much the events in the Carter administration didn't simply begin with the Carter administration. This was a stream of events into which the Carter administration stepped. There was a good deal of continuity between Angola, Ethiopia, and in some ways even ultimately Afghanistan. We need to keep this in mind.

Now, Phil, did you—?

**BRENNER:** Yes, I wanted to lead into exactly the same questions.

**LEGVOLD:** Okay; then I've got Dan, and then Vlad.

**BRENNER:** Let me ask the first question to the Russian participants, and then move on to the second question. The first question concerns perceptions—because a major part of what we

were dealing with, we have learned, is this question of misperceptions. Can you help us understand your calculations with respect to Ethiopia? How did you think that having Cuban troops in Ethiopia would affect the United States? I understand that you had your own calculations as to why you didn't want to be involved; but I want to understand how you thought the United States would react to Cuban troops there? Did you think the United States would connect them to you? What did you think the implications would be for your relationship with the United States?

Let me ask you a second question about perceptions. In the March 1977 meeting between Gromyko and Vance—[to Sukhodrev:] perhaps you can help us in particular, if you were at that meeting—what was your perception of what Vance was doing? Secretary Vance tells us that he felt like there was a wet blanket. What was your perception? What was Gromyko's perception of what Vance was doing? What was the reaction to the Vance meeting? And what explains your reaction? What were you anticipating, and what didn't you get? What did you perceive you *were* getting?

LEGVOLD: Viktor, do you want to respond to that now?

SUKHODREV: Well, I think we have discussed this. We were saying that, on the one hand, it was a total departure from what had been expected; but, at the same time, it was not a surprise, because we had had advance knowledge of it. And yet there was a feeling, I would say, of disgust. I mean, if you want the real word for it, it was a feeling of disgust on the Soviet side—indignation; disgust. For Brezhnev personally, this was a personal affront. And Gromyko, of course, followed suit. That was evident in the very rare public appearance of Gromyko at that press conference. That was very rare.

BRENNER: How did you explain what the United States did? What was your own explanation for why the United States behaved the way it did?

SUKHODREV: It was not just a SALT—it was a whole complex of issues: SALT, the total departure from Vladivostok, compounded by the attitude to human rights. These had never

been put in this way before by Nixon, by Kissinger, or by the Ford team. Suddenly, right there in Moscow—in Brezhnev's office—to talk about human rights! To talk about Soviet violations of somebody's human rights! Unheard of! It was a personal affront. It was taken very, very, very personally by Brezhnev and Gromyko. On the human plane, that's how it was.

**LEGVOLD:** On the other question that Phil asked: by the time of the war over the Ogaden—the Ethiopian-Somali clash—you had had the experience of Angola and the way the Americans, in the prior administration, had reacted to Cuban involvement there, and the question of Cuban-Soviet cooperation. What was your calculation, as Phil said, about the likely reaction in the case of Ethiopia? Was the essential position that, basically, it was an American problem, and they would simply have to adjust?

**DOBRYNIN:** I think we have spent too much time on the Horn. It's a nice place, of course; but, I think if we have only one hour left, we'd better finish our business, and we can come back to the Horn another time. There were many more horns in our relationship.

**PASTOR:** Could you just give a two-sentence answer?

**DOBRYNIN:** I really don't know. I didn't ask.

**LEGVOLD:** Okay, fair enough. This is an issue that we will be coming back to in a different context at a different time, and so we'll pursue it later. I do want to make sure that everyone has a chance to ask the questions that are of concern to them; so, feel free to get on the list.

The next person on the list is Dan Caldwell.

**CALDWELL:** I think one of the things that we've seen in the last two days is that SALT, and the broader Soviet-American relationship, were intertwined like the strands of a rope. And one of the questions that I have emerging from the conference, and from interviews I had with Soviet government officials about SALT II, was, when did the Soviet government give up on getting SALT II ratified? We know that the American government gave up early in January 1980, when President Carter withdrew the treaty from Senate consideration. And when I in-

interviewed Soviet officials about when they gave up, I asked them, “What about Afghanistan? Didn’t you know that that would kill SALT II?,” the response has typically been, “Oh, no; we thought SALT II was dead long before Afghanistan.” So, I would like to know if there was a specific time at which the Soviet leadership gave up on SALT II?

LEGVOLD: Dan, when you say “gave up on SALT II,” do you mean gave up on the possibility that they would actually be able to get it ratified on the U.S. side?

CALDWELL: That’s right.

LEGVOLD: Vlad Zubok is next, and what I’m going to do now rather than call for answers to each of the questions that are posed, is let a series of questions pile up on the table. So, Vlad Zubok is next; then David Welch; then Mark Garrison.

ZUBOK: SALT II was very much alive, even without ratification. And this allows me to ask, with the wisdom of hindsight, whether all of this fuss about ratification was necessary, or merely tactical? I am thinking of the view espoused by Dr. Brzezinski—that they had to placate the opposition to ratification by proposing more military programs and armaments programs. On the other hand, Secretary Vance thought the public and the Congress would be able to differentiate between various issues, disengage the issue of SALT, and ratify the agreement. With the wisdom of hindsight, was it necessary to placate the opposition? This is relevant to the future, I believe, because all kinds of complications emerge in the relations between states, and this tactic of placating a possible domestic opposition may return to haunt us in the future.

The second question is to Ambassador Dobrynin and to the Russian delegation: since the American principals are not here, we can discuss them behind their backs. [Laughter.] When did you perceive the sharp differences between Vance and Brzezinski inside the administration, and how did you report them to Moscow? What possibilities or dangers did you perceive in that split within the administration? Thank you.

LEGVOLD: The next person on the list is David.

WELCH: I found the entire discussion this weekend fascinating, and I would be interested in trying to find some way of fitting it into a coherent framework. It seems to me that, at some point, we will want to discuss further the relative importance of—and the specific interactions between—at least five different kinds of explanations people keep coming up with for failures of various kinds:

- The first kind of explanation we have heard several times is that inherent problems of the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, having to do mostly with technical military considerations, were at the root of the failure of SALT II.
- The second kind of difficulty that people have referred to repeatedly is the broader political context in which the SALT negotiations were taking place—what was going on in the Horn, China, Afghanistan, and so forth.
- Still other people have given primacy to domestic political explanations for various failures—this is where the rising conservative tide thesis figures in most prominently.
- The fourth kind of explanation we've heard appeals to intra-governmental failures of communication: how the specific decision-making processes in the United States and—most interestingly—in the Soviet Union led to specific errors, breakdowns, and missed opportunities.
- Finally, the fifth kind of explanation we've heard for various failures is fundamentally psychological—Gromyko's and Brezhnev's personal indignation and outrage at the United States, for example, or specific people's misperceptions of specific actions and events.

I am wondering how these five different themes interact. Obviously, I suppose, they are all relevant to some degree; but I wonder whether it is possible to fit them into some coherent package, or some coherent vision, of what lay behind the real difficulties in this period.

LEGVOLD: Mark Garrison.

GARRISON: I think one of the things that we need to try to do today, as we begin thinking about the following conferences, is to try to establish as best we can the relative importance of

various questions and issues, and each side's cumulative assessment of what the other side was up. I think we've heard a lot about issues that were of concern to the American side; I would like to get some sense of the relative importance of some of these issues to the Soviet side. I'm not sure what they would be, but I would think that China or the Middle East might be important. I don't know if there was a sense on the Soviet side that the U.S. had designs on Eastern Europe, for example; but, if that's the case, we ought to hear about it. I would like to hear what issues were of broad concern to the Soviet leadership—beyond Ponomarev, that is, who presumably would be the one worried about the Horn of Africa.

**LEGVOLD:** My list is now clear, so if people want to speak up, let me know.

The point that Mark was just making, I think, is a good one: going into the subsequent meetings, we need to begin identifying some of the critical issues on the Soviet side—areas where they were having a great deal of difficulty. I think part of the reason why Viktor yesterday—and Anatoly today—felt frustration, is because of this emphasis on the Horn and Angola. We haven't turned to the other side of the story, to look at the issues that were deeply troubling to the Soviet side. With Mark, I would assume, they include things like China, and developments over the Middle East—from the October statement to Camp David—because we know from the record that they were very prominent issues. We don't know the degree to which there was concern about Eastern Europe; at least, I don't at this stage. And, so I think, without necessarily talking about those things today, we need to have some sense from our Russian counterparts of what it is that we should be trying to focus on in the future.

Bob had a quick intervention, and then Phil.

**PASTOR:** As long as we're thinking about questions that we all ought to address in the future, I'm drawn back to questions of contemporary policy relevance. One thing I am drawn to is the kind of failures that David Welch pointed to. I'd like, if we could, to give some thought to how different bureaucratic organizations and different domestic political tactics on either side affected individual decisions. It would also be fruitful to ask whether the wider relationship between the two countries was taken into account at moments in which crucial individual decisions were made, and whether any thought was given as to how those decisions would bear on future

relations. Both sides had legitimate concerns about that.

So, I'd like us to think about the policy relevance of those particular failures, as well as the broader issues involved. Given the tremendous changes that have occurred in the last five years, is there anything of policy relevance in what we've been studying—for the future, not just for understanding the past?

LEGVOLD: Phil Brenner.

BRENNER: I want to pick up from what Mark Garrison and David Welch—and now Bob—said. What I want us to focus on for a moment is yesterday's exchange between Nikolai and Harold Brown. It was really quite an extraordinary moment: for me, it was one of the highlights of this conference. I don't think we have quite recognized how much we've learned here; that's what I want to help us to do.

Harold Brown is a very smart man. Those you who worked with him had told us this; and it's very clear. And yet he felt compelled time and again to explain to the Russians what crisis stability meant. And he couldn't quite understand why they didn't understand. Finally, Nikolai said to him, "We agree that crisis stability is a good thing, but you're not defining crisis stability for us. What you're defining is something that serves *your* interests, but that would, in fact, be quite destabilizing for us. Here is what crisis stability would mean for us." And Brown finally got it. It was a revelation. It was extraordinary. It reminded me of a moment in the Cuban missile crisis conferences when Bob McNamara finally understood what the Cubans were perceiving.

Actually, it turns out that there are significant parallels between what we learned from the Cuban missile crisis conferences, and what we've learned here. Let me point out three very interesting parallels—things that changed the conventional wisdom on the American side as to what happened in this period. The first parallel is the issue of threat perception. It turns out that both sides felt threatened by the actions of the other. [To the Russian delegation:] On the American side, what we have been telling you is that we felt threatened by things that you were doing—that you were doing things that seemed to undermine *détente*; things that seemed like aggressive actions. But it turns out that you were perceiving things that *we* were doing as

being equally aggressive and hostile. Viktor has said explicitly that we were quite ungracious guests in your home, and that we were acting in a very hostile way. So there was a series of things that I'm not going to enumerate that you felt were hostile on our part; but we also felt that you were acting in a hostile way. That's the first issue: threat perception.

The second issue is self-definition. The Soviet Union, it seems, felt itself to be vulnerable in ways we didn't understand. You had an aging leadership that it seems you weren't sure would, in fact, be able to lead you. That vulnerability made you extraordinarily cautious. You also felt that you had done a very good thing by having signed Helsinki and having agreed to the terms of Vladivostok. These were remarkable breakthroughs, in your view. And yet the United States, on the other hand, felt that it was acting in a benign, if not noble way in pursuing human rights concerns. We thought we were assisting the forward movement of history, as someone put it yesterday—Brzezinski, I think. We were in tune with what history was about, and we were trying to help you catch up with that. We were aggrieved by your actions that violated the tacit understandings we thought we had.

The third turns on this question of miscalculation. There is a wonderful line in Brzezinski's memoir, where he says that he believed the United States could—and I quote—"carefully calibrate its responses and actions" so as not to renew the Cold War, but simultaneously have both competition and cooperation. That's almost exactly the same phrase that Arthur Schlesinger used in talking about the way in which we thought we could manage the Cuban missile crisis. Careful calibration. Well, that was a miscalculation; we can't calculate so precisely when we are dealing with other countries. And in the same way, the Soviet Union miscalculated that there would be no linkage when you sent Cuban troops—or when you worked with Cuban troops—in Ethiopia. It was a miscalculation.

I think these are three quite extraordinary parallels to the Cuban missile crisis.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Phil. I would add a question to those that have been put on the table, and I would address it to our Russian colleagues—and I am also interested, eventually, in hearing our American colleagues' response to it: how do you feel about Les Gelb's statement yesterday? Is Les right? Are there really no lessons that you have learned—or no implications that you are drawing—from these conversations, because you knew those lessons

all along? Is that right? Stan.

**TURNER:** So far, I have taken away two, maybe three key lessons. The first one is that neither side gave adequate consideration to how the other side would interpret its actions. For instance, the American side yesterday emphasized that crisis stability was our objective, and the Soviet side emphasized that parity—not superiority—was its objective in designing its nuclear force structure. I see no reason to question either statement of intent. But at the same time, we defined crisis stability as foregoing threatening weapons and capabilities. But I don't recall us in any way discussing at the time how the Soviet Union would perceive our proceeding with the MX missile—which clearly was not crisis-stable weapon. We rationalized it as a way of placating domestic opposition; but the very opinion we were placating was one that demanded superiority and a war-fighting (or war-winning) capability—the very antithesis of crisis stability. But we didn't ask ourselves whether there was anything else we could have done to try to signal to you that we did not want to upset crisis stability, notwithstanding the fact that this was the only way to get ratification for domestic reasons. And MX is only one example. There was also the improved accuracy of SLBMs; the 15-warhead MIRVs; and so on.

On the Soviet side, you made light of the fact that we were concerned that 250 land-based launchers and 150 sea-based launchers were being built every year. I question whether you ever asked yourselves: will the Americans extrapolate that out for ten years, and then weigh the balance and see where they stand? Will they feel that ten years from now they are going to be way behind if we keep cranking things out at this rate? Given the lead-times, if the Americans were to keep pace, they would have to get their own programs going right away—and so the arms race compounded itself. Did the Soviet side ask itself whether there was anything it could do to assure the United States that this would not go on forever—that you had limited objectives? It really seems to me that we ought to learn from this conference, and from future ones, something about studying the other side's perceptions.

Secondly, from this conference, it seems to me that neither us understands what nuclear weapons are. Over and over again on both sides we talked about superiority, and the risk of either being superior or inferior. That doesn't recognize that when nuclear weapons came into

being, the military equation changed. Historically, if a chief of staff went to his chief of state and said, “You’ve got a problem with country X, and I can handle that for you, because I can beat them up with my tanks and artillery a heck of a lot more than they can beat us up,” the chief of state may well have gone to war. Today, if the chief of staff says, “I can beat up the other side with nuclear weapons a heck of a lot more than they can beat us up,” the chief of state will say, “But will the damage that we receive in response be acceptable?” In most cases it will not. It’s a different equation. We have not addressed this in this conference—the misunderstanding that is apparent in all of our conversations about that equation.

I put the equation to a test in 1980, and had the CIA do an estimate—the official estimate of the nuclear balance for that year. We worked from the assumption that the Soviet Union would launch a surprise first strike, optimized to destroy our nuclear forces, and we would do nothing. At the end of that, I asked the question, what is the nuclear balance? And in 1980 it came out that the nuclear balance was such that we could still destroy the Soviet Union twice over, and the Soviet Union could still destroy us at least one more time. It didn’t make any substantial difference if you doubled the numbers on either side, because the residual forces were virtually invulnerable. And so, most of the calculations that we’ve been discussing here about SALT II were, in my view, totally irrelevant—throw weight, number of RVs, and so forth. I look back on the tremendous effort that I personally had to put in on verification, and it was really not worthwhile. The degree of precision we wanted when we were dealing with twenty or thirty thousand nuclear warheads was not necessary. We heard a lot of convoluted concerns in nuclear theology—concern that the Soviets might bring up the submarines and knock out our bomber bases, for instance, followed quickly by ICBMs arriving to knock out our ICBMs, and so on. That was absolutely irrelevant, because we still had our submarines.

The Soviet side said, “Gee, we were concerned about a cruise missile attack; that’s destabilizing.” But we wouldn’t strike you with 22 cruise missiles; there is no sense in that. If we were going to strike you with cruise missiles, there would have to be several thousand to knock out all the ICBMs and all the bomber bases, and the whole Soviet command and control system. We couldn’t possibly bring that many cruise missiles to bear on the Soviet Union without it being apparent. And you wouldn’t have any question what was happening if we launched them. So, this kind of theological discussion over all these years has been irrelevant.

Brezhnev had it right at Tula: sufficiency is what we both needed; but neither of us really grappled—not then, and not in this conference—with defining sufficiency. In my opinion, the only way you can have superiority with nuclear weapons, rather than sufficiency, is to impute to the other fellow his superiority and your inferiority, and accept a position of self-intimidation. There is no need to be intimidated if the other side has twice or three times as many as you, as long as you have a secure retaliatory capability.

So, I would suggest we ask ourselves how this thinking got so far off track, and how to think in more sensible conceptual terms. I would very much like to hear about the conceptual thinking about nuclear weapons within the Russian military—because it appears that this was done within the military. How were policies formulated? What kind of people did it? What kind of thinking and reasoning went into this? You heard yesterday that, on our side, much of the reasoning that went into our nuclear strategy originated with civilians. The military in some sense co-opted the civilians, and built a base for a continuing expansion, on the old thesis that more is better—if we can beat up the other side more than they can beat us up, we can afford to go to war. I'd really like to understand more about how Soviet strategic doctrine was formulated. And I believe sincerely that in future conferences, if we can get at that, we can lay out a constructive course for the future, and work at correcting that—coming up with something more workable.

I'm sorry to take so long, Mr. Chairman.

**LEGVOLD:** No, no, Stan; thank you very much. That was very good. Viktor would like to comment on it immediately; Sergei is the next person on the list after that. Viktor, say what you want, and I will turn to Sergei; then we are at the coffee break.

**STARODUBOV:** I listened with a great interest to what the Admiral had to say. And I must say that I have the most positive impression from what he has said, because we also had this way of thinking. And I am ready to repeat what I've said many times before: that during the negotiations we had very good exchanges with the U.S. military. We understood each other very well.

In particular, I would like to begin from the end: what was our psychology? A lot of things

were similar but there was one difference. It was the difference between the psychology of a leader and the psychology of an underdog. I cannot go into details now, but the underdog—the side attempting to catch up—always thinks that the leader has already thought everything through, and that if he does something, we should do it also. And here, of course, we lacked communication, mutual intellectual exchange: why did we need to improve precision, for example, when we had mountains of weapons? What for? Precision is a characteristic of weapons primarily necessary for launching a first disarming strike. It is only marginally important for other goals.

And there is one other thing that I would like to mention in respect to Admiral Turner's remarks. I would like to add something. The American side did not always understand the consequences of our strategic programs. I have already mentioned one concrete example. The American side was concerned when in the second half of the 1960s the Soviet Union began rapidly accumulating strategic capabilities, building 250 ICBM launchers a year, 100-120 launchers on submarines. We understood that the American side could read it in different ways—that they could misunderstand our goals. And they did. But here again, there was a lack of communication. We couldn't communicate our goals to each other. We couldn't communicate to them that the Soviet Union was only striving for parity.

In this respect I have an idea—call it a proposal—concerning our conference. We talked about the SALT II treaty; we said that it was unfortunate that it was not ratified. But I think that SALT II, even unratified as it was, was carried out. After the two sides had signed this treaty, there was no more question of the Soviet Union building 250 launchers a year. Similar questions never emerged on our side either. We were convinced that the levels stated in the treaty were the upper limits beyond which neither side aimed after the treaty had been signed. I must say that for us such numbers as 2400, 1320, 1200, 820—I think everybody here understands what are the numbers I am talking about—they became a highest law, they set absolute limits for us. When I was in the Political Consultative Committee, we would consider the problems that sometimes would arise with the American side on treaty limits. If ever we built too many of one type of bomber or missile, we would immediately cut the number of other types of strategic weapons. We strictly followed the rules. There was an exception, though. You all probably remember that the American side had been very painfully discussing for a

long time the question of whether to build a cruise-missile carrying bomber that would exceed the SALT ceiling. Eventually they built it, but I don't think it gave them more—

**DOBRYNIN:** Confidence.

**STARODUBOV:** Yes, confidence—that they were doing the right thing. I think that the American side regrets it now. It was the only case when they exceeded the agreed-upon limits.

But still, as Admiral Turner said, when you don't know when the Soviet side would stop building—when you aren't sure that they will not dig those silos indefinitely—a treaty such as this can be very important. And I think that when we start to discuss subsequent questions, we ought to come back to discuss the period of the treaty's life—its life after death, I mean; its life after it had not been ratified. It still lived. I think there is a correlation between how the sides abided by the treaty and the external events—even events within the country and their external behavior. I think that that correlation, in some way, would help us, even in the future, avoid the difficulties in ratifying and carrying out treaties. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Viktor. Sergei, you have the last word before coffee.

**KONDRASHOV:** Thank you. First of all, I wish to say that I completely disagree with Mr. Gelb's statement yesterday. I feel that this sort of exchange of opinions is very useful. It's a way of leading us to a better understanding of the actions of the other side. And that, I think, is the main thing that we gain from this sort of a discussion. If we analyze the discussions over these last days, it is clear that the discussions which went on at different levels in the 1970s were not sufficiently informed about, and attentive to, the perceptions and the actions of the other side. In this sense, I completely agree with Admiral Turner.

For the sake of clarity, I should say the following. It would seem from the discussions which we had today that some of the decisions taken by the Soviet government and party leadership were purely accidental. That is not the case. Certainly, there was a great deal of information from the security services, the military side, and from the political side. A heap of

information came in every day. But there was certain priority, and the priority was well defined. I would not say important issues received no consideration; but I completely agree with Ambassador Dobrynin when he says we have devoted too much attention to Horn of Africa, because that was not an important issue. The Politburo members spent considerable time on important issues, such as relations with China, or matters in the Near East, or situations on our border—your bases in Turkey, or somewhere else near our border. Those were the issues that had priority. The Horn of Africa was a distant problem.

I think it the United States gave greater thought to how things were perceived in the Soviet Union, then relations between the two countries would have been much better. Let me give you a personal recollection. Once I toured the Far East, and when I came to Petropavlovsk, in Kamchatka, they asked me, “Do you want to see an American submarine?” There was an American nuclear-powered submarine routinely stationed 50 kilometers off Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka. It would serve there for two months, I think, then go away, and another would replace it on station. The whole Far East knew about this submarine. It was very provocative. Or take the American RC-130 reconnaissance planes. They flew four flights a day along the Soviet borders in the Far East. I’ve observed it myself. Every day, one flight after another. You see, that produces an impression—not only on public opinion, because in the Far East everybody knows about it; but also on the leaders of the Far Eastern regions, who are constantly in contact with the highest leadership of the country. It makes it difficult for us to improve relations.

Let us take just one example from modern days. The United States supports the Japanese claim to the Southern Kurile islands. I don’t know how this problem will develop, but I must tell you that the whole Far East is living with this problem. In the beginning of *perestroika*, the prestige of the United States was rose steadily. But you made certain pronouncements with regard to the Kurile islands, and believe me, in the whole Far East, the prestige of the United States dropped sharply. It is important to assess the possible reaction of the other side—of the government; of the leaders of the country; and of public opinion, which is also nowadays playing an essential role in our country—when formulating and making decisions.

With regard to the problems of the SALT agreement which we were discussing, certainly one thing you have to keep in mind is the number of times the issue of first strike capabilities

was discussed on either side. We knew from the very beginning that, under certain circumstances, a first strike was part of your strategy. We had to take that into consideration; and it produced an impression—

SHULMAN: Would you say that again? You knew what?

KONDRASHOV: That a first strike was among the possible reactions to certain political developments in the Soviet Union. [Several voices simultaneously inquire whether Kondrashov is referring to a *preemptive first strike*, or to the first *use* of nuclear weapons in the context of a conventional war.] First use; first use.

SHULMAN: Did you feel that the United States not only had the capability, but that also, under certain circumstances, it might have the intention to strike first?

KONDRASHOV: Yes, that's essentially so.

Lastly, on the human rights issue: during the Carter administration, innumerable cases were brought to our attention. We were ready to solve a great many of them—and we have solved a great many of them. The Americans picked many complicated cases; many of them were hard to solve. Particular cases were taken from the files and presented to us. This was an aggravation. But we told the American side that we were ready to solve them on a bilateral basis, and we solved a large number of cases.

I would say that we were ready to go much further in area of human rights, despite the fact that some of the decisions we saw as detrimental to the situation inside the country. But we were ready to go forward—if there was movement in the area of disarmament. Thank you very much.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Sergei. Now a half an hour for coffee; we'll resume at 11:30.

GARRISON: I wonder if the ambassador might want to say something before he leaves?

DOBRYNIN: Well, it's a little bit late, maybe. I think that the discussion was very important. Specifically, for me it was very interesting to know more about the military side of the story. The diplomatic side I know rather well; but there were some nuances which will be useful for our colleagues to know. It was an important and useful discussion, and I welcome this opportunity to share our views, our knowledge, our experience.

Unfortunately, we had no chance to discuss how we would implement the changes we identified as useful. This is a very practical question, and it would have been useful for both sides to discuss it further. But we had no time; we were stuck on the Horn. [Laughter.]

I think the military people here are right—Admiral Turner and our friends, the two Generals. Many things were the result of misunderstanding, or different perceptions about military matters. And we, in diplomacy, knew very little about that. We were overwhelmed with the feeling, as the Admiral rightly said, that this was all “nuclear theology.” I feel that the American side is still overwhelmed by this theology. It is hard for us, on the diplomatic side, to understand. We didn't discuss it at the time, those of us who were responsible for foreign policy. We didn't discuss at all. You kept pressing on us things like crisis stability; but it is important for you to understand how it was for us at that time, and how it is now. This was all theology.

I think our military was up to the level of yours—their prognoses, their evaluations, their recommendations to the government. We were behind, yes; we were trying to catch up. And this influenced our positions on SALT. On the diplomatic side, we were trying to help our country not get too far behind. But the main problems of SALT II were political, not military. The discussion of military aspects reminded me of that movie in America, “Gray Area”—you know, this night movie show—

PASTOR: Twilight Zone.

DOBRYNIN: Yes, twilight zone. After SALT II we passed this twilight zone: the discussion of who was going to attack, whether we had enough to strike first, or maybe second, or a third time. We managed to get beyond this. We realized that our safety really lay in our own hands, and in the hands of our colleagues from other side. We don't have this fear of war between us now; this nuclear theology helped create this fear. Of course, we are still con-

cerned about the security of our countries—your and ours. It's one of our main concerns still. But now our security depends more on discussion, on dialogue.

I don't know how many hours I spent on this Horn, or human rights, or Scharansky; it was unbelievable. Instead of using our conversations constructively to find out what was going on between us, we spent so much time on these irritants. If we had come to the conclusions then that we have come to now, many things would have been completely unnecessary for us—then and now—to discuss. Sometimes I feel sorry that we spent so much effort in our competition, in our rivalry, on issues which were really of no importance to us. Look around the Third World; I don't want to sound cynical, but who in the Soviet Union or United States cares now what's going on in Somalia? You were there; you tried to do something about it; and now you don't want even to be reminded about it, because Somalia became a symbol of failure. Or take Ethiopia. It is the same thing. I could give you many examples. But these were certain issues which we had to deal with.

Sergei, I think, was complaining about human rights. Well, he was a representative of the organization which was very much involved with human rights. We were less involved—the diplomats, I mean. But I should say, at that time it was our impression that, quite frankly, you couldn't find a compromise with the Carter administration on human rights. I was 100% convinced that it didn't matter whether you solved the case, for example, of Scharansky, or Sakharov; they would continue with more. As Zbig very clearly mentioned, for some it was a way of putting the Soviet Union on the defensive. That was very convenient policy, putting the Soviet Union always on the defensive. We kept saying, "Don't interfere, don't interfere." When you say, "don't interfere," you are accepting that something is happening—you merely don't want to discuss it. So it was a convenient issue for the American side to attack us with vehemence. It was a very convenient way to try to undermine the regime. They didn't say that publicly, of course; you didn't say it in a diplomatic conversation. In friendly talks, Marshall Shulman or Cyrus Vance never mentioned to me that they were trying to undermine our regime. [Laughter.] But we understood each other quite well.

So, coming back to what I was saying earlier, we should look at the real issues—not the unimportant ones. Not the distractions. Not the tactical issues. We have to look back with perspective and discuss the lessons of this. Unfortunately, we do not have time to look at it

now. But there are lessons we could draw, because I am a little concerned that relations between Russia and America are starting to look a little old-fashioned and familiar—not because of any specific issue or situation, of course, but because the euphoria of *détente* has passed. We don't use the word "*détente*" now—but it used to be a magic word, almost. Now we have more and more questions; more issues are arising between the two countries. Viktor spoke about Far East; this is one example. And he is right. The new administration is losing a great deal by taking such a strong position on the side of Japan over the so-called "Northern Territories." I was in Washington for many years; your position on this issue used to be different. There has been an evolution from administration to administration. I could quote you what the Presidents of United States said about it, beginning from, let's say, the 1950s. They had different positions than you have now. If you think it is worthwhile to take such a strong position on behalf of Japan—well, that's your business. That is between you and Japan. But why do you agree to support them so strongly? You are losing so much in our opinion; Viktor is right. Why? Just to support Japan? I don't think Japan really needs your support. Maybe we are a little bit oversensitive; but you should take our sensitivity into account, because it's your future, too.

That is all I would like to say. I think this was very useful, really—to discover the mistakes we were making; we made a lot of mistakes. The main lesson should be not to repeat them in the future.

LEGVOLD: Anatoly, thank you very much. [Applause.] What you do is underscore how much work this enterprise still has to do. This is a first step. And as you leave, I want to tell you again how much you have enriched the discussion. Thank you for being here.

We will come back at 11:30.

## **MAY 9: MORNING SESSION 2**

LEGVOLD: Okay, are we ready to begin? We'll go on now for approximately an hour, and

then right before we break for lunch, we have one other thing that we want to do. If you noticed on the schedule—those of you who have it—it is says that this session, “Summary and conclusions,” was supposed to begin with Legvold, who will initiate the session by presenting a brief summary and analysis of the discussions, emphasizing main themes and arguments. But I told you at the beginning that we didn’t want to constrain this discussion with an overly precise agenda. So, I don’t intend to do that. Instead, I will take ten minutes—and I apologize for taking that much—to make three points that are of the nature of what I would call the lessons for the future. They are not substantive historic lessons for the future of Russian-U.S. relations, or of international politics; they really apply to the future of this enterprise—because we’ll go from here to a second meeting, and then to a third, and we want to build this process in a way that in the end will produce the kind of results that Ambassador Dobrynin called for in his final comments, and that a number of others have also called for in the course of a meeting.

The first point that I would make is that contemporary history—that is, history that you have been a part of, either as an observer or as a maker—is often like a Rorschach test. A Rorschach test, for those in the room who may not know about it, is a psychological test, in which people are shown an ink blot and asked what they make of it—what shapes they see in it. And the answers normally reflect the person’s psychology, imagination, and way of seeing things. And, as I said, history that you’ve been a part of is often like an ink blot test. You see in it, in a way, what you want to see; how you interpret it depends upon your own personality. My sense is that if we were to bring Marshal Grechko back from the grave—or Senator Scoop Jackson—even today they would see in the history that they were a part of essentially what they saw when they lived through it. On the other hand, those who believed that we should give the other side more of the benefit of the doubt, and who held that the fundamental problem was a function of the fact that we were insufficiently concerned about the interaction between the two sides, as opposed merely to the actions of the other side—many of whom are represented at this table—would also be more or less confirmed in their view of the situation. That would be their response to the Rorschach test. In terms of this enterprise—the meeting after this one, and the final meeting—I don’t think we’re really going to try to prove which side was right or wrong. We’re not going to try to convince Marshall Grechko in his

grave, or Scoop Jackson in his, or others who are at this table, that one side is right and the other wrong. What we want to do is make sure that we have developed the record as fully as we possibly can, so that reasonably open-minded people will be able to draw comparable conclusions about what this period meant. The purpose here is to understand the meaning of this history for the longer run, as I said on the first day

The second point that I want to make by way of lessons for the future of this enterprise is what I would call “the Gelb thesis.” I take the Gelb thesis very seriously. Les Gelb was not saying that there were no lessons in this history; Gelb was saying that there were many lessons in this history, but that they were not new lessons. We really knew them at the time. Les was not saying that things might not have been different; Les believes deeply that things could have been different. Moreover, Les believes that we knew what it would take for things to be different. But his view is that we were simply unable to do it. Given the configuration of the political forces within the two countries—given the general trends occurring at that time—there were limits within which people operated. I think there is something to be said for that. I think we have to wrestle with that reality. Marshall said at one point, rather wistfully, “If only we could have had this kind of a conversation at that time.” Anatoly Dobrynin echoed that in his final comments. But there were many reasons why it was impossible to have this kind of a conversation at that time. It’s important for us to understand what those reasons were, and to figure out which of them absolutely precluded a discussion, and which were susceptible to manipulation.

But that’s not the real point I want to make about the Gelb thesis. The real point I want to make about the Gelb thesis is that, in the long run, what really matters is the cumulative effect of little differences. I don’t believe—I don’t think most people around this table believe—that there was a single major thing that could have been done differently that would have resolved the problem of mistrust that grew during that period of time. I believe that if every significant step in that evolution—every event—had been only marginally different—only marginally better—the cumulative effect of what was going on during this period in the end would have made an enormous difference—an enormous difference. Therefore, I’m not satisfied with Les’s response to my question about the role of human intervention, when he said that if we had been blessed with enormously courageous and far-sighted leaders who were prepared to buck these

historical trends, then things could have been different. I don't think we can count on that in any period of time, nor wait for it. I think what we have to care about is the way in which we make marginal differences every step of the way for the better. And I believe that was very much possible during the period we are discussing. One of the purposes of this exercise, it seems to me—coming to the lessons for the future—is to embrace the task of what I would call “confronting counterfactuals”—the question of what might have been. But we must do so in a very specific context, not in a broad, abstract way. We must look at important moments from 1977 to 1980 with an open mind about what might have been—because a marginal improvement in any one of those things, even at that time, when added together, would have created a very, very different outcome.

The third and final point has to do with what I am going to call “the Zubok thesis.” What Vlad was saying about the importance of culture differences is something that is widely held among people at this table. Many of us who understand other societies as specialists—diplomats, journalists, or academics—agree on the importance of culture. So I don't think his basic proposition has to be argued. I think most of us embrace it. There are things that make us different—that made us different during those years, and that continue to make us different. We are different as societies now; we were different as societies then; we are different as cultures now; we were different as cultures then. We were not Americans dealing with Americans, although that's often the way in which we acted, and in which we thought about it subconsciously. And you were not Soviets dealing with Soviets. We were Americans dealing with Soviets, and you were Soviets dealing with Americans. And that made a difference. To be more concrete, I think one of the lessons that comes out of this, as any other period of time, concerns an important distinction: that is, issues and problems that arise in the relationship are not only about what one side is trying to do, or what one side is trying to accomplish, but also how they try to do it, and how the other side interprets these things. Time and time again in this conversation the issue of the way something was done has been almost as important as what was done. It arises most conspicuously in the case of human rights—in the way in which Americans went about pursuing the agenda of human rights. That was not a new issue with the Carter administration; there had been earlier efforts—“quiet diplomacy,” as it was called—behind the scenes, as opposed to the very public posture of the

Carter administration in dealing with this. But I think that's the obvious version of the point. The less obvious version of the point concerns the event that we really did spend some time probing, and that was March 1977. Here it wasn't merely what the Americans wanted to accomplish and what the Russians or the Soviets didn't want them to accomplish; it was the way we went about it on the U.S. side. The way we went about it persuaded the Soviet side that either we were not serious (because of the publicity that we gave the measure before we arrived; the speeches that the president made, and so on), or else we were not well-intentioned (because we seemed to be ready to abandon Vladivostok, and because the Soviets saw the proposals themselves as very one-sided—something that we did not spend much time talking about here). For both those reasons, the way in which we went about it, I think, persuaded the Soviet side that we were either not serious, or even worse, that we were not well-intentioned.

On the Soviet side, one of the things that's striking to me, in terms of the way one goes about doing something in the context of the March events, is the following. I'm persuaded by what Ambassador Dobrynin was saying on the first day: that the problem was a very large one; that the Soviet side was convinced that the Americans meant to unilaterally redraw the agenda in U.S.-Soviet relations comprehensively—not just in terms of the way we were dealing with nuclear weapons, but also in terms of the role that human rights would play in it. We were not prepared, in effect, to work out the U.S.-Soviet agenda neutrally or cooperatively. The Americans were determined to impose an alternative agenda from the one that we had been working on in the late Nixon years, and then during the Ford administration. And they were determined to stop that—to rebuff the Americans. That may have been complicated by the personal stake that Brezhnev had in Vladivostok, and, as a result, his emotional reaction to what happened on that score; but there was a larger issue here. If Soviet leaders and diplomats had been able to convey that problem to the American side, somehow, I think there might have been a different process at that stage.

Now, here comes the Zubok thesis. It's almost inconceivable that Brezhnev, given the nature of the system—given the nature of the leadership; given the nature of times—would have talked to Nixon, or would have talked to Vance, in those terms. As was evident in the back-and-forth between the American and the Soviet sides at many points in this conversation,

national leaders decided that candor—openness with the other side—was not the best policy, for whatever set of reasons—either because we assumed that the other side knew what we were up to, and thus that it didn't need to be expressed; or because we assumed that it would be counterproductive to be candid in this fashion—that it might even reveal a kind of weakness. Even the language we use obscures things—the language of nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, strategic balances, issues of war, and so forth. Clearly, there ought to be greater transparency. But perhaps the best way to put it is that there was simply a lack of candor. We would have been better off if we had been able to express ourselves to one another in a more direct way. But here the cultural factor, I think, does get in a way. It would not have been easy for Brezhnev to know how to talk to Nixon in a way that would have been convincing to Nixon.

And this then leads to the last thing I would want to say, still in the context of the “Zubok thesis.” If there is a real fundamental stake that we have in this period, it is not so different from the stake we would have in any period: it is to understand the degree to which, and where, and how, human intervention can make a difference. It is to understand the various obstacles we face within bureaucratic political environments, with public opinion, and in domestic politics. This is true of democracies, authoritarian states, and states like Russia today, a society that's midstream—somewhere between its authoritarian past and its democratic aspirations. It is important to understand how individuals, national leaders, and policy makers can get some kind of marginal influence over these obstacles; because my own sense of where we are today, in the post-Cold War world, is that we are rapidly losing the capacity to have that kind of marginal influence. We are in poor shape today, not only in terms of U.S.-Russian relations—although it's growing increasingly apparent in that context—but in virtually every context. If we cannot learn those lessons in this period, where, in fact, it was easier to do than it is today, then we are in a lot of trouble going into the 21st Century.

That's what I want to say at the outset. Since that really builds on things that were being said at the conclusion of the meeting, I invite people to continue with their thoughts. Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** That was very good, Bob. It will take some reflection to respond adequately to your thoughts.

I have a few thoughts of my own. First, I would like to react a little bit to the things that we were saying before the coffee break—these are just scattered thoughts—and then I thought it would be useful to go on and talk about the last part of this period—that is, the crucial year of 1979—and what happened to the relationship during it.

There was some useful discussion back and forth here about the lack of a sense of proportion and balance that we exhibited in dealing with nuclear weapons. It occurred to me, particularly when Stan Turner was talking, that on both sides, when we were considering new systems, our thinking was rather narrowly constrained—partly by the nature of the military bureaucracy, perhaps—to thinking in the rather short term. We also thought in very narrow terms about the putative military advantages of particular new systems. But we didn't ask ourselves what would over the longer term—particularly how the other side would respond. Consider, for example, the movement towards MIRVs. That looked like a red-hot development, from our point of view. It promised to give us an enormous advantage. We had the technical capability of handling multiple warheads then, and the Soviets did not; but I don't think anyone at that time really projected the future consequences of deploying MIRVs. And, of course, the Soviet Union developed MIRVs, and applied them to their heavy missiles. That increased the vulnerability of our forces. And that pattern happened over and over again—for the most part, it seemed to me, for bureaucratic reasons, and because of the narrowness of our perspective. We thought only in the rather short term. There are many examples I could cite, but at any rate, I think this one makes the point.

Our understanding of the other side was clouded by the rather primitive view that tended to dominate. One of the consequences of the Cold War situation—the fears that it generated—was that it led to the demonization of the other side. This was a rather primitive view. And, I think, that contributed to the expectation that any improvement in our military capabilities would have the effect of cowering the other side—intimidating it. We felt that the stronger we could be, the more we would circumscribe the freedom of action of the other side. That was working in both directions. And to some extent, the discussions we had about the military situation—the relationship between the military on the one hand, and the diplomats and civilians on the other—indicated that narrowness of perspective. As several people have suggested, the newness of experience with nuclear weapons—the fact that it takes time to adjust one's

thinking to what a revolutionary development this was in the nature of warfare—compounded this.

I think this was as true, by the way, of the American side as the Soviet side, although earlier I spoke of the civilian contribution to the theoretical developments in deterrence, with respect to crisis stability and so on. In fact, on the U.S. side—although there were contributions to the theoretical side; what some people have called in a pejorative sense “nuclear theology”—in practice, in terms of the procurement of weapons systems, the only real civilian limitation was essentially budgetary. The main contributions really came from the military and the scientific military community. And the fact is that in the United States, although thinking was more advanced, I suppose, on the implications of nuclear weapons than it was in the Soviet Union, there really has not been, and is not now, an effective political constituency for arms control. It would have taken an exercise of extraordinary leadership, as Les Gelb said, to have tried in that climate to develop public support for the complex—and to some extent counterintuitive—measures that would have been required to get a SALT agreement through and implemented. And in that kind of apprehensive environment, the advantage goes to the aggressive thinker—to the more virile, to the more gung-ho. I mean, it’s much, much harder in that kind of a contested environment to make an argument for moderation, just as it is in any conflict situation, whether it be a trade union strike, or anything else. It’s much more difficult to make the case for moderation than it is for muscle, and for adventure. And that’s still true, I think. The aggressive view tends to have the advantage.

Finally, one other thought. Oftentimes we tend, in diplomatic history, to say, “Russia does this; the Soviet Union does this; and the United States does that.” We think in terms of “they.” The beginning of wisdom, obviously, from the discussions we have had here, is the recognition that “they” must be broken down. It is quite apparent that it would have been useful at that time to have more insight into the interplay within each country. We call it “domestic politics,” but it was more than that. There were structural, cultural differences, as Bob has said. But however you unpack it, it is important to understand “they” are not a unified personality, but a variety of players. We have to keep in mind the many different inter-reactions going on the other side, and how our actions affect that interplay. This is not a problem confined to U.S.-Soviet relations; there are many examples today, as I think about it, in our dealings with China,

or in our dealing with Islamic fundamentalism, where we operate outside of areas where we have an intimate familiarity with the culture, the politics, and history, and so we tend to black box them, and to think of our protagonist as a unified group, when it isn't. That's a mistake.

About the period that we started to talk about: my impression is that the question raised in the very beginning of the of the discussion paper that was circulated—"Why was it that relations turned out the way they did?"—has no simple answer. My impression is that, for the most part, the entire period we are talking about—1977 to 1980—was a period of steady decline in U.S.-Soviet relations—with the possible exception of the Vienna meeting in '79. But even that came too late to alter the outcome. As I said at the time, in early '79—I remember doing an interview in which I said this—"It was like sitting on hilltop and watching two locomotives approaching each other on the same track, and not being able to stop them." That was early '79: before Vienna; before the Cuban brigade; and before Afghanistan. It seemed to me that, already by that time, relations were very bad.

Cy Vance and I don't have the same opinion on that. He felt that it would have been possible to get SALT ratified in the summer of '79. I felt that the game was lost by that time. By that time, there had been such an intensification of the suspicion, mistrust, and anger on both sides, that the ascendant view on both sides was the most negative view of the motives and intentions of the other. And, as I said yesterday, in the United States, we had not resolved the differences in approach we had to the Soviet Union. We did not resolve the differences between our understandings of the Soviet Union, and what we wanted to do about it. But in that period, I think, the ascendant view was the negative one. I think that was also true on the Soviet side.

We have not talked here about the Cuban brigade issue; perhaps everything has been said that needs to be said about that melancholy episode. About Afghanistan: the president said in a press conference around the time of Afghanistan that he had learned more about the Soviet Union in the previous few days than he had learned before. I think that was a bit of rhetorical license; it seems to me that his view—and the dominant view in the United States before that occasion—was already a fairly dark view. But it is clear that that was the capstone on the period. From that time on, it was no longer possible to salvage things. It might have been possible to salvage things before, with strenuous effort; but it seemed to me Afghanistan really

fed into what became the ascendant Reagan view in American politics—the “evil empire” view that dominated the first term of the Reagan period.

I would mention, however—just to anticipate future discussions a little bit—that there is an instructive lesson to be learned from the second Reagan period. This is not the time to go into it at any length, but it seems significant that something happened in that second Reagan term that profoundly changed the situation. We may not understand altogether why; but it has a bearing on the things we are saying to each other now. We reached a point at which it was clear that we had a strong self-interest, for domestic political and economic reasons, to go back to the SALT negotiations in a more serious way—to reenter into negotiations, and to have a regular dialogue between the leaders in a way that we hadn’t been able to do before. Why it was possible then is still an interesting question. And that it should have come from the conservative side was very interesting—as it had, in a sense, in the Nixon period earlier. I would simply suggest that we put that on our agenda for further reflection.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Marshall. I know that Phil wants to comment on this specifically. Phil Brenner?

**BRENNER:** Thanks, Bob. Just a very brief note, because I think what Marshall said is quite instructive. It suggests that in our next meetings, it would be very useful to have Cubans at the table, rather than think about the Cubans as a corporate entity: “they” also had divisions. I know that Anatoly doesn’t want to hear any more about the Horn, but it will play a role in what we going to talk about in the future, and I think it would be quite useful to hear from the Cubans what they have to say.

**LEGVOLD:** My list now is David Welch, Bob Pastor, Geir Lundestad, and Odd Arne. David Welch, please.

**WELCH:** Marshall’s last comment leads naturally to my own. The theme of this conference has been “missed opportunities,” and the general underlying question is: what went wrong? From the discussions we have had, it would be easy to conclude that various failures, and the

deepening distrust between the United States and the Soviet Union during this period, were overdetermined. There were far more than sufficient reasons for these various failures—which makes it all the more remarkable that there was a SALT agreement at all. And it makes it easy to lose sight of the fact that an agreement on strategic arms limitation was not the only instance of U.S.-Soviet cooperation during this period. The Soviet Union was, frankly, very forthcoming in the handling of the Cuban brigade affair, which was in essence an American fiasco; it was nothing of the Soviet Union's doing. During this period of time, there was also slow but steady progress on confidence and security building, in the framework of the Helsinki accords.

For future meetings, I think it would be worthwhile paying a little attention to the figure-ground problem. We have been concentrating so overwhelmingly on the failures and their causes that we lose sight of the successes and their causes. We ought at some point to flip the question around and ask, how was it possible that there was a SALT agreement—that there was U.S.-Soviet cooperation at all in this period—given the various powerful forces arrayed against it?

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, David. Bob Pastor.

**PASTOR:** Yes. First, let me congratulate and salute our Chairman, not only for leading an excellent discussion, but for giving us as good a summary as I have ever heard at the conclusion of any conference—a summary that, I think, ought to lead all of us to think hard about some of the issues that were raised.

I'd like to pick up on one of the points Bob made—what I will call “the Legvold thesis.” [Laughter.] I think it really leads into the future discussion. Theorists of international relations who are realists would have said that the Carter-Brezhnev years were the most dangerous years conceivable in the Cold war period, precisely because it was a moment in which the Soviet Union was catching up with, and aspiring to go beyond, the United States. If you look through world history, it's just those moments that very often lead to what we call “miscalculations,” but are actually systemic collisions between the most powerful actors. Indeed, that was the context within which both countries were working. The United States was

acting as the world power which was looking over its shoulder and wondering whether the Soviet Union might actually pass it in weaponry. And, although we said we were interested in parity, as Brzezinski pointed out, we did an assessment in which we concluded that we were in balance on strategic weapons, but ahead on everything else. And the Soviet Union was at the same time interested in parity; but one element within the Soviet Union said, “This is the moment to press in the same way that the United States has pressed in the last 30 or 40 years. Just as the United States pressed its influence in every Third World vacuum, we are going to do the same thing; we are going to show the United States that we can do the same thing they do. We should push, in a sense, to be first.” And yet, there was also an element in the Soviet Union that was saying, “But we are inferior; we really cannot catch up.” And the way in which those psychologies played out in our different political systems was the context within which our decision-makers were working.

But at the time, the scope of decision seemed very large: A new group of American leaders came into office—young individuals, still reasonably young—thinking that they could create a new relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. They felt a wet rag thrown in their face in Moscow in March 1977. And that was the beginning of the period of distrust, in their minds. But that was a part of this collision. At the same time, the Soviet Union finally thought they had gotten the United States’ attention to negotiate on *their* agenda, and all of a sudden, a young group arrives with a different agenda.

From that perspective, a lot of the things seem very logical, and the “Gelb thesis” makes sense. We can explain the difficulties that occurred in these terms. But I prefer the “Legvold thesis:” that marginal decisions of an alternative nature could have created a cumulatively different impact overall. In short, what we want to focus on is the scope for marginal differences that could have led us in a different direction—precisely because, as Bob points out at the end, there is an old saying in the United States that the time to fix one’s roof is when it’s not raining. The changes that have occurred right now in the international system actually provide the opportunity for us to think hard about the past, so as to prevent repetition in the future.

There are several things that I wanted to mention, both of a specific nature and of a more general nature. Specifically, responding to the question about the ratification of SALT, I

brought a document which we didn't have a chance to talk about, but which I will allude to right now, and which Jim Blight will circulate. It deals specifically with the question of whether SALT could be ratified in the United States after the Soviet brigade issue. It's a confidential document from President Carter's top Congressional affairs advisers in the White House, who had done a complete survey of the Senate in October. On October 24, 1979, they wrote a long, 50-page memorandum to Carter, the bottom line of which was: SALT is still winnable in the Senate. This was October 24, 1979. They said, "The negative atmosphere created by Soviet troops in Cuba is rapidly diminishing." And they went on to state the other factors at work that could lead, in their judgment, to a win on SALT as late as October 24, 1979. The president's principal Congressional advisers laid out a credible strategy for how to do that. That, of course, became impossible after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. And the critical question is whether the Soviet Union made a major miscalculation in not thinking through the trade-off between the invasion and SALT? Or was Afghanistan simply more important than SALT?

The second hard question was asked by Vlad Zubok, and it forced me to think very hard. That is the question of the alternate strategies, exemplified by Vance and Brzezinski, for how to win SALT ratification. One strategy was to placate the right wing opposition by additional arms expenditures—MX, and so on. The other strategy was, in effect, to play that down, and to play up cooperation with the Soviet Union. Those two strategies competed in their minds; but the most interesting thing was the way in which it played out in Carter's head. Carter, in an interview with one of our colleagues, said very explicitly, "Brzezinski was much more concerned, you know, about the Communist threat than I was. And I was probably more concerned about the Communist threat than was Cy Vance." I think Carter was in the middle, politically and empirically. And I think that's where the country was. He was trying to sort out both alternative strategies, and also to think through what was in the national interest. The way we work out the national interest in the U.S. system is to integrate and accommodate the various concerns in a manner that approximates balancing. Carter understood that you couldn't ignore the arguments of Brzezinski about Soviet advances in the world and in the strategic balance. But neither could you abandon cooperation entirely. And I think the result was a balance between the two views which was unsatisfying: because at the end of the

game, even if you had had SALT II, you still had the MX, and you still had increasing defense expenditures. It makes sense to ask in this context, how much have you really controlled the arms race? But that's the way the political system shapes the options.

There are three simple conclusions that I would draw from this. The first is that we need to think harder about how individual issues relate to the overall relationship on both sides. The United States did not adequately take into account how individual concerns—whether on human rights, the Middle East, China, or the MX—affected the overall relationship from the Soviet perspective. And the Soviets, evidently, did not take into account how their positions on the Horn, human rights, or Afghanistan would affect the overall relationship from the U.S. standpoint. We need to think about techniques, devices, mechanisms to ensure that these individual issues are taken into account on both sides.

Secondly, it's important, from the theoretical or academic standpoint, to understand the relationship between individual decisions and systemic constraints. That's the Legvold thesis: that there is, in fact, room for maneuver, but on the margins. Let us not pretend that we have great room for maneuver—either historically, or in the future. You have to understand the constraints.

Finally, it's important to find compensating mechanisms when tension increases in a very competitive relationship, to ensure that the arenas for compromise do not get squeezed too much—to ensure that there are opportunities for dialogue, such as we have encountered here, at moments of maximum tension.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Bob, that's very helpful. The list has four names on it, but before I turn to Geir, who is first on that list, let me say one other thing prompted by what several have said around the table, but most particularly by what Bob Pastor has just said. I want to share with you some of the thinking of Mark Garrison, Jim Blight, and myself about the next meeting. We think we have to do some things differently if we're going to be able to accomplish what Bob has just urged us to do, and answer some of the questions that the rest of you have posed. So, at this stage, what we would intend to do at the next meeting—perhaps not exclusively at the next meeting; that is, we won't take up the whole meeting with this, but some substantial part of it—is to pick a series of what might be called “cases” to examine

closely. The cases will be determined primarily in terms of critical periods of time in the relationship that contain a number of events, rather than in terms of a single event—such as the Horn that we keep getting hung up on, as Anatoly points out. It might be a period like May through June of 1978, where a lot of things were happening. And we will look at those periods intensively by trying to add as much as we can to the documentation that we have now—because we can't really do this unless we have a great deal more documentation on decision making on both sides, both Soviet and American. We will share that documentation, and a set of questions, in advance of the next meeting, so that you will have given some thought to it when we meet. And then we will look intensively at what took place with an eye to answering the kinds of questions that we are now posing. Otherwise, if we continue doing what we're doing at this meeting—which has been very useful in opening things up—we will be skimming along the surface of these events, and we won't really have probed them. You will notice that on several matters—whether on Anatoly's questions about Vienna, or some of the things we talked about in the Horn—there is simply a great deal of detail that we don't have in our mind right now. We need to push to a deeper level. We will consult with our Russian colleagues about what that list of cases should be, of course—what periods of time we want to look at. And then we will work very hard to try to provide the kind of documentation that will allow us to do it. I think that's really the only way we'll be able to accomplish some of what Bob has challenged us to do. It's certainly the only way that we could do anything about my basic point that marginal decisions make a difference, because we don't know how those decisions could have been marginally different without more nuanced understandings of the decisions that were actually made.

Geir, you are next.

**LUNDESTAD:** I would like to address the Gelb thesis, and say something about some of the conclusions I have drawn from this. I would say that I agree wholeheartedly with the Gelb thesis. I mean, for a historian, I think it's almost self-evident. There's nothing sensational about it. But I think it's much too early to come to that conclusion, and we should really shy away from that conclusion. I mean, history is written and rewritten over time, and the first cut will often focus on the personalities. We have actually dealt less with personalities here than I

would have liked to; maybe we will be able to get into the personality factors more at the later conferences than we have done so far.

The next wave will often consist of questions like missed opportunities. At this conference, we focussed on March '77 as a big missed opportunity. I'm not sure it was such a missed opportunity. I mean: the cuts that were suggested weren't that deep. This did not really derail the negotiations. They were brought on track fairly quickly. There was an agreement—a SALT agreement—after two and a half years of negotiations. So, I'm not sure that these few months, or marginally deeper cuts, would have made any really significant difference, when, as so many of the participants pointed out, there was this underlying current of conservatism. And I think we see this very clearly when we compare this period to what followed later. It's very obvious that politics drove the arms race, and not the other way around, because the underlying political structure, and the political currents you had in the two main countries, determined the shape of the arms competition. It's very difficult to imagine an entirely different scenario.

We talked a lot about perceptions and misperceptions. Yes, of course, there were misperceptions. But again, as Les Gelb said, there were very good reasons for those misperceptions. But what would have been the consequences if we had cleared up some of these misperceptions? Let me just take one example. I think a major misperception in the West concerned Soviet strength and Soviet planning. It is obvious with hindsight that we overestimated the strength of the Soviet Union. There was no arc of crisis; there was no basic plan to advance to the Persian Gulf, or whatever. We clearly see that the Soviet Union felt vulnerable, and in many respects was very weak. But what is the political conclusion of this? I think the political conclusion will be almost the exact opposite of what many here would expect: the conclusion would have been that we should have cooperated *less* with the Soviet Union, not more. Since the system was so weak, why didn't we push harder? This is one reason why Jimmy Carter's human rights policy is beginning to look a little better. You also see this clearly in the discussion in Europe, particularly in Germany, about *Ostpolitik*. *Ostpolitik* was celebrated as a marvelous policy at the time; but now, of course, it is being criticized because it extended the life of the Soviet system. So, I think the political thinking was not really as hard-headed as it could have been; therefore, I think we should expect that clearing

up misperceptions might have consequence somewhat different from what we might expect.

Historians, of course, will tell you that any conflict is inevitable. But they will do this after the fact. We are terrible at making predictions. One major criticism of historians, and of the way historians write about conflicts, is that they are not sufficiently open or sensitive to alternative paths. That's why I am saying that, while I think Les Gelb is right, we shouldn't come to this conclusion yet. We should be sensitive to these alternative paths. We should be sensitive to the margins of leadership, for many reasons—one reason, of course, being that we shouldn't expect the participants who were so closely involved in this period to come up with the kind of detached historical view that historians only start to get after ten, fifteen, or twenty years' time.

I'm pretty sure that we will conclude that there could have been many small differences; but I don't think this will add up to an enormous difference—to the judgment, for example, that the Cold War could have been transcended. But let's see. That's a very important reason, of course, that we should move with considerable optimism to the next two conferences. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Geir. Arne, then Dan Caldwell, then Jim Blight.

**WESTAD:** It was good to hear that the organizers—Bob, and Jim, and the others—have gone into the issue of follow-up conference. I think the way you outlined it, Bob, is very good; it's a very good way of pursuing what we are really after here.

Before this conference started, Jim Blight and I—and others—were trying to decide what we should focus on to figure out what it was that really derailed the process. In those discussions—which went on in numerous faxes and phone calls back and forth across the Atlantic—I was a proponent of the idea that it was primarily the overall relationship, not the SALT process itself, which was the problem. That is to say, I thought that issues almost wholly extrinsic to the SALT process were what brought SALT down in the end and derailed the bilateral relationship that we came to know as *détente*. I think there were some indications during this conference that there is something to that view; but that troubles me much more than I thought it would before the conference started, because it raises a whole lot of issues of

how that worked. How can we get at those issues? How we should try to couple them up with the bilateral relationship in order to make sense of what went on during this period within the decision making bodies on the two sides?

Clearly, what we need to do is focus on some of the issues mentioned in this conference. There are many things that we still have a lot to learn about, and that we have not had a chance to discuss in detail during the two days that we have spent together. Some of those issues, I think, are exactly the issues that made it so difficult for the two sides—for the veterans from the two sides here—to understand each other on those specific points. There were very different views of the human rights issue, for example. I think this is one of the things that we'll have to pursue further. I have heard from several of the Russian participants—and I understand them to some degree—that it's very difficult to grasp what the political strategy was behind human rights issues on the American side. I consider it truly an important thing to take up; there are different perspectives on that. It's something that is still difficult for the Russian participants to grapple with. China, of course, was likewise an important issue. What were the motivations on the American side in terms of China policy? And Eastern Europe, which we heard very little about; there were indications, at least in the documentation that's now becoming available, that the Carter administration was preparing a much more offensive strategy than we thought possible.

Turning to the other side, I think the problem is at least as great. And here, of course, we are dealing with some of the issues that Ambassador Dobrynin, among others, thought we ought not to concentrate on a lot. I must say, with all due respect for the enormous wisdom and insight in international relations that the ambassador has, I do not agree with him. I do think that issues like the Soviet intervention in the Horn of Africa are terribly important—Angola perhaps even more so, because it influenced the views of the incoming administration on Soviet objectives in the Third World. And then, finally, of course, there is Afghanistan. I think these played an enormous role. And I do think that it's very important for the Russian veterans participating in this process to address the issue of American perceptions of Soviet actions within these areas.

Lastly, in terms of decision making—because it's the whole issue of decision making, and decision making processes, that has occupied us at this conference—we need to try to dive

into detail on both sides. Vlad brought up the role of mutual perceptions and ideology—the way the two sides viewed each other, and viewed their missions on the global scene. This also relates to the role of personalities that Geir pointed to. I do think that we need to spend more time on that, at both of the two coming conferences. We need to spend more time looking into the processes of decision making, and at the personalities that advocated different viewpoints in the two administrations—and we need to try to talk about specifics. Here, of course, we will be enormously helped by the documents, once we get them on the table. I do think, as I said, that the strategy that Bob, and Jim, and others have drawn up in trying to focus on specific issues will help us a great deal with that.

**LEGVOLD:** Dan Caldwell.

**CALDWELL:** It has been said that Washington D.C. is a city that combines southern efficiency with northern grace and charm. [Laughter.] I have found that this conference has, in fact, reversed that; it has combined southern grace and charm—the hospitality of the Bagleys' Musgrove plantation and the Arca Foundation—with the northern efficiency of the Center for Foreign Policy Development, and our organizers of the conference. I want to add my voice to the rising chorus thanking our hosts, as well as the sponsors of the conference, for a most informative and provocative meeting.

But I'd like to raise one question, and then pose a counterfactual. The question is the “so what?” question. Does it matter that SALT II was not ratified? It's something of a heretical question, particularly at this point; but I think nevertheless it's a question that should be raised, because the two sides did continue to observe SALT II until the United States surpassed the limits—I think in November of 1986. That's a question that we should deal with at some point: so, what? Did it make a difference?

The counterfactual is this—and it gets partially at some of Bob's comments, as well as Les Gelb's comment. What if, rather than the situation that we have discussed, President Carter and Michael Gorbachev had been the leaders of their respective countries at the same time? I think that we would have had a very, very different result. And indeed, I think we would have a very different world than we have—or had until recently. I think that does lend at least some

credence to Les Gelb's observation concerning—perhaps not the necessity, but the desirability of having leaders with vision and courage to step out in new directions.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Dan. Thanks very much. Jim Blight?

BLIGHT: I just like to say a word here at the end about another thesis—I don't know quite what to call it. I'll start calling it the "anti-Gelb thesis." Since all the subsequent theses are in some sense anti-Gelb theses, I don't know what to call this; but it derives from a sense that I get, as a person whose background is in psychology, that the only sensible approach to the study of history—or, in fact, to human affairs generally—is to assume that human choices can make a difference. This doesn't mean that we have to be foolish optimists; it doesn't mean that we have to believe that all things are possible. But I think we have to believe that some things are possible, which have not occurred. And what I particularly like about the way Bob has formulated this problem is that it outlines a way that we can begin to connect what was possible—or what may have been possible—to what in the present moment we may be able to make, on the basis of that knowledge, slightly more probable, or slightly less probable. This seems to me to be both a modest contribution, in the sense that it doesn't make extravagant claims for what such process can do, and a step toward addressing not only Dan's very large "so what?" question, but any kind of question that might be put to any of us who were connected with this process about the utility of revisiting history: "Why are you doing this? History has already occurred."

And, of course, there is a tendency, when you look back at history, to assume that, because it happened that way, it *must* have had to happen that way—forgetting, as scholars often do, that the people who participated in these events, with responsibility on their shoulders, had choices to make. If you are able to really revisit historical events with some degree of psychological reality, you can see that at given moments things were not clear; outcomes were uncertain. Things rarely turned out as people hoped or expected; but that is a far cry from saying that events were wholly determined. Where we would like to try to intervene here, I think, is in that little space between what people aspired to, and what they had to settle for.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Jim. The last two speakers are Vlad Zubok and Sergei Tarasenko. Vlad?

ZUBOK: The name of the conference is, “The SALT II Process and the Growth of Mistrust.” I put the emphasis on the last word—mistrust. That’s what I spoke about yesterday and would like to emphasize today. That’s why I consider this conference to be relevant to current U.S.-Russian relations, and to the current international situation.

Mistrust continues to emerge where we don’t expect it to emerge. It needs exploration. I certainly agree that we should look at the existing literature, and I would like to mention the first book of a young political scientist from Princeton: Albert Wolfers [?], who meticulously followed the attempts of the Soviet leaders to achieve legitimacy, and who claims that the continuous denial of that legitimacy by the United States led to constant tensions, crises, misunderstandings, and misperceptions. Of course, we know that the Soviet Union had a dual search for a dual legitimacy—as the revolutionary leader of the Socialist world, but also as a traditional great power. That was the source of certain tensions. But now Russia considers itself to be a part of the “civilized” world; yet Russian leaders continue to feel that they are denied certain things—they are denied a certain amount of legitimacy. And this feeds the growth of mistrust, and the growth of tension.

So, we have to look at the existing theoretical literature—which leads me to another observation: that this is a unique format, where historians—including relatively young historians (I consider myself a very very relatively young historian) [Laughter]—can sit with venerable and knowledgeable veterans. We have to think about how to prevent the growth of mistrust between these two groups, too—we have to think about how to ensure maximum efficiency while working here together. At this conference, of course, it was necessary to give the first word to veterans. It is essential to hear them speaking about the issues. But if we just sit and listen, instead of trying to structure the discussion—instead of trying to bring in theoretical questions—we cannot make a contribution. Alexander George has well documented the deep gap between scholarly interests and policy makers’ interests; this gap exists. But if we find common ground and ask questions, we have reason to expect that these questions will be

answered. That would help us prevent the discussion from just sailing on the surface of people's recollections. Sometimes I felt at this conference that the scholars were not active enough in structuring the discussion. This is why I would like to propose that a workshop, or a part of a larger conference, should be devoted to scholars speaking about the existing concerns, existing frameworks, and existing problems. The policy makers could listen and to prepare answers to the scholars' questions. Because both sides don't realize, at times, what is on each other's mind. Maybe we should plan a whole session for the next conference devoted to scholars, with policy makers sitting, listening, and thinking about the answers. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Vlad, for a revolutionary suggestion. [Laughter.] Sergei?

TARASENKO: On behalf of the limited Soviet contingent which invaded this beautiful land [laughter], I would like, on behalf of our colleagues, to express our sincere and deep gratitude to the organizers of the conference, for the wonderful agenda, for the wonderful preparation of this conference; to the owners of this place, for the unique, marvelous atmosphere of friendliness and hospitality which you have created for us during these three days; and to all the institutions and all individuals who made this conference possible. I think that history, whatever our attitude toward it, should record that there was such a conference, and I think it will be important not only for scholars, but also for politicians, and for people of all countries. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Sergei. I said that you were the last two, but I notice that Viktor would like to speak. So, I give the floor to him as well.

STARODUBOV: I am not going to compete in eloquence with such a master of words as Tarasenko; I just wanted to thank all the organizers of this conference: those who are at the table; those who sponsored it; and our hosts and hostesses for all the attention that you devoted to all the members of our delegation.

But I would also like to say something on the substance of the conference that I did not

have time to say before. Of course there is no limit to digging in the quest for the truth of certain events. We can discuss every question indefinitely. I think that one of the little shortcomings of this conference was that the bulk of the discussion was devoted to the actions of the Soviet Union outside of its territory, on the international plane. It is naturally right that we had to discuss Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. All this is right—especially Afghanistan; we denounce those actions of our government ourselves. But still, I think that in order to create a fuller picture of the world, maybe the American side itself ought to pause and discuss their own actions even though they thought those actions were insignificant. Those actions should have been on the table and under discussion by all the participants. Did we have something to say about American actions in Somalia? Admiral Turner said that they were very interested in the base in Berbera. I think that was not a neutral position that the United States had toward Somalia. Nobody mentioned Grenada, Libya. All of those were actions that were perceived in the Soviet Union in a certain way, and they were not perceived neutrally. We did not say, “The United States bombed Libya; so what? They killed several Libyans; so what?” It was not like that. Those things created an emotional atmosphere. They negatively affected our relationship. Therefore, admitting our actions, we would like to hear at least mention of the actions of our partners.

But this is not to detract from our discussion here. I would like to reiterate what Tarasenko has said. We are very satisfied. I personally gained a lot from this conference. Maybe not everything was new, but I heard many things for the first time. And some information I had was confirmed here. Several events assumed new colors for me. This all creates additional capacity for understanding.

We were very pleased with the way Bob Legvold conducted the conference, and we want to thank him. The conference was perfectly organized; I see that my comrades agree with me. We were very pleased that among the participants were the “elders,” such as C. Vance, Z. Brzezinski, Admiral Turner, Marshall Shulman. They were telling us about things they participated in directly.

We regret that G. M. Kornienko was not with us—and V. G. Komplektov also. They would have added some color to many questions. I think that in the future they will be able to join us; their absence is not a result of their desire, but a product of circumstances. I know that

Georgy Markovich deeply regretted that he could not participate here, and that he could not meet again his old partners in the events of this period.

Once again I would like to thank the participants, the hosts, the organizers, and to wish everyone a good trip, good health, and successes in their work. Thank you.

LEGVOLD: Thank you, Viktor.

Before I turn the chair over to Mark Garrison for some words about Tom Watson, I want to do two brief things. First, I want to extend my thank-you, as everyone else has, to Smith and Elizabeth. This was a magnificent place to hold this conference. It really has contributed, as so many people have said so often these days, to what's happened here. And we are grateful to you and to the Arca Foundation—to Janet and her staff, and to the board members who came along. I go to many meetings, and they all have foundation support—but rarely are those meetings attended by more than foundation officers; here, board members are also in attendance. I want to thank all the people in this facility who made things so gracious and comfortable; I also want to thank Jim and Janet; and Mark Garrison. You people at the table can only know in part the amount of effort and commitment that they put into this enterprise. Again, as I said, I am involved with a variety of activities at any given point, and I keep folders of what's coming up. I must tell you that by far the thickest folder in my drawer is the one labelled "Jim Blight." [Laughter.] Some of you know what Janet [Lang] has been doing, together with Betty [Garrison], in order to make all of this work for us here; so I am extremely grateful to them. And also to Malcolm, and to Tom, and to others like Arne and Vlad who have been working on the documentation. Not only do I thank you; I want you to know that you'll have additional allies from here on in trying to get more documentation. I will do what I can to mobilize key people around this table, and in other settings, in order to get the kind of documentation that we need for subsequent meetings.

Most particularly, I want to thank those who are still at the table—and those who have been at the table—because you are the enterprise. You have made this a very good first step. We have got a lot of work to do; but I have enormous confidence in what you will accomplish in the next couple of meetings.

The second thing I want to say, on the way to Mark Garrison and his tribute to Tom

Watson, is simply that when Stan Turner was speaking—I don't know if others around the table felt the same way—I felt that a tribute to Tom Watson had already begun. In many ways, the way you spoke, Stan, was the way in which Tom would have spoken. And, although your voice is different, the presentation is very similar. He did not know as much as you know about these issues; but he understood them with the same wisdom which you have come to have about them. So, it really was the beginning of the tribute. Thanks very much.

Mark, your turn.

**GARRISON:** Well, I think we have a couple of people who have something to say. I know that Sergei has some words from Georgy Kornienko; Marshall, I believe you wanted to share some thoughts with us?

**SHULMAN:** Tom Watson is very much of a vivid presence to me still, and I can visualize him, as I'm sure those of you who knew him can. He would squint up his eyes, and put on a wry smile, and he'd say to me, "Well, professor—" and he had a way of saying "professor" that made it other than a compliment. It sounded like somebody who played piano in a bawdy house. [Laughter.]

But I would get back at him through his fingernails. Tom had a habit sometimes—because his memory was tricky—of writing notes to himself in a felt pen on his fingernails, just to remind him of the key things he might forget. And one time he got into real trouble with that. This was in Vienna, actually, when he had been designated ambassador, but not yet confirmed. He had agreed to do an interview with a couple of newspapermen, and in the course of it he made a reference to the notes to himself on his fingernails. And they made fun of it—in fact, the whole interview tended to disparage him as a doddering old man who couldn't even remember the name of Brezhnev.

In recent years, Tom and I—when we were both beyond the age of combat—used to enjoy many things together. We loved flying, and would fly a lot together. He taught me to fly his helicopter. We loved gliding; we loved riding motorcycles together; we loved sailing together. And I realized, as time passed, how much Tom needed to set himself challenges. When he had his first heart attack, he lay there in bed, and he determined to do two things: one was to

climb Mont Blanc—or, rather, the Matterhorn. Tom had a pair of heavy boots by his bedside, and every day he would tramp up and down the corridor of the hospital in those heavy boots to strengthen his legs, to strengthen his heart, preparing himself to climb the Matterhorn—which he subsequently did. After one first failed attempt, he then did it. The other thing he did was to begin to assemble plans for his new boat—the first of the Palomar series, equipped in such a way that he could sail it with minimum crew. He had all kinds of automatic rigging on the boat. He had plans to cross the South Atlantic alone. He set himself these challenges. And when he had his second heart episode, he had an operation on his aorta. Not long after that, we were up on his island together, when he decided after lunch that he wanted to see what his heart could stand in the way of Gs—you know, how much pressure it could take. So, he had a pit trainer—a little biplane outfitted for aerobatics that could fly in inverted flight, and so on. Tom took it up, and with Olive [Watson], and my wife, and I standing there with our hearts in our mouths, he did a number of loops, just to see whether his heart would stand the pressure of these maneuvers. Then he came down, landed, and he was satisfied that he could do it. [Laughter.]

I only began to understand later, after I read his book about the life of his father, how much he was constantly testing himself, challenging himself, and proving himself to his father. Long years afterwards—it was in the war really—Tom gained his confidence in relation to his father. It was as a pilot; he flew in the bomber ferry command, flying planes into Russia. He delivered them over the Siberian route. Later he retraced that route. But Russia became very important in his mind, and later, when he was appointed to the embassy in Moscow, it was sad that it came during a very tough period. He and Olive would have been prepared to extend human communications in Moscow—the kind of communications we have had across this table. If only Tom and Olive had had that embassy in later years, when relations were more human, it would have been a tremendous success.

I once asked him, while we were sailing, what was it that made him so successful as a businessman; because it was hard for me to reconcile the fellow I knew with the man who was one of the great businessmen of our times. And he said, “The quality I have, I suppose, that was most important, was that I picked good people and I let them do what they wanted.” That was evidenced, among other things, by the fact that when he went to Moscow as ambassador,

he picked Mark Garrison as his principal adjutant. It was an illustration of his capacity for recognizing quality—and depending upon people of quality.

As Bob already said, and as illustrated by what Stan Turner said, the ultimate challenge for him in his service on the General Advisory Committee on Disarmament—and throughout his years—was to communicate to others a sense of proportion about the awesomeness of nuclear weapons and what they could do. His fear was that, in playing the kind of games that we had been playing with each other, we would lose sight of the massive fact of our time: that we had the capacity for destroying life on the planet. And that seemed to him the big thing, the thing that mattered most—the thing we should get on with. And you will know, those of you who have seen the record of the prior meeting in Pocantico, with what emotion Tom spoke to the group at the time. He was invited to speak; he spoke with deference. He said, “You know, I am not at home among all you scholars,” and so on, in this sort of mock self-deprecating humor he had. But he got to the point directly, and it was the urgent point—the only point that really mattered: and that was, that we were not bringing reasonable common sense to the control of nuclear weapons as the most important single fact of our time.

That stays in my mind; it has been in my mind many times in the course of our discussions today. His presence has been with me throughout. Indeed, his spirit has been reflected in the discussions we had here today.

**TARASENKO:** I’ll just read the piece written by Kornienko. He gave it to me the day before I departed for this conference:

With the passing of Thomas Watson, the world lost not simply the most successful capitalist in history, as *Fortune* magazine ones called him. Tom succeeded not only in making money, but above all, in using it rationally for the good of the American people, and indeed, for all mankind. The Institute of International Studies at Brown University, created through his donations and named after him, is one proof of this.

To me, Tom was a man of many talents, broad world view, and great personal courage, which he displayed both during World War Two and the Cold War years, consistently exerting efforts aimed at ending the Cold War, and preventing a nuclear one. He was not afraid of accusations of being soft on Communism, pointedly calling such accusations “a thermonuclear McCarthyism.” I am convinced that Tom Watson played a much greater positive role in the relations between our countries that even he himself realized. Certainly, it is not hard to understand his disappointment when for reasons totally beyond his control, his stay as the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow was short and not as successful as he had hoped. But I do believe that if it had not been the wise Thomas Watson in this position at this moment, but instead a

career diplomat with professional advantages but intrinsic disadvantages, Soviet-American relations would have suffered to a much greater degree. The credit for warding off the worst goes to Tom.

I will treasure his memory for the end of my days.

Georgy M. Kornienko

May 2, 1994

And I am honored and privileged to have known Ambassador Watson. I worked in Moscow and saw him in his official capacity as Ambassador, and I was privileged to see him here in the States, and to be a guest on his boat. He was a wonderful man. Words fail me to describe the kind of man he was. Thank you.

**GARRISON:** Thank you, Sergei. I would like to just mention a few coincidences revolving around Tom which made it possible for there to be a Center for Foreign Policy Development, as a base Jim Blight used to conceive of this conference and organize it.

In the first place, I have to correct Marshall a little bit. I was in Moscow when Tom arrived, and the reason I was there was that I had been assigned there a year or so earlier, as DCM to Mac Toon—although I really didn't want to go, because I didn't think Mac Toon needed a DCM. Certainly he didn't need me. But Marshall and others in the State Department put their arm on me and sent me out to Moscow. So, Betty and I were there—to our everlasting gratitude—when Tom and Olive Watson arrived; otherwise we wouldn't have had a chance to know and become friends with this remarkable man and his wonderful wife. So that is one coincidence.

Actually, Tom's appointment as Ambassador to Moscow by President Carter in a sense grew out of that wartime experience that Marshall mentioned, because Tom spent about six months or so in Moscow in the middle of the war—around 1943—helping his boss organize a route for bringing aircraft into the Soviet Union through Alaska. That was the only way to get them there, because of the danger to shipping. That was the only way to get small fighters and light bombers in. If it hadn't been for that experience, he certainly would not have gone to Moscow as ambassador because he didn't want to be an ambassador. But he had this great interest in, and affection for, the Soviet people, which he had acquired during the war.

The third coincidence was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which, as it turned out, gave Tom and me a lot of spare time on our hands, as we sat in Moscow with nothing to do. And out of our conversations at that time developed the idea of setting up at his alma mater—Brown University—a little group of people to look at some of these issues that so concerned him, and also me.

Let me just mention that the last time that Betty and I saw Tom was in the hospital, a week before he died. He was feeling terrible physically; but the whole time I was there he was prying me with questions about what was going on in Moscow, and what was going on with nuclear weapons. He didn't want to talk about anything else. So, I agree with what Bob Legvold said: he would have been very pleased to hear Stan Turner's comments, and he would have been, of course, fascinated by the whole discussion—and, I think, well-satisfied by it—if he could have been here.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Mark. And on that note, I call the meeting to a close. [Applause.]